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
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CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION.

BY

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REVISED AND ENLARGED
WITH TWO MAPS

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

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INTRODUCTION

THE first edition of *China in Transformation* appeared in 1898, at a time when signs of renascence were obvious only to those who had the opportunity to look below the surface. The author's first intention in bringing out the present edition was merely to preserve those parts which appear to have a permanent value, but in practice it was found difficult to adhere to this, and the result is a book, of which many chapters are strictly new, while all have been carefully revised and brought up to date.

If it appears that rather undue proportion is given to the history of the middle of last century, and especially to the diplomatic and commercial relations of that period, it must be explained that the material for this was obtained by the author in 1897 from original sources no longer available either to the student or the general reader. For this reason, this portion has only been slightly curtailed, in order to fit into the general perspective.

As the original edition, though fourteen years old, has never ceased to circulate, notwithstanding the great number of books on China which succeeded it, it is hoped that the present work, which is really a new *China in Transformation*, will meet the need for a simple, yet not ephemeral, description and estimate

of a country and people destined, before long, to be counted among the great world-powers. It may interest readers to know that this work has exercised some little influence on the Chinese reform movement. Dr. Sun Yat Sen, at present leader of the Republican party in China, informed the writer that he was seldom without a copy, having, in his wanderings, purchased as many as fifteen for himself and his friends.

The author has to acknowledge his indebtedness to several old China friends for help in revising the proofs, to Mr. H. B. Morse's *Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire*—a valuable study—and to the China Year Book, 1912, which is a mine of information on a variety of subjects.

CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION

CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION

I

THE CHINESE PEOPLE

THE manners and customs of the Chinese, and their social characteristics, have employed many pens and many tongues, and will continue to furnish an inexhaustible field for students of sociology, of religion, of philosophy, of civilization, for centuries to come. Such studies, however, scarcely touch the province of the practical, at least as yet, for one principal reason—that the subject is so vast, the data are so infinite as to overwhelm the student rather than assist him to sound generalizations. Writers on this theme may be classified more easily than the subjects on which they write. Two groups at least are sufficiently distinct to admit of being labeled: the censorious and the picturesque. Both approach Chinese portraiture with a bias which distorts their pictures. The one set go up and down among this great people with a Diogenes lantern, and fail to find any good thing in them. They are weighed in the

balance against other nations, notably the Japanese, and are found wanting.[1] Their virtues are vices, their customs odious, their religions abomination, and all their practices brand them as a lost race. These catalogues of vileness recall a class of advertisements, now very common, which from a tale of unutterable woe lead up to a sovereign remedy.

The second class of writers seek, legitimately enough for their own purpose, to catch the excrescences of Chinese life, with a view to caricature, and through their exertions the European public is possessed of a series of impressions which, though true in themselves, are out of setting, and, for want of a natural background, constitute distorted pictures. A few philosophical observers like Sir John Davis and Taylor Meadows address serious readers, but are little known, though they are most authentic. The Abbé Huc touched with an artist's pen the dry bones and made them live. Dr. Williamson has left us many sound and practical observations. But the reading public of our day are chiefly indebted to the two American missionary writers Justus Doolittle and Arthur H. Smith for the most laudable attempts to cover the whole range of Chinese life, the one relating with great circumstantiality of detail the social customs of the Chinese, and the other their

[1] "The sickly praises lavished by passing travelers upon Japan and her fitful civilizations; the odious comparisons drawn by superficial observers to the disparagement of China, of her slowly-changing institutions, and of her massive national characteristics; these are gall and wormwood to all who know under whose tuition it was that Japan first learned to read, to write, and to think."—*Gems of Chinese Literature*, by Herbert A. Giles.

moral and mental characteristics.[1] That these two conscientious writers have done their best to repress natural prejudices cannot be doubted; and that one of them has succeeded, at least in his second edition, may be readily admitted, which is the more creditable since it is obvious that the very *raison d'être* of the Christian missionary would be gone if the Chinese were acknowledged to be a nation of exemplary livers; for they that are whole need not the physician. One may especially commend Mr. Smith as at once terse and fascinating, calm and cultured: his modest volumes[2] bear the impress of accurate original observation in every line. Readers whose tastes incline them to follow up this interesting subject will thus find abundant food for reflection in the recorded observations of a host of writers from the early Jesuits, whose works have borne the test of two or three centuries of subsequent experience, down to the shoal of ephemeral paragraphists and photographers of our own day. This is not the place either for abridged discussion or for summarizing conclusions on questions which do not fall within the scope of the present volume. Only one observation need be made which ought to be borne in mind, alike in judging of their traditional customs and of their potential efficiency in the life of to-day. The

[1] Though hundreds of books have appeared in the last fifteen years, some of them containing clever and picturesque studies of various phases of Chinese life, the writer has read nothing to alter this estimate of the best authorities on Chinese character. Of recent descriptive books he would place first Mr. Johnston's *Lion and Dragon in Northern China*, which contains valuable side-lights on characteristics.

[2] *Chinese Characteristics* and *Village Life in China.*

two great facts which differentiate the Chinese from every other people of whom we have any knowledge are their unprecedented mass and their unprecedented duration. Without discussing the causes of one or the other feature, the bare facts are there, staring us in the face, and they surely explain much that strikes the foreigner as paradoxical. There has never been any such accumulated experience in the world's history; never such accumulation of custom, of ceremonial, of superstition. The early contemporaries of China have all fallen to pieces, some of them many times, and the continuity of tradition has been broken. But if we, instead of gathering their social history painfully from potsherds, or paintings on tombs, or their religion from survivals of poetical mythology, found the Assyrians, Babylonians, ancient Egyptians, and ancient Greeks alive at the present day, should we not expect to find the same maze of folk-lore as in China, the same confused and contradictory superstitions, layer upon layer, survivals from the oldest mingling with the newest accretions? The product resulting from duration multiplied by numbers must be immense, and if to that we add a third factor—isolation—we have no right to be surprised either at the complex character of Chinese civilization or at its peculiarly conservative form. Indeed, whatever may have been the cause of the long life of the nation has probably also been the cause of its crystallization. And that is what gives so hazardous a character to all innovations forced on China from without.

Leaving aside, for the moment, all these speculative questions, it may be profitable and practicable

to consider in what relation the Chinese people stand to the outward and work-a-day world of our own time. What part are they capable of playing in the drama of mechanical progress, in which they are left no option but to join? To arrive at a just opinion on this subject it will be better to consider the Chinese from the point of view of their likeness to ourselves, rather than from that of their unlikeness, which is the picturesque view. No nation can be fairly judged by its books, for there will always be a gulf fixed between aspiration and achievement, between the maxims of the study and the manners of the forum. For practical purposes we must take the Chinaman of real life, of active life. We have known him intimately for over sixty years—a cycle of Cathay—and can speak of his doings, if not of his thinkings. His predominant quality, that which marks the Chinese as a race, whether at home or abroad, is, beyond doubt, his industry. He has almost a passion for labor: in search of it he compasses sea and land. He seems born to be the hewer of wood and drawer of water for humanity, but not as a slave. The Chinaman is a merchant and sells his labor for a price.

In those countries where the race is persecuted it is his industry which offends, because it competes with the desultory work of white men, who deem themselves entitled to dissipate half their time. Combined with the appetite for hard work, the Chinaman has two highly important qualities—docility and temperance. The latter enables him to profit by a double economy—that of time and that of money; the former enables him to "stoop

to conquer." There is, indeed, no end to this patience. He is content to exploit worked-out claims for an infinitesimal gain, and as ready to be kicked out whenever it pleases his superior white brother to come along and "jump" them. A valuable agent is the Chinaman, therefore, for sweeping up the "tailings" of human industry.

He demands no comfort, still less luxury; but, though he can do with rough and scanty fare, he never starves his body when he can afford nutritious, well-cooked food. For sentiment, as we understand the term, the Chinaman has no sympathy. His outward life is conducted on a "cash basis," so much so that when wages are very low he will sometimes strike a balance between work and food, calculating that, as a certain amount of exertion will necessitate so much food, the game may not always be worth the candle. He works outrageously long hours with very moderate inducement; the clink of the artisan's hammer and the whir of the spindle are heard in the streets at all hours of the night, and the dawn finds the laborer already at work. The faculty of endurance and of patience is well evinced to foreigners in such occupations as domestic service and nursing, in both of which capacities the Chinaman excels. However late the master or mistress may come home, the servants are in waiting, and are as ready for a call in the early morning as if they had had twelve hours' good sleep. As nurses Chinamen are quiet, light-handed, and indefatigable; no need, with them, to reckon day and night shifts; such snatches of sleep as can be picked up at odd moments satisfy them.

In addition to robust muscularity the Chinese physique is endowed with great refinement. Their hands and feet are well made, and the fingers are remarkable for suppleness and delicacy of touch. Their skill in the minutest kinds of handicraft, such as intricate carving in wood or ivory, miniature painting, and fine embroidery, are well known; and when European manufactures are introduced into China they will find no lack of the manual dexterity needed for the most delicate productions. Ample experience has shown the aptitude of Chinese artisans and mechanicians to fabricate in wood and metal, and to become experts in the use of labor-saving machinery. Not only in workshops and building-yards has the skill of their artificers been tested and approved, but in the responsible positions of engine-drivers on steamboats and locomotives, under proper training, the Chinese are found to answer all requirements.

The intellectual capacity of the Chinese may rank with the best in Western countries. Their own literary studies, in which memory plays the important part, prove the nation to be capable of prodigious achievements in that direction. It is stated in Macaulay's *Life* that had *Paradise Lost* been destroyed, he could have reproduced it from memory. But even such a power of memory as he possessed is small compared with that of many Chinese, who can repeat by heart all the thirteen classics; and it is as nothing to that of some Chinese who, in addition to being able to repeat the classics, can memorize a large part of the general literature of their country. A Chinese acquaintance of mine

was able, at the age of sixty-five, to reproduce *verbatim* letters received by him in his youth from some of his literary friends famous as stylists. When pitted against European students in school or college, the Chinese is in no respect inferior to his Western contemporaries, and, whether in mathematics and applied science or in metaphysics and speculative thought, he is capable of holding his own against all competitors.

In considering the future of the Chinese race, therefore, we have this enormous double fund of capacity to reckon with—capacity of muscle and capacity of brain; and we have only to imagine the quantitative value of such an aggregate of nervous force when brought into vital contact with the active spirit and the mechanical and mental appliances of the West, to picture to ourselves a future for China which will astonish and may appal the world.

But, while there are here the elements of an immense subordinate success—the success of muscular and intellectual force directed by a master—it does not follow, and there are many to be found who will deny that the Chinese can ever play the leading rôle. Experience, it must be admitted, so far as it goes, gives its verdict against this, though the verdict is by no means final; and it is to be noted that Dr. Pearson, in his learned and well-thought-out work on "National Character and Development," ignores altogether the assumed disability of the Chinese to cope with the creative genius of the world. In favor of Dr. Pearson's hypothesis of the latent power of the Chinese race their mere numbers are a telling fact, since, if the

percentage of original, initiating, and directing minds among them were but a tithe of that of the Caucasian races, it would constitute them a real energizing force in the future progress of the world; and, though the modern Chinese copy, and do not originate, may there not be in them, nevertheless, a latent talent which is waiting for favorable circumstances to cause it to blossom into action? That they possessed creative power in the past cannot be doubted. Before answering the question, however, we should have to solve a few preliminary ones, as, for instance, the true cause of Chinese stagnation and of the sameness of their life routine.

Here, however, it may be appropriate to indicate briefly some traits of character and effects of hereditary training which militate against their success in the pursuits which have built up the power of the modern Christian States. Only a few of the more obvious need be noted. One is universally acknowledged: it is the indifference to truth, as such. A lie is no disgrace; it is only disgraceful not to put a good "face" on things. Combine these two ideas, and the natural result is universal mistrust, which places co-operation, without which even a pin cannot be economically made, largely out of the question. The entire absence of natural science and of any definiteness of conception or arrangement in matters not rigidly prescribed by traditional etiquette coincides with the unconsciousness of the value of accuracy; but the question is whether the general introduction of science as part of the educational curriculum, followed by its extensive application to the business of life, will not cure this radical de-

fect in the moral equipment of the nation. That such a result would be, at the least, a protracted affair, the most sanguine can hardly doubt, nor will the process be rendered the more easy by the fact that the Chinese have discovered certain working substitutes for factual truth. Meadows has pointed out that personal probity is not relied upon, because the business of life, mercantile and domestic, is carried on under a chain of guarantees, infidelity to which is of very rare occurrence. In a general reform of the code of honor, this time-honored institution would have to be uprooted, rendering the whole operation doubly difficult, except as a result of protracted evolution. But, as an offset against a chain of reasoning based upon experience in other countries, we are bound to confess that China is a country where one can never argue from premises. Seventy years of dealing with them may convince us that co-operative trading is impossible for the Chinese, and then comes the astonishing experience of the Commercial Press, as told in the chapter on "The New Learning."

Closely allied with untruthfulness is the looseness of conscience in the handling of money. The process known as "robbing Peter to pay Paul," of patching a hole by a piece cut out of the garment, forms a part of the Chinese practice, from the Throne downward. Even in the returns of the imperial revenue the authorities seem to prefer that deductions be made from disbursements before remittances are forwarded, rather than that the full revenue be shown on one side of the account and the full expenditure on the other. Such a system in-

vites peculation, which is carried on wholesale throughout every government department. The shifty tendency pervades every relation of life; shameless malversation is tolerated as a mere peccadillo where a breach of filial etiquette would be punishable as a crime. With such a code of financial morality it would, apparently, be impossible to develop joint-stock enterprise, for no confidence would be felt in the integrity of the management, and yet in Hongkong, Singapore, and Tientsin such enterprises are now being successfully conducted. Mines do not pay the proprietors because the laborers pilfer the production; cotton-factories because the mill-hands carry off the raw material, stowed away in their clothes; railways, under native management, eat up the capital provided without any appreciable advance to completion. The most important Chinese companies are machines for wholesale misappropriation of funds, a state of things which is always aggravated in cases where an official has a hand in the manipulation. While such an all-sufficing explanation exists, it seems needless to seek for more speculative reasons for the want of enterprise of the Chinese, or for the well-known fact that they are willing to place their funds at low interest with foreign banks rather than trust their own countrymen on more tempting terms. This preference for foreign security, based on foreign integrity, is the principal lever by which the commercial, industrial, and financial resources of China may hereafter be developed. It is only by organized probity that we can compete with the Chinese. This is not advanced as a principle or a

theory of Chinese morals, but merely as an empirical observation, for it is in flat contradiction of other facts equally well known. The probity of Chinese merchants and bankers has always been proverbial, and is no doubt the basis of their success in these enterprises. It is a melancholy fact that this high standard has suffered by contact with Europe and America, but it remains unique in the business world. As the Chinese have no separate castes, it is hard to account for such apparently contradictory phenomena as exceptional fidelity in certain walks of life and systematic fraud in others, the line of demarcation being, moreover, sharply drawn.

That some general cause is in operation to produce such disparate results seems evident, and the explanation may possibly be found in the special training which is required by different avocations and the selection of the men who are to follow them. Every profession has its own code of honor and rule of practice, and every society its law of self-preservation. The deterioration of Chinese commercial morality is said to be due to the influx into business of a different class of men from those originally engaged in what was, after literature, the most honorable pursuit in China. Commerce cannot be carried on without confidence, and the continuous experience of many centuries has burned this law into the hearts of those who are enrolled under its banner. Natural selection will tend constantly to the rejection of individuals who do not obey the law by which alone a commercial community can live, and the hereditary principle lends its potent aid toward keeping the body pure. Traditions handed

down from father to son, not so much in formal maxims as in daily practice, enter deeply into the character; and children follow unconsciously and automatically the ways of their fathers and families, in contact with whom they have grown up. They would find it difficult to do otherwise.

The different code of honor which prevails in official circles, on the other hand, may equally be pleaded as a necessity of existence. No government official in China can possibly live on his pay; his necessary expenses many times exceed it. What is he to do? Immemorial tradition points out the way. The ox is not muzzled that treads out the corn. Of course, official corruption is an insidious poison, not only as affecting the efficiency of the public service, but also the personal character of the individual. Once admit bribery or malversation as a justifiable means of living, and it is impossible to draw the line. Necessity soon becomes rapacity, and rapacity grows by what it feeds upon. It is astonishing that any vestige of character is left in men who have graduated in the official school. Some, indeed, there are who resist the common temptation, and are regarded as a kind of monstrosity of virtue—a sort of "white elephant"—who for this reason may claim unlimited indulgence. Such officials must either be themselves wealthy, or have wealthy friends, or be financed by some shrewd man of business, who manages everything behind the back of his principal.

The danger of new enterprises lies in the circumstance that they fall outside the tradition, and, therefore, outside the protection of the professional

code which is so efficacious within its own sphere. If an official personage has any concern in the undertaking, his dominant idea is to make it a milch-cow for himself; his whole habit of mind would militate against his paying any regard to the rights of shareholders.

Where the commercial morality of the Chinese is at its worst is where it comes in contact with Western legality. They are shown in an unfavorable light when, for example, they are called upon to pay up calls on their shares in limited companies registered abroad. This is one of those cases where their tradition fails to support them in a right course, the whole thing being alien from their own customs. Neither family honor nor public opinion concerns itself with such strange devices as foreign legal forms, which are as unintelligible to the Chinese as to the unlettered peasantry of Europe. There is no sanctity attaching to them, and if their terms can be successfully evaded, and without prejudicing one's interest in other ways, it is considered permissible, the mere moral sanction counting for little.

Rectitude of conduct between man and man is secured among themselves in an entirely different manner; everything is regulated by custom, which possesses greater vitality than judge-made or statute-made law. A mercantile contract, for example, drawn up and signed, is held of quite secondary validity; but if bargain-money has been paid is it unimpugnable, and bargain-money without the paper is of greater efficacy than the paper without bargain-money. It is not, therefore, to be expected that a people living and moving in such an atmos-

phere of tradition and custom should adapt themselves easily to the machinery of foreign legislation, which in its subject-matter is necessarily altogether uncouth to their ideas, varies more or less in each nationality with which they have to deal, and is subject to change in each new session of some foreign parliament which to them has not even the consistency of a myth.

"Respect for the law," as a virtue of civilized peoples, cannot apply to exotic regulations which are alien in their nature as well as in their source. The sentiment bred in the bone of the Chinese people is not respect, but reverence for law; it is more than religion to them. But the foreign manufactured article is as strange god introduced into their pantheon; it takes no hold of their moral sense. The whole attitude of the Chinese toward this kind of law, therefore, differs fundamentally from that of the peoples of the West, and this should be taken into account by all who have business with the people of China. The Chinese look to quite other safeguards in commercial dealings than do Englishmen, who have always a solicitor at their elbow and learned counsel to consult on every clause and shade of meaning of a contract. In the first place, the Chinese merchant or banker places no reliance whatever on litigation, but takes his measures as if there were no such thing to fall back upon. His first line of defense against fraud or misunderstanding is to select his clientèle on the most rigid principle, and deal only with men of known character and untainted connections, in such a manner as to be able to follow them into all the transactions

they may undertake. It is this perfect mutual knowledge which cements the confidence between men of business; and the customs, which are better known to them than any legal enactments can possibly be to the people of Europe, rule every transaction that is doubtful. Written contracts have scarcely any place in the Chinese system, whereas they are the very essence of ours. Our jurists place the verbal construction of an agreement before everything, while in China the whole stress is laid on the obvious and reasonable intention of the parties; the one regards only the documentary contract, the other the thing contracted for. The difference between the two points of view is almost irreconcilable, and it is as erroneous for us to test Chinese equity by means of our standard as for the Chinese to judge us wanting in good faith because we take advantage of a technicality to avoid a disadvantageous obligation. The moral to be drawn from this state of things would seem to be that each party should take the other on its own ground—that foreigners should rely on Chinese time-consecrated sanctions to bind the Chinese commercial conscience, and that the Chinese should trust foreigners only so far as they can have written contracts signed, sealed, and delivered.

An element of distrust between Chinese and foreigners—which is really a phase of that natural instinct of resting on the substance and not on the form—is the looseness and disregard of punctuality which characterize the Chinese. Except in banking transactions, time with them has not the same recognized value as it has to us, and their habits

are easier and more slovenly. This leads to irritation, and sometimes needless suspicion, when an important engagement is not kept, and when either no excuse is thought necessary or the most ridiculous reasons are given. Much should be allowed for mere habit in such matters, and a great deal more for the complex life Chinamen lead. It is alleged against them that they are superstitious, but it is scarcely possible for a foreigner to conceive how completely their lives are enveloped in cobwebs of necromancy, geomancy, witchcraft, animal-worship, luck, evil eye, and a thousand influences which seem to us grotesque and childish. This is a natural result of the long duration of the people, which has permitted the accretions of three thousand years to be preserved in a gigantic accumulation, whereas the primitive beliefs and folk-lore of Western peoples have been broken up by their migrations, wars, and commotions. Almost every conceivable action of a Chinaman's life is prescribed by a minute etiquette which no one dreams of disregarding. Being unintelligible to foreigners, this necessarily creates friction in their mutual relations. But in addition to this the Chinese, even the most reasonable and most practical, are under the dominion of sorcerers and fortune-tellers and the reign of "luck" to such an extent that they are in constant apprehension of doing or saying things at the wrong time, the wrong place, in the wrong way, or in company with the wrong people. A promising combination may be spoiled by some occult warning, and a Chinaman may often have bad faith imputed to him when he is really under the constraint of some

influence which he dare not avow, and which causes him to make a shuffling and mendacious excuse.[1]

What is most mysterious in Chinese ways would probably be simple enough if we were in sympathy with the explanation. Probably the fundamental principle of their national and private life, the family idea, if well understood, would supply the key to many seeming peculiarities. To dub them idolaters because they worship their ancestors is begging the question. It were more to the purpose to examine into the relationship which is called "worship" and see what an important part these ancestors play in Chinese life. Their authority seems to be the power which keeps the nation together; they are one with their posterity, and the ancestral tomb is the family altar.

The ancestors assist at the family council and sanction its proceedings. The effect on the practical or business life of the people of the ancestral cult is various. The family being the unit of the state, there is a collective responsibility for the behavior of each member, in consequence of which order is kept in every village and city without the supervision of military or police. This alone is no slight gain. The family responsibility in financial matters, too, gives security in business, for a debt is never canceled except by payment, and descends as a burden from father to son. A bad side of the system

[1] Foreign-trained Chinese students may escape from some of this bondage, though they will find it difficult to evade its influence when they return home. But, after all, the foreign-trained man is still a minute fraction of the vast population, whose characteristics can alter but slowly.

is the moral obligation which rests on any one who is rich to support all the members, for obviously such a principle discourages enterprise and industry. It stands seriously in the way of material progress, for no sooner does a man by his own energy establish some promising industry than he is pounced upon by all the ne'er-do-wells of his family, who live upon him, and whom he is obliged to employ to the exclusion of useful men, even to the ruin of his enterprise. It is impossible for a Chinaman to emancipate himself from his family incubus, and the fact must be reckoned with in all schemes for co-operation with Chinese.

In all estimates of the social system a practical distinction must be made between the Chinese people in their individual and their public capacity; between their utility as material to be molded and managed by others, and their power to organize and lead their own forces—industrial, commercial, political, and military. In what has gone before, the former forces have been glanced at; we will now refer briefly to the latter.

The Chinese in public life, as we conceive the idea, is as yet an unknown quantity. The nation, as a whole, does not concern itself with political affairs any more than, on the advice of Confucius, it concerns itself with theological affairs. The popular maxim is that, as the mandarins are paid (and pay themselves) for attending to public administration, it is their business to do it, while the public cultivates its garden and pays its taxes. As this is not a philosophical treatise, we are not tempted to speculate on the development of this

state of feeling, or on its significance, further than to make the obvious remark that a faculty that has never been used or that has fallen out of use is virtually non-existent. We may conclude, accurately enough for practical purposes, that public spirit has hitherto been an unknown sentiment to the Chinese people. To our appreciation the Chinese, as a nation, exhibit no patriotism; but this may be the effect of our own prejudice and want of insight into the true relation between the subject and object of what we call "patriotism." Instances of the loftiest and purest devotion are not rare, nor in these cases does the ideal appear very different from our own. Speaking, however, only of what operates on the masses as we see them, and not as they may be intrinsically, we should perhaps be justified in saying that what represents the feeling of patriotism in China is a survival of clannishness, which affects small segregated areas—not a provincial or even a civic patriotism, but rather a local village spirit which on occasion is capable of combining to resist extortion or resent interference. It is elsewhere shown how this great political vacuum in the Chinese social organism is partly supplied by secret societies, as in the commercial sphere the juridical gap is supplied by trade-guilds. The officials themselves possess their defensive combinations, each province having in the capital a society, which we call a "club," where gatherings are held daily to discuss public affairs. These clubs are managed with considerable strictness, and the very highest officials may be expelled when accused of conduct derogatory to the character of the society. It is

interesting to note that the particular offense which has led to a sentence of expulsion in conspicuous cases has been "truckling to foreigners." For this the most respected and influential official in the last two generations, Tsêng Kwo Fan, father of the late Marquis Tsêng, was expelled from the Hunan Club in Peking, and many years and many sacrifices were required before he could gain readmission. This general, perhaps universal, feeling —a most natural and proper feeling, we must admit —against foreigners is by some maintained to be the only article in the Chinese code which may fitly be called patriotic. In 1898, when this book was first published, although anti-foreign feeling was rapidly growing, it did not appear to have any central idea or direction or to lead to common action; but, in the years which have passed since then, out of the blind agitation which culminated in the Boxer agitation has come a clearer vision of China's needs. It is less the foreigner who is blamed by the intelligent reformer of to-day than the government, which has made the predatory actions of the foreigner possible. "China for the Chinese" became an anti-dynastic cry as well as anti-foreign, and the conduct of the reformers of 1911-12 in protecting missionaries and other foreigners shows the trend of their policy.

The events which followed the Boxer rising dissipated the remains of the atmosphere of semi-religious seclusion with which the Throne had been surrounded, and as a political force the Manchu dynasty showed itself contemptible. Reverence for the Throne undoubtedly exists as the apex of that

great pyramid, the family system, but is rather a sublimated religious than a political sentiment. There is no vital attachment in it, no loyalty which commands sacrifice, and among the officials even the genuine feeling of devotion to the Imperial service has been absorbed into and dissipated by the hyperbolic formulæ prescribed for their memorials and addresses.

Associated with the political are the military sentiments of the Chinese people. There we find the same general principle prevailing—that of aloofness or indifference. If they ever were warlike, the Chinese ceased for very many centuries to be so. The nation has survived the military age, and till recently the treatises on strategy dated from before the Christian era. For a long time, even after they had come in contact with the West, the Chinese persisted in their contempt for militarism. They conceived the superiority of their antagonists to be due merely to mechanical devices, and therefore supplied themselves with the latest pattern in guns and other armaments, without any provision for training men. Their defeat at the hands of Japan in 1894-95 opened their eyes to the facts, and Yuan Shihkai, during the period which followed the counter-reform of 1898, actually raised, trained, and equipped a respectable modern army. The reorganization of the army was initiated by Yuan in 1902, and a law of military reorganization was promulgated in 1905. A national army has been established—at least, theoretically—with the view of replacing the heterogeneous forces under the provincial viceroys, but as yet it is impossible to

form any accurate estimate of the caliber of the troops. They have been distinguished, for the most part, by a tendency to mutiny, which is not the best of signs.

The personal courage of Chinese soldiers is usually estimated at a low value, but there are extenuating and explanatory circumstances. The manner in which an old-time Chinese force used to be levied, the way it was treated, paid, and led, should excuse much in the private soldier. When sent unarmed, as they virtually were in the Chino-Japanese War, against highly disciplined and well-armed hosts, the only sensible thing to be done was to retreat, and, as in that movement, at least, their commanders could generally be counted on to set a good example, they fell back in greater or less disorder before the invaders. But when they are paid, fed, disciplined, and armed, as was for a time the case in the Chinese navy, the men leave little to be desired in the way of courage. Even then they need leading. Under European officers there was no forlorn hope or desperate service for which they would not volunteer, and they rallied round the brave Admiral Ting, whom they were ready to follow to a heroic death, when he was shut in a trap in his own port, Wei-hai-wei. It has always been the personal qualities of a man, rather than a cause, which attracted the Chinese. Gordon could have led them anywhere; so, no doubt, could Admiral Ting. It is probably a mere question of organization with the Chinese, who are apt learners, and are capable of drill and discipline. Confidence will do the rest—confidence in their leaders and—in their pay!

Chinese Gordon and Lord Wolseley have spoken highly of the courage and endurance of the Chinese soldier, and an excellent résumé of his qualities has been given by one who had experience with Gordon's "Ever Victorious Army."

The old notion is pretty well got rid of that they are at all a cowardly people, when properly paid and efficiently led; while the regularity and order of their habits, which dispose them to peace in ordinary times, gives place to a daring bordering upon recklessness in time of war. Their intelligence and capacity for remembering facts make them well fitted for use in modern warfare, as does also the coolness and calmness of their disposition. Physically they are, on the average, not so strong as Europeans, but considerably more so than most of the other races of the East; and on a cheap diet of rice, vegetables, salt fish, and pork they can go through a vast amount of fatigue, whether in a temperate climate or a tropical one, where Europeans are ill-fitted for exertion. Their wants are few; they have no caste prejudices, and hardly any appetite for intoxicating liquors.

And, according to the Abbé Huc in his *Chinese Empire*, it may not be impossible to find in China the elements for organizing the most formidable army in the world and for the creation of a navy.

The Chinese are intelligent, ingenious, and docile. They comprehend rapidly whatever they are taught, and retain it in their memory. They are persevering, and astonishingly active when they choose to exert themselves, respectful to authority, submissive and obedient, and they would easily accommodate them-

selves to all the exigencies of the severest discipline. The Chinese possess also a quality most precious in soldiers, and which can scarcely be found as well developed among any other people—namely, an incomparable facility for supporting privations of every kind. We have often been astonished to see how they will bear hunger, thirst, heat, cold, the difficulties, and fatigues of a long march, as if it were mere play. Thus, both morally and physically, they seem capable of meeting every demand. China would present also inexhaustible resources for a navy. Without speaking of the vast extent of her coasts, along which the numerous population pass the greater part of their lives on the sea, the great rivers and immense lakes in the interior, always covered with fishing and trading junks, might furnish multitudes of men, habituated from their infancy to navigation, nimble, experienced, and capable of becoming excellent sailors for long expeditions.

Distinction may be justly drawn between the populations of different parts of the vast Empire. The people of Honan are known for their independence. The Cantonese have always been of a daring character, which for many years, unfortunately, expended itself in wholesale piracy on the coast. The natives of Shantung, however, where the Germans have established themselves, and whose overflow has peopled the rich lands of Manchuria, enjoy the finest record for both physical and moral qualities. It was from them the Chinese navy drew its best recruits; it is they who have proved their prowess either as brigands or as self-reliant and self-defended exploiters of the resources of Liaotung and Manchuria.

When all is said, however, it must still be conceded that it is not military or scientific or political, but commercial genius that has characterized the Chinese in the past, and is, therefore, most likely to distinguish them in the future. They are the original, true, and only real shopkeepers, and in every position of life, even the farthest removed from the atmosphere of commerce, the Chinese may be said to think in money. As with the Jew, their instinctive habit is one of perpetual appraisement. No matter what object may be shown to them for their instruction or admiration, their first and last thought is what it cost; and conversations overheard among boatmen, coolies, and laborers turn invariably on the same topic—money. This trait of character cannot be better described than in the words of the Abbé Huc:

> The Chinese has a passionate love of lucre; he is fond of all kinds of speculation and stock-jobbing, and his mind, full of finesse and cunning, takes delight in combining and calculating the chances of a commercial operation.
>
> The Chinese, *par excellence*, is a man installed behind the counter of a shop, waiting for his customers with patience and resignation, and in the intervals of their arrival pondering in his head and casting up on his little arithmetical machine the means of increasing his fortune. Whatever may be the nature and importance of his business, he neglects not the smallest profit; the least gain is always welcome, and he accepts it eagerly; greatest of all is his enjoyment when, in the evening, having well closed and barricaded his shop, he can retire into some corner, and there count up, religiously, the number of his sapecks, and reckon the earnings of the day.

The Chinese is born with this taste for traffic, which grows with his growth and strengthens with his strength. The first thing a child longs for is a sapeck; the first use that he makes of his speech and intelligence is to learn to articulate the names of coins; when his little fingers are strong enough to hold the pencil, it is with making figures that he amuses himself, and as soon as the tiny creature can speak and walk he is capable of buying and selling.

Nor is it the mere gain that inspires the passion for merchandizing. In common with Orientals generally, the Chinese are fascinated by the sport of bargaining, as a cat is by playing its mouse or a fisherman his salmon. It is said that the late Li Hung Chang derived a purer pleasure from "doing" an employee out of half a month's pay, as the result of an afternoon's contest, than if he had saved a province of the Empire—a weakness which no doubt was often turned to profitable account by those who had important transactions with that eminent statesman. It is held to be a maxim of wisdom for an undergraduate to let his rich uncle have the better of him at chess. Human nature is essentially the same everywhere; the point of difference to be noted here between Oriental and Occidental is that time seems to be of no account to the one, while to the other it is a synonym for money, which is of prime value to both.

And in connection with money-making there is another point to be noticed and kept in mind in regard to the Chinese, in which they are distinguished from the races of the West, and perhaps of the East as well. Though parsimonious, the China-

man is not mean. He is generous almost to a fault when the humor takes him—has a supreme disregard of trifles in settling an account—for example, takes a loss stoically, lends freely with small expectation of return, and rarely sues for a debt. The ease of the Chinese in money-dealing contrasts strongly with the exigence with which they are treated by foreigners with whom they traffic. And yet in the essence of things there may be no real superiority or inferiority, for the liberality in the one case may be referred to the general laxity of Chinese reckoning and to the margin of perquisites on which they instinctively fall back, while the severity in the other case belongs to precision of accounts and the absence of any margin of debatable ground where generosity might find pasture. In the West the open-handed man too often comes to penury, while in the East "there is that scattereth and yet increaseth."

The combination of the qualities of avarice and profusion sometimes produces results which, though entirely natural in themselves, are both comical and paradoxical when viewed from a foreign standpoint. Once upon a time the agent at one of the minor ports for a wealthy firm in Shanghai lived in the somewhat lordly style which had been inherited from the East India Company. His "boy," or butler, and his whole domestic staff made a good thing out of the establishment. Times changed, and the big firm ceased business. Left stranded, the agent decided to set up for himself and work the connections he had formed among natives and foreign merchants. But the old scale of expenditure could

not be supported. Summoning his faithful "boy," he explained the situation to him—impossible to keep up the old expensive style of living, very sorry to part with such a good old servant, and so forth. The boy rose to the occasion in a somewhat surprising manner. "What for, masta, too muchee sollee? My too sollee, masta, no catchee good chance. My like stay this side. Masta, how much can pay?" (Why is master so sorrowful? I am very sorry that master is not doing well. I should like to stay in master's service. How much can master afford to pay?) The master scratched his forehead and paused, then named a sum which was just two-thirds of what his house bills had hitherto amounted to. "Maskee, masta; masta talkee so muchee, can do" (Never mind, master; whatever you say will do), said the accommodating serving-man. So the *ménage* proceeded, everything exactly as before—table as bountiful, servants as smart and as respectful, but the monthly charge thirty per cent. less. A year passed; the new business had been uphill work, as new businesses are wont to be; the emolument was disappointing. Again the master had to make an explanation to the servant; again the solution of the difficulty was to reduce the establishment. "Never mind, master, tell me how much you think you can pay," was the substance of his "boy's" reply. The master was seriously taken aback, but he named a figure which was just one-half of what he had originally been paying. The "boy" accepted as cheerfully as before and went on his way rejoicing, and the *ménage* proceeded not a salad leaf or a partridge or a mushroom the less;

only the cost was reduced to very modest proportions. Of course it is open to remark that the wily Chinaman had been extortionate in the high old time—but what elasticity of accommodation, what fellowship in misfortune!

Take a converse case of more recent occurrence in Peking. A French gentleman there keeping house with his wife had gone on smoothly and economically for many years, no ripple disturbing their domestic felicity. By and by they found a substantial increase in their monthly budget. They remonstrated with their head servant, but in vain. Stolidly, month after month, he brought in the same bill, until at last the master resolved to part with the servant, and did. When the successor came and was being inducted, he observed to the master: "What thing masta talkee? How can? S'pose that piecee man have talkee so fashon, that b'long tlue. My no can makee more plopa. He b'long welly good man," which, being interpreted, meant that he could not manage any cheaper than his predecessor. The master was surprised at this speech, argued the matter for a little, but could make nothing more out of the new servant. At the end of the first month, sure enough, the account came to within a fraction of what it had been. Remonstrance from the master respectfully received, but the following month the same old charge. The master gave it up, and went on resignedly, as if in the clutches of Fate. But when some time had elapsed, and all controversy had ceased, the master, disputing no longer, begged the servant, merely to satisfy curiosity, to explain to him how it had come

about that the scale of charge, which had gone on the same for so many years, had suddenly risen without any change in market prices or any other apparent reason. Taken into confidence in this way, the "boy" looked blandly at his master and said: "Masta, six moon fore time have catchee good chance. Allo man too muchee glad. Masta have catchee good chance, allo man can catchee too"—which means that, the master having had a piece of good-fortune six months before, all the servants considered themselves entitled to their share.

We should not do the Chinese justice without carrying the money test of character a stage higher, almost into the region of pure ethics. It is not uncommon to impute ingratitude to them. But the rule applies—East and West alike—that a bad master never had a good servant, and those who most loudly cry out against ingratitude are usually those who have merited nothing else. There are two sides to all human relations; sentiments are not self-existent, but, like vertebrates, are the product of two parents. All foreigners who have studied the Chinese in a human, sympathetic manner, like Meadows, Smith, and others, testify to their devotion and gratitude. So many instances of this are recorded that it must be taken as natural to the Chinese to attach themselves heart and soul to any one, be he native or foreigner, who once gains their confidence. And the way to do that is explained by Meadows: it is to show them, not by words, but by acts, that you are thinking of their welfare as much as your own. There is no mystery in this; it holds good of all races and of all periods. But

the gratitude of Orientals, Africans, and others has freer play than that of our own people because of the accommodating quality of their social relations and the extraordinary supply which their numbers afford. Stereotyped as are the Chinese relations in certain respects, they admit of great elasticity in others—thanks to the family and clan system—which makes it easy and common to find substitutes for almost any occasion. This enables a man to attach himself to a master, or follow a leader whom he appreciates, and to detach himself from his family, and even from business engagements, for indefinite periods. There are many foreigners who can speak from experience of such proofs of devotion and gratitude.

That the family spirit expands and perpetuates the individual sentiment the following illustration will show:

It happened to an Englishman once to revisit China after the lapse of many years. One day he was surprised to receive a call from some Chinese whom he did not know. They were well dressed and most respectful. After the usual conventional preliminaries, the principal man of the party—which seemed like a deputation—explained that he was the son of a Chinese gentleman who had died more than twenty years before, while the speaker was still a child; that he had been told by his relatives of the kindness which the Englishman had shown to his father in those old days, but had never, since he grew up, had any means of expressing his gratitude. Now it had come to his ears that a person bearing the name of his father's friend had

recently arrived in the town, but he could not tell if it was the same. So he paid this visit merely to find out, was overjoyed to have discovered him, and begged to be allowed to pay his homage on another occasion. Exchange of family news naturally took place, and on his next visit the Chinese gentleman came laden with valuable presents specially selected for the respective children of his casually discovered English friend.

Instances of large-heartedness in money matters in which foreigners have been the beneficiaries are indeed comparatively common. In the last generation they were still more so, for commerce, especially that portion of it which was centered in Canton, was conducted in a grander, more merchant-princelike fashion than the circumstances of our day admit of. Complete trust was the rule between the old Hong merchants and the European and American traders, and business was transacted in whole ship-loads. The friendly relations then established subsisted for a generation after the destruction of the "factories," in 1856, and the inauguration of the new era, which is of a more individualized and retail character. One well-known survivor of the old régime, an American gentleman, Mr. X., who was alive in Canton in 1884, had, in consequence of the collapse of his firm, fallen from affluence to penury, and was personally deeply in debt to certain of the representatives of the old "co-hong." Seeing that the veteran remained on in Canton, never visiting his home and family, his Chinese friend asked him why he denied himself the natural solace of his old age—permanent separa-

tion from the family home being specially intolerable to a Chinese—and guessing the reason, it is said he produced Mr. X.'s note of hand for a large amount, and tore it up before the maker, saying, "Now are you free to return to your home?" Whether literally accurate in its details or not, the mere currency of such a story goes a long way toward proving the contention.

Of course, it may be said these are exceptional cases, and so they are. But the question is—on which side is the exception; on that of the Chinese or that of the foreigners? If more of the latter endeavored to gain the confidence of the former in the natural way, would not the experience of grateful, devoted, and trustworthy Chinese be greatly extended? And, considering the race antipathy that keeps them apart, the fact that any instances at all of such kindly relations ever come within the experience of foreigners affords strong presumption that among themselves the Chinese maintain a more than friendly, a really generous intercourse.

One of the most valuable qualities of the Chinese people, considered with reference to their utility in the future development of their country, is their marvelous tolerance of things disagreeable, and their invincible contentment under all circumstances. Every traveler, every one who has had opportunities of observing them, testifies to their unfailing good-humor under every kind of discomfort, and under the severest bodily toil. Their cheerfulness is undaunted; neither cold nor heat, neither hunger nor fatigue, has power to depress them; nor does misfortune or natural calamity or sickness provoke

them to repine. As Giles says, "They seem to have acquired a national habit of looking upon the bright side."

According to A. H. Smith, "to be happy is more than they expect, but they are willing to be as happy as they can." Possibly they follow Carlyle unknowingly, and do not recognize "happiness" at all as an object in life, and therefore they enjoy the more of it—enjoy all they get, instead of vexing themselves about what they lack. Smith tells us of a Chinese who was employed by a foreigner—no doubt himself—in pushing a heavy wheelbarrow on journeys, often months in duration.

Upon these trips it was necessary to start early, to travel late, to transport heavy loads over steep and rugged mountains, in all seasons and in all weathers, fording chilling rivers with bare feet and legs, and at the end of every stage to prepare his master's food and lodging. All this laborious work was done for a very moderate compensation, and always without complaint; and at the end of *several years* of this service his master testified that he had never once seen this servant out of temper!

One may venture to add on one's own account that this description seems typical. Now, to put the merits of such a placid temper on the lowest utilitarian grounds, consider what an economy of nervous friction is implied in a working life passed in such a happy frame of mind. Is it not alone a source of wealth to the people who possess it?

Smith adds his experience of the Chinaman in sickness. He says:

Their cheery hopefulness often does not forsake them in physical weakness and in extreme pain. We have known multitudes of cases where Chinese patients, suffering from every variety of disease, frequently in deep poverty, not always adequately nourished, at a distance from their homes, sometimes neglected or even abandoned by their relatives, and with no ray of hope for the future visible, yet maintained a cheerful equanimity of temper, which was a constant, albeit unintentional, rebuke to the nervous impatience which. . . .

He concludes his chapter with the observation which may also fitly conclude the present one: "If the teaching of history as to what happens to 'the fittest' is to be trusted, there is a magnificent future for the Chinese race."

II

CHINA AND RELIGION

IN the preceding chapter the Chinese people are studied from the point of view of what they are in every-day life. Elsewhere we deal with their relations to the state and to each other as units in a vast community. In this chapter an attempt will be made to gauge the relations of the Chinese to the Unseen—the spiritual life which shapes and bends and sometimes even breaks the man who is, perhaps, hardly conscious of its power. We are accustomed to attribute to spiritual influences certain qualities which have a moral value in our eyes, such as truthfulness, honesty, or mercy. When we find the Chinese devoid of these we rashly conclude that his conduct has no ethical basis. But, although it is true that the religion of Christianity inculcates those qualities as a moral duty, it is not quite clear whether we have adopted them as such or because, as a matter of experience, we have proved them to be the best policy. There are other qualities, equally insisted on by the Founder of the Christian religion, to which we pay little attention (as, for instance, meekness and respect for parents), because we find they do not conduce to material well-being. We need

not, therefore, assume the airs of superior beings on the ground of our higher standard of morality or approximation to an ideal, but where we are entitled to some satisfaction is in the fact that Christianity has certainly helped to mold a civilization which is more efficient than any other in the world. Whether the religion is essential to the civilization or not remains to be seen. Be that as it may, we are bound to admit that, not abstract principles, but the conventions necessary to facilitate human intercourse are the real factors in deciding, beyond a certain point, what is good and what bad in human conduct. Morality is largely a geographic question, and virtues in one zone become vice in another. Without any attempt to judge the Chinese on any ethical grounds, therefore, we are bound to examine their code and their conduct, not only to see how far the second approximates to the first—how true they are to their own lights—but to estimate the practical value of the ethical basis of their society when it is brought, as it must be, into contact and competition with others.

It may be said at once that the Chinese are singularly little occupied with the problems of the universe and of human existence. This vast field of speculation interests them but little, nor are they wont to question themselves as to where they come from and whither they are going. From the point of view of persons to whom definite convictions on these subjects are essential to moral welfare the Chinese are by no means a religious people. On the other hand, if the careful and punctilious observance of certain rites and the performance of certain duties

are to count for anything, they are a very religious people. The difficulty is to define their religion.

The paramount influences in forming Chinese character (apart from geographic influences, the deep-rooted belief in the animation of the universe with good and evil spirits, and ancestor-worship) have been the philosophies of Confucius and Lao-tsz. Unlike Western philosophies, which from Pythagoras to Spencer have been abstract and utopian, Confucianism is practical, and rules the lives of the masses, instead of making a purely intellectual appeal. Confucianism, moreover, is apparently quite independent of a specific religious basis, and is, in fact, a great moderating force specially calculated to preserve in men's minds the truly philosophic—that is, the tolerant—attitude. The teaching of Confucius was an attempt to evolve a standard of morality, based upon his interpretation of history, which would influence the social, moral, and political life of the people. Lao-tsz, who was a contemporary of Confucius, was the expounder of a more mystical philosophy, in which the keynote is *tao* — the "correct way." He who finds this "way of life"—a rightly adjusted attitude toward life—is independent of all outside circumstances; and, although Lao-tsz recognized that some men must inevitably be leaders in the state and that government, even by force, was essential, yet he preached a pure form of democracy. Ancestor-worship—the "very core of the religious and social life" of the Chinese, as M. de Groot calls it—enters into the life of the people more fully, perhaps, than any other influence. Buddhism

and Taoism supply the forms of ritual or outward observances.

A less desirable result of *tao* is its encouragement of superstition, and in its modern form this aspect has practically eaten up the others, and it appears now as the groundwork for Feng-shui and every kind of demonological belief.

This *Shen-tao*, or divine faith, is the Shinto of Japan, and both Confucianism and Shintoism insist on the sacredness of the family as the basis of society. Buddhism and Christianity, on the contrary, make the relation of the individual to a divine ideal their main feature, and it is interesting to trace the conflict between these two fundamentally differing views of life in the countries of the Far East. Buddhism has undergone many transformations in adapting itself, and the twelfth century witnessed a species of reformation in which the sacredness of the family was upheld. Indian pundits claim this new teaching as a reformed Brahmanism; and its resemblances, both in doctrine and ritual, to Christianity are strikingly apparent in Japan to-day.

The doctrines of Confucius and Lao-tsz are not, however, to be considered as religious, but rather as ethical systems. Lao-tsz appeared to have a vague conception of a future life, while Confucianism recognized tacitly the underlying natural religion which had prevailed from the most ancient times—the belief in a Supreme Being. The influence of these two philosophers, moreover, was not altogether inimical to the introduction of foreign religions, since they inculcated tolerance and kept their

disciples free from religious fanaticism. Buddhism, accordingly, reached China in the first centuries A.D., by the overland route, followed later by Marco Polo and other travelers. It was encouraged by the Emperor and spread peacefully in China, though when it reached Japan it was for a time the center of conflict. Islam came to China in the seventh century, both by land and sea, and its reception is interesting to us because, being a pure form of monotheism, it might have been expected to clash with some of the most cherished customs and deeply rooted prejudices of the Chinese. Throughout their history in China, however, the Mohammedans have preferred to bend rather than to break, and, by permitting the veneration of ancestors, they have removed the most serious obstacle in their path. In many respects their doctrine was sympathetic to the Chinese. The treatment of women was similar; their fatalism, subjectivism, and regulations as to régime and behavior are in no way strange or repugnant to the Chinese; and, as they refrained from propaganda and merely appealed for protection, they roused none of the latent suspicions of their hosts. It was not till the twelfth century that the influx of Mohammedans was considerable, but after that time they spread over the west, north, and south, and at the present time are steadily on the increase, especially in the western provinces of Yunnan and Kansuh. The outbreaks of rebellion, which have given the Mussulman Chinese a bad name, have been due to political rather than religious causes.

There is no need to recall in detail the history of the introduction of the third foreign religion into

China. Every one is aware that the Nestorian Christians gained a footing both with the Court and people in the seventh century, and during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, under the Mongol dynasty, both Nestorianism and the Church of Rome flourished not only in Peking, but in various provinces. In the early part of the seventeenth century there were estimated to be no fewer than thirteen thousand Christians in as many as seven different provinces (and among them members of the Imperial family and high officials), while the Spanish Franciscans and Dominicans, who came over from the Philippines, claimed to have (in 1665) over fourteen thousand Christians in the three coast provinces. It even seemed possible at one period that China might officially adopt the Christian religion, but there was a decisive barrier in the way—the refusal of the Church to sanction ancestral rights. Although the seventeenth century saw considerable variations in the attitude of the Chinese government toward Christianity, and a struggle between the followers of Christ and of Mohammed for power at Peking, yet the former continued to increase until, by the end of the century, there were three hundred thousand Christians in various parts of the country. The question which sealed the fate of Christianity in China was that of the rival authority of Church and State, also the decisive factor in European history. Early in the eighteenth century the Emperor Kang-hi practically abolished religious freedom in China by decreeing that in future no one should preach the Gospel without the Imperial license. Considerable dissension occurred among the Jesuits, Dominicans, and Franciscans,

and this served to aggravate the points of difference between Church and State. The most vital point, however, was that of the ancestral rites, which the Pope refused to allow, and from this time the light of Imperial favor was steadily averted from the Christian priests.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century, on the suppression of their Society, the Jesuits were replaced by the Lazarists, and France became the most active power in missionary work. This was the great persecution period, when many Christians won the crown of martyrdom, and only the stanchest converts remained true. The tide rolled back so surely that in many provinces only ruined churches remained to tell the tale of Christian endeavor. Although the history of certain missions has been continuous and there has been no break in their record of work, yet their harvests were small, and Christianity must be acknowledged to have been for this period almost in abeyance as an active force in Chinese evolution. It was not till the middle of the last century that the despised and rejected religion was to revive in a new manner.

The first coming of Christianity was made on sufferance, with appeals for protection; the second was, under treaty rights, practically a forcible entrance. China yielded to Europe under pressure the right to certain treaty ports for trading purposes, and by the treaty of 1858 foreigners were permitted to travel in the interior. This was the opportunity of the missionaries, but the situation was largely affected by the determination of France to make use of it for her own political purposes. Ever since the reign

of Louis XIV. the eyes of the French ecclesiastics had turned eastward (first to Siam), and the movement was always politico-religious. Chinese writers in later days have noted the fact that even the free-thinker Gambetta, who persecuted the Church in France, was ready to expend men and treasure in supporting it abroad. A celebrated clause interpolated in the Chinese version of the convention of 1860 has been used by France to strengthen her claims to the protection not only of European missionaries, but of native Christians. That these pretensions were not acknowledged by other Powers is shown by the action of Germany in insisting that German Catholic priests must apply to their own legation for passports and for support if needed.[1] No more striking illustration can be found of the extent to which political motives overruled the purely missionary element than that of the bitter opposition of the French government to the proposal made by the Chinese to the Pope, in 1886, that a special legate should be sent to Peking as controller and protector of all Catholic missions. The Pope, entirely favorable to the scheme, was obliged by the French opposition to abandon it, but the proposal may yet bring forth fruit.

It would take too great space to trace, even in bare outline, the varying steps by which those who preach the Gospel of Christ in China have been the instruments of political designs. The situation is

[1] It is not generally known that, by the German Treaty of 1861, Article X, to Germany (and presumably, therefore, to other nations) security is guaranteed for the persons and property of missionaries and their converts.

summed up in the phrase "extra-territoriality," and it may safely be said that no religion has ever been presented to a people under such peculiar conditions. In 1871 Wensiang, the head of the Chinese Foreign Board, one of the fairest and most open-minded of Chinese statesmen, drew up a circular reviewing the whole position and, in a series of categorical proposals for the regulation of intercourse with the people, plainly indicated the main grievances of the Chinese. Briefly these were: Grave offense to Chinese ideas of propriety (such as the mixed attendance of the sexes at public worship); the legal status of the missionaries and their attempt to remove even their native converts from local jurisdiction; the desire of the missionaries to move about without being clearly traceable; the neglect of certain etiquette in intercourse with officials; the reclamation of ancient sites and churches which had sometimes to be taken from Chinese owners who had honestly acquired them; and the method of requiring vengeance on anti-Christian rioters not only from the men themselves, but from whole districts. These grievances, with slight modifications, exist to this day, and the last-named in particular has been made a source of fruitfulness to foreign governments, who have claimed monstrous indemnities for outrages on their nationals. It may be mentioned here that a recent act of the Peking government has been to obtain a complete list and valuation of missionary property throughout the Empire, which looks like a characteristic piece of Chinese business acumen.

The legal status of Euopean missionaries in China has been that of superiority to the laws of the coun-

try whose hospitality they have enjoyed and whose ancient customs they have attacked, not infrequently with imprudence. It is not necessary to dwell on the mistakes of individuals, since it is evident that the whole position was one which could not fail to rouse the deepest resentment in a people so proud as the Chinese. The irritable condition set up has been aggravated in several ways, first by the order, resulting from pressure brought to bear on Peking, that all ancient church property should be restored. This led to real hardships, and apart from these, the contempt of Chinese susceptibilities and prejudices (which, for instance, led to the erection of a cathedral actually overlooking the palace and to many outrages on the *feng-shui* superstition) has not tended to reconcile the Chinese to the situation. The last straws have been the right to acquire and hold real estate throughout the Empire, and, infinitely more, the obtaining of official rank for European missionaries, a measure wrung from China in 1897, just after her disastrous defeat by Japan and territorial losses. Since the treaty of Nanking, European civil and military officials have enjoyed the privilege which the ceremonious etiquette of China rendered useful in official relations, but the claim of a Christian bishop to equal a viceroy or provincial governor and of an ordinary priest to the rank of prefect (their influence and authority, of course, corresponding so far as possible) was a new and dangerous political weapon bound to bring evil consequences. The Protestant missioners declined to accept the privilege, although some of them regard it as due to their position not as individ-

uals, but as representing a mass of people in Europe.

The actual growth of mission bodies is of less importance, however, than the broad aspect of the question; but it may be roughly said that, while the Catholics have a great advantage in being organized and directed, while the Protestants arouse the wonder and scorn of the Chinese by the variety and incompatibility of their doctrinal teaching, and while the former avoid preaching in the streets or open air (which is opposed to Chinese ideas of decorum), yet the Protestants have of late years been developing their work on lines which are more promising than any hitherto adopted. The Catholic educational work is almost entirely ecclesiastical or literary, and their method of filling orphanages with children, who as they grow up serve the Church in various capacities, has led to hatred and suspicion on the part of the Chinese. The Protestants are now making a grand effort to promote secular education and to diffuse good literature throughout the length and breadth of the country; and since the terrible massacres of 1900 there has been a genuine attempt to draw all Protestant workers together. The estimated number of Catholic workers is 47 bishops, 1,391 European and 640 native priests, and nearly 1,300,000 converts (inclusive of children); and of Protestants, 4,500 missionaries (including wives and women workers), while their converts number over 287,000. In passing it may be noted that the writer finds it difficult to believe that the presence of lady missionaries in the remote interior does not, as their champions declare, offend the Chinese sense of propriety.

There has been one remarkable change in the missionary outlook. Up to recent times we were always told that the common people were ready to welcome Christianity and (what is more) the Christian missionary, but that the government and literati were hostile. Now we find the government and officials almost ostentatiously friendly, while at the same time the signs of anti-Christian feeling are still apparent. The truth is that in a country like China, with a truly democratic basis of society, no actual artificial line can be drawn between the classes; but whereas the Manchu rulers and the officials dependent on them have become convinced that China's needs and capacities will not permit her the luxury of murdering foreigners, the mass of the people are too ignorant to appreciate the situation. They are, moreover, moved by a new spirit, and it becomes increasingly doubtful whether any government can long exercise that control over them which, despite frequent rebellions, it has so long possessed.

What are the prospects of Christianity in China? To answer that we must ask another question: What has Christianity to offer to China? We offer her a system of ethics which is in some respects inferior to her own. Our moral system is founded on individualism, hers on the family life. Christianity bids a man leave father and mother and cleave to his wife. It preaches war even in the family, and its Founder said, "I came not to bring peace, but a sword." These are hard sayings for China, and it will be long ere she can accomplish so entire a change of moral vision as to perceive their true meaning. She is able now to gauge how far the abstract prin-

ciples of Christianity have been abandoned in building up our ethics; and she can see—for instance, in France—how far the Christian people are from recognizing the influence with which we desire to supplant Confucius, Lao-tsz, Buddha, or Mohammed. The Chinese are too subtle a people to be drawn away from the worship of one set of words to another without being convinced that the new form has a more vital force than the old. To them, unfortunately, Christian doctrine must seem mostly a form of words, since its very propagation among them is founded on what they consider untruth. "Christianity," they say, "was permitted to be preached because it taught virtue; we find it teaches a great many things which are not virtue, such as defying the law of the land; and it is, in fact, a political and not a religious propaganda." Readers will make allowance for the Chinese point of view.

But, again, what has Christianity to offer to China? The spiritual consolations and upliftings of our religion do not have the same appeal to a people whose fundamental idea of virtue is stoicism, and whose mystical side has never developed. In fact, when we remember how little the Chinaman is aware of his own need of religion, it is hard to formulate in words any exact spiritual benefit which we can promise him in exchange for long-cherished customs and traditions. To borrow an expression, the conviction of sin and the longing for salvation do not enter into his purview of life; and, when we reflect that many things which we call sin are virtues in his eyes, it is hard to see how we are to bring these things home to him.

But Christian civilization, without Christian doctrine, has much to offer China; and the benefits of advanced humanitarianism, of applied science, and of personal devotion to an ideal are beginning to bear good fruit after a long period in which their connection with the hated foreigner and his ways was the great obstacle. The opening, under official patronage, of a medical college even at Peking, promoted by missionaries but secular in character, is one of the signs of a new order of things. It must be remembered that surgical work has been greatly hindered by the Chinese hatred of mutilation, which rendered operations in hospitals the subject of frightful misrepresentations. This most Christian form of teaching—the alleviation of human suffering—has had to fight its way through many obstacles, and has illustrated well the wide gulf which separates the Eastern and Western modes of thought. The whole fabric of *taoism*, with its pseudo-scientific jargon of elements and essences, breaks down before a training in elementary chemistry.

It is notorious that a new era has begun in China, and that the "new learning" is no longer to be despised, but has become the fashion. The insecurity of the Manchu dynasty in the midst of these new conditions drove the Court and officials into an attitude of great complaisance to foreign Powers, and now we see a Chinese Christian elected as the head of the republic which the reform party wishes to establish. Is this the beginning of a fresh era in the history of Christianity? Despite everything—the Chinese attitude, the false position created by the extra-territorial rights of missionaries, the trans-

parent political designs of those who protect Christianity—despite all these and many other handicaps, are we yet to see Christianity as a practical and efficient force in the rebirth of the Chinese people?

Naturally, we turn to Japan at this point, as China has done. We see, as China sees, that Japan has taken Christian civilization and left its religion —that is to say, the husk without the kernel—and Japan has been extraordinarily successful. The period of her renascence has coincided with a greatly increased missionary activity in the East, and might have been reasonably expected to show a proportionate increase of Christian converts. We know that the opposite has been the case—that the last decade has seen the worst Christian persecution on record in China; and that even the optimistic Americans, who are the principal workers in the Japanese missionary field, acknowledge somewhat barren records. Japanese influence in China is, in fact, solidly anti-Christian, not in the sense of stirring up anti-Christian riots, but in stimulating the national and racial pride which, unfortunately, have been most sorely wounded by the politico-religious European propagandists. There is actually a pan-Buddhist revival, artificially stimulated by Japan, which makes its appeal to racial rather than religious feeling. Moreover, the success of the Japanese in adapting, rather than adopting, Western civilization has been the subject of much remark in China, and the conclusion drawn is that to be efficient like the barbarian it is not necessary to accept his religion.

Between religious disputes among the missionary bodies, which from time immemorial have disagreed

as to the best method of presenting Christ's teaching to the Chinese, and between the political rivalries of the Christian European Powers, it is evident that China must find it hard to accept the religion of peace on earth as anything more than a convenient pretext for foreign aggression. Were she inclined to do so her experience of the last half-century would disillusion her. Her own faults of misgovernment and vacillation are largely to blame for the state of affairs; but nothing can alter the main fact that, by placing Christianity on a different footing from other foreign religions, Europe has enormously increased the difficulties of the position. In the words of the late author of *The Englishman in China*, one of the acutest observers of the relations between East and West who has written in the English language:

> When all suspicion as to [the Christian missionary's] motives shall have been removed; when he shall have learned to live on amicable terms with his Chinese neighbors, and they to regard him not as a danger, but as a reasonable friend; when there shall be no more local sources of irritation; when, in short, the missionary shall be treated on his proper merits—what, then, will be his position toward the Chinese? Will it not still be that of a destroyer of their traditions, their morality, their philosophy—in a word, of that on which they build up their national and individual pride and of all that now sustains them in an orderly and virtuous life?

These words represent very accurately the attitude of many earnest and thinking men toward Christianity in China, but the troubling of the waters which has taken place since they were written has

modified some of the conditions. Chinese philosophy and morality are breaking down of themselves before the impact of materialism, and, dark as the outlook has been and still is for the spread of the dogmas of Christianity, there is reason to believe that the efforts of Christian men to raise the Chinese standard at just those points where it is lowest—in humanitarianism, respect for women, and freedom from degrading superstitions—will eventually win for the religion which prompted them a recognition which no mere doctrinal propagandism could attain.

But the question of religion in China is not, to the mind of the writer, only concerned with the future of Christianity. Though the amalgam of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism (which for the average Chinese has supplied the place of a religion that is a moral and ethical basis to his material existence) may be inferior as an elevating influence to Christianity, yet it has certainly had some very striking effects, and has helped to produce a type of man with some sterling qualities and a society whose very longevity is a guarantee of efficiency. The precepts of Confucius and Lao-tsz and the Buddhist doctrines of the purer kind are of the loftiest character. But, just as the English school boy or girl may contract a lifelong aversion to the Bible from being compelled to memorize solid chunks of it, so the "classics" of China are in danger of being neglected in the rush for Western education. More is said on this subject in the chapter on "The New Learning." The real danger is that Young China, rejecting the fashions of their fathers, may

grow up without religion at all. It is the experience of mission schools that their best pupils passing on to government universities are concerned only with the secular side of education. How many Japanese, trained abroad, return in fact to the nominal faith which it is still their patriotic duty to profess? The Chinese are extremely tolerant in religious matters. The persecution of Christians has always been connected with politics, even when the ostensible reason was some infraction of Chinese codes by missionaries. Tolerance in religious matters is not always a positive virtue; more often than not it is a question of indifference. It has been asked whether the Chinese people, who so recently persecuted Christians, will accept a Christian ruler. Probably his record as a patriot will quite outweigh any slight disadvantage attaching to his profession of a foreign faith. But the latitudinarianism of the Chinese constitutes a real danger, to which some of their wisest men are already awake, and, unless they are to lose altogether the moral rudder by which they have hitherto been guided, a strong effort should be made to preserve the teaching of their own classics. That this can supply the place of religion is not advanced, but a man's religion is the outcome of his own spiritual needs. He can be guided, but not driven, toward it. The ethical training on which his character and his relations with other men are largely founded must, on the contrary, be given him early and in large doses. Young China may find Christ, but cannot dispense with Confucius.

III

GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

PERHAPS the simplest conception of the government of China is to regard it as an ancient theocracy, the Emperor being Pontifex Maximus, and ruling by divine right. There is no Church or priesthood, no dogmas to become obsolete, no ritual to be corrupted, no scriptures to be perverted or criticized, but only one Solitary Man standing between Heaven and Earth. Hence, perhaps, the unexampled duration of a system whose ethereal essence, unencumbered with perishable integuments, has hitherto been superior to time and change. The Emperor worshiped Heaven pure and simple. It was his place to declare the will of Heaven to the people, which it must be admitted he did with much modesty and reserve. He was responsible to Heaven alone, and was in his own person the blame of Heaven's judgments on the people, humbling himself in sackcloth and ashes to avert the Divine wrath. But as none could share his responsibility, so none could share his authority.

Viewed from the terrestrial standpoint, we reach the same result by an inverse process. The Imperial structure may, with as much accuracy, be regarded as the supreme development of the family idea.

The people are the children, the Emperor the great father: absolute obedience on the one side, protection and nourishment on the other; such is the theoretical relationship. The family, the master key to all Chinese polity, is a mighty power in support of order culminating in the Throne. Parricide is the most heinous of crimes, and rebellion is parricide. Nevertheless, with that bewildering combination of two opposing theories which often confront us in China, the right to revolt against bad rule is an acknowledged privilege of the Chinese democracy.

It is, of course, hard to bring lofty ideals into harmony with the grisly reality of Palace intrigues which place this or that infant in the seat of the Son of Heaven to the accompaniment of assassination; but it is convenient, nevertheless, to bear the theory in mind, were it of no greater utility than to keep us from error in interpreting the forms and phraseology of edicts and other state papers.

More important for practical purposes is the Chinese civil administration, which may be considered apart from the abstract theory of government. And the first point deserving notice is the position of the absolute monarch in the governing machine. He has not, in practice, governed any more despotically than a constitutional sovereign or the president of a republic: he only says yes or no to projects submitted to him, or refers them "to the board concerned for further consideration and report." Though the power of initiative may be vested in the Emperor, it is sparingly used. Besides the check automatically applied by the official mechanism, an influence less definite though no less

effective over the acts of the sovereign has always been exerted by the body of educated opinion. From the literary oligarchy, indeed, Huc considers the central government derives its real inspiration and moral authority. The regular procedure is by memorials, which are addressed direct to the Throne, and, as has been stated, are generally sent to the boards to report upon. This may cause convenient delay in giving a decision, and the members of the Great Council have also their final say. In the end the matter may be approved, dismissed, or deferred by the Emperor on the advice of the Privy Council. The system is probably as effective a way of sifting a question as a parliamentary discussion would be, especially as the Chinese government has its own way of making officials personally responsible for the advice they give. The operation of this principle of personal responsibility runs, indeed, through the whole scheme of Chinese life, and is important to be kept in mind by all who have dealings with them, whether political or commercial. An official who criticizes the conduct of another in a matter of difficulty is often taken at his word and sent himself to carry out his own alternative plans. In this way some of the results of party government are attained by a different process.

The attempt to classify the Chinese system of administration so as to bring it within the group of governmental forms with which the Western peoples are familiar is apt to lead to erroneous impressions, for it cannot be described by any of the names in common use. If we call it a despotism we are confronted with facts which would show it to be the

most democratic polity extant; and, if we call the Empire a federation of independent states, we are met by the absolute power vested in the Throne to remove the provincial governors at pleasure. It is best, therefore, to leave the system without a name, except that it is Chinese; for the "labels" have in times past sometimes misled Western governments into assuming what was non-existent, and into basing their policy on the fallacy.

The ultimate unit—the germ-cell, as we may call it, of the Chinese body—is the family, compact and indivisible, theoretically living on the soil which contains the family altar and the family tomb.[1] It is the first course of the political pyramid, which is but little affected by the storms that may blast its apex, and which survives the wreck of dynasties and the march of conquerors. Groups of families constitute villages, which are self-governing, and the official who ventures to trench on their immemorial rights to the point of resistance is, according to an official code not confined to China, disavowed by his superiors, and generally finds a change of scene imperative. The family system, with its extension to village and town groups, the respective heads of which are responsible, in an ascending series, for all the individuals, is the cheapest form of government extant,[2] for it dis-

[1] In dealing with the Chinese this all-important fact is usually forgotten by Westerners, with whom the *individual* is the unit.

[2] So cheap that, according to M. Simon, Chinese taxation amounts to three francs per head of the population; and so good that crime is comparatively rare. In the preservation of order the interested vigilance of the people themselves goes hand-in-hand with the official organization in the prevention of disturbances or crime. And both forces receive a vital sanction from the indissoluble tie

penses with police, while disposing effectually of offenders against the peace or respectability of the community.

Where the aboriginal government, which has grown, so to say, out of the soil, meets the artificial rule which has been imposed from above, the line cannot perhaps be drawn with absolute precision, but it may, for the purposes of this work, be assumed that the official hierarchy begins with the *chi hsien*, who rules a district (*hsien*) about as large as an English county. He is usually called by foreigners the "district magistrate," but this title, like that of an Indian "collector," very inadequately represents his multifarious functions, which are educational, fiscal, judicial, and all that belongs to an executive; indeed, as the last link in the long official chain which connects the Imperial Throne with the peasant's hut, there is nothing that concerns the life of the people which does not concern this very hard-worked officer. As the family is the unit of the Chinese nation, so may the district be considered the unit of the administrative system of the Empire.

A group of districts forms a department, or *fu*,

which binds every individual to the family, even in exile. As has been well said, "The man who knows that it is almost impossible, except by entire seclusion, to escape from the company of secret or acknowledged emissaries of government, will be cautious of offending the laws of his country, knowing, as he must, that though he should himself escape, yet his family, his kindred, or his neighbors will suffer for his offense; that if unable to recompense the sufferers, it will probably be dangerous for him to return home; or if he does, it will be most likely to find his property in the possession of neighbors or officials, who feel conscious of security in plundering one whose offenses have forever placed him under a ban."—*The Fortnightly Review*, 1895, p. 578.

which is governed by the *chi fu*, or prefect, whose place of residence takes rank as a *fu* city, as Hang-chau fu. The prefect is the court of appeal from the magistrate.

A group of departments forms a circuit, at the head of which is an official whose title is very familiar to readers of newspapers—the *taotai*, or intendant of circuit. If the magistrate be the important official for the Chinese people, the *taotai* is the important one for foreigners, for he is the pivot on which all business outside the territorial administration turns. Meadows tells us[1] that the *taotai* is the lowest civilian who exercises a direct *ex-officio* authority over the military. Though he would naturally reside in a departmental or *fu* city, the exigencies of business often require him to select one of district rank, as, for instance, Shanghai. Tientsin is a *fu* city and also a *hsien*, and thus has a prefect as well as a district magistrate. It is not only the official residence of the territorial and other *taotais*, but has been the seat of the vice-regal court of the province of Chihli ever since 1870, when the great massacre took place there. Its peculiar position as the gate of the capital renders the presence in Tientsin of an officer of the highest responsibility a necessity of state.

The next grade in the administrative system is the province, the chief executive officer of which is the governor, or *fu tai*. The number of the provinces has remained for such a length of time eighteen that China proper is usually known to the inhabitants simply as "The Eighteen Provinces." Each prov-

[1] *Chinese and Their Rebellions.* 1856.

ince is autonomous, with a difference. It is as independent as an army corps, possessing the complete machinery of government, civil and military, educational and fiscal, judicial and penal. The province administers its own revenue, provides for its own defense, holds its own competitive examinations, and performs all state functions without any interference from the central government. Since October, 1909, the province has had its own representative Assembly or Parliament. It is true that the functions of these bodies were fixed by edict as purely consultative, but it was clear from the first that they held more ambitious views. Officials are appointed from Peking, and each province has to remit tribute —or, as it may be called, its quota of the Imperial revenue—to the capital. This done, the province is freed from all interference from above. The whole duty of a governor may be summed up in two articles: Keep the peace and pay the tribute. The governor is absolute, the chain of responsibility in the ranks below him being complete. The provincial officials next in rank below the governor are the finance minister, the criminal judge, and the literary chancellor. The governor, however, is the only one who in his sole name enjoys the privilege of memorializing the Throne, and, as he is thus in a position to report on all his subordinates, thereby wields absolute authority over them. We thus reach the last link in the chain. The district magistrate connects the official hierarchy with the people; the governor with the Throne. There remains, however, another high provincial officer, who is not essential to the system, since in certain cases he is dispensed

with, and that is the *tsung tu* or *chih tai*, or governor-general. He usually superintends the affairs of two provinces (each with its own governor), and sometimes only one (as in the cases of Chihli and Szechuan), while some provinces, as Shantung, have no governor-general. This high authority is rather inaptly called "viceroy" by foreigners, a word which finds no equivalent in the Chinese title. Those best known are: The Viceroy of Chihli, the office held for twenty-four years by the late Li Hung Chang; the Viceroy of Kiangnan (Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Kiangsi provinces), whose capital is Nanking; the Viceroy of the Hu Kwang, or Liang Hu (Hunan and Hupei), whose residence is at Wuchang, on the Yangtse; the Viceroy of Min-Chê (abbreviation for provinces of Fukien and Che kiang), who resides in Fuchau; the Viceroy of the Liang Kwang (the two Kwangs, Kwangtung and Kwangsi), whose capital is Canton; of Yun-Kwei (Yunnan and Kweichau), who resides at Yunnan fu; of Shen-Kan (Shensi and Kansu), who governs at Sian fu.

Great as are the powers of governors and governors-general, that of life and death is not one of them, except in certain special cases—such as piracy or crimes which may be construed into seditiousness—where drumhead court-martial would apply in Western countries. In ordinary cases no death-warrant can be signed save by the Emperor himself. As is notorious, the Chinese system in practice does not protect the accused from the misery of protracted imprisonment.

Two important characteristics of Chinese officialdom need to be constantly borne in mind by foreigns

ers who desire to have a just appreciation of the merits and demerits of the man and of the system. The first is that the aspirant enters the ranks through the portal of competitive literary examinations. These examinations form, perhaps, the most remarkable feature in the whole fabric of Chinese polity; they are so ancient, and have taken such a complete hold of the ambitions of the people. No part of the administration is so minutely organized as this. The prize of a literary degree, and then a higher, and yet a higher, is the blue ribbon for which the whole nation seems to be contending; at once an honorable distinction and a passport to official appointment. As is explained in the chapter on "The New Learning," the introduction of modern education has only modified the training; it has not altered the system. The gaining of the prize is an occasion of public festivity in the birthplace of the successful candidate. The results of the system are, as might be expected, both good and bad; but, at any rate, it has secured hitherto that every Chinese official shall be a scholar, and generally an expert in style and penmanship. Not only on entering the service, but in his subsequent career, the power of the pen serves its owner as well as the power of the tongue does in parliamentary countries. "Junius" would have risen to high office in China. One of the most prominent of the viceroys, the late Chang-Chih-tung, was just such another master of invective.

The second characteristic follows naturally from the first and marks the shade in the picture. Scholarship being the essential qualification for office, no other was sought for, nor were the state functions

so differentiated as that a young official could gain special training for any department of duty for which he might have particular aptitude. From the district magistrate upward one man has had to discharge many duties, as revenue officer, literary examiner, coroner, sheriff, prison inspector, and judge. From his induction into public service the young official has had to be jack-of-all-trades; and, even when in the higher grades some separation of function took place, it was a mere chance, or at least depended on no consideration of special fitness for the duties, whether one was promoted to be provincial judge, literary chancellor, or provincial treasurer. Although these conditions will now be modified, under whatever form of rule, yet the ingrained characteristics of Chinese administration will not be lightly altered. No doubt this promiscuous experience sharpens the general intelligence, and it is, perhaps, therefore, not so much a matter of surprise as it is sometimes thought that Chinese officials thrown into novel relations with foreigners should acquit themselves so well. Of course, the principal lesson of their lives is caution, which educates their instinct for evasion and delay. The reality, they think, will always keep, and it is never too late for compromise. Hence they become adepts at plausible representations, which are so ingenious as to puzzle, and sometimes nonplus, an inexperienced foreigner who attempts to follow them through their mazes of argument. But they are not at all disconcerted when confronted with their own false premises. Honor is not stained by what is euphemistically termed by the Chinese "big talk"—in other words,

untruth. From the point of view of the efficiency of the government service, however, it is obvious that the jack-of-all-trades system must be fatal whenever an emergency arises. During the Japanese War its breakdown was conspicuous in the case of Li Hung Chang. He alone had to conduct the campaign, as Minister of War and as commander-in-chief of both army and navy, while at the same time he had to carry on his territorial duties as governor-general of a large province, his special duties as superintendent of trade, and numerous other functions. And all this without any organized staff! Yet the Emperor and his advisers probably had no real insight into the reasons of their military collapse, so completely were they wrapped up in their traditional practices, in military tactics two thousand years old, and in the bow-and-arrow exercises of the Manchu garrison in Peking.

Taking the scheme as a whole, and as applicable to internal affairs, which were the sole concern of the Empire until fifty years ago, the Chinese administration was very well thought out. The government neither attempted impossibilities itself nor expected miracles of its distant agents. It could not follow out the intricacies of every local question that might arise in so vast an Empire, so it cut every such consideration short by simply making the provincial authorities responsible for success, which amounted to little more, as has been said, than keeping the peace and paying the tribute.[1] The "barbarians"

[1] "Keeping the peace," however, includes the absolute obligation to discover and bring to justice an offender, an obligation which extends in an unbroken chain through all official grades from the

on the coast were, of course, a serious element of disturbance, and a man who had a reputation for "soothing and bridling" them had a good chance of receiving an appointment at a treaty port. The essential thing always was to prevent the intruders from ever being heard of in the capital.

Many precautions were devised to prevent any kind of malfeasance in the provinces, such precautions, indeed, as must *à priori* have commended themselves to any wise ruler. For one thing, the term of office in one post was limited to three years. Further, a mandarin could not hold office in the province of his birth. By such means as these it was sought to guard against local interests growing up to compete with Imperial duty, and especially against territorial attachments which might become the bases of disloyalty to the Throne. Where distances were so great and communications so slow, such checks cannot have been considered to be superfluous, but the drawbacks to the system are obvious, for it is the absence of local and territorial attachments which encourages some of the worst official abuses. Rapacity makes hay while the sun shines all the more ruthlessly when there is no tie of sentiment between the parties, and no forebodings of reprobation in old age or retirement in the locality where the family of the official is domiciled. Neither in such a short term of office is an official likely to

lowest to the highest, who are successively responsible, like the series of endorsers of a bill of exchange. No excuse for failure is admissible, and it is on this principle that the governor of a province is punished for a crime if he has not been vigilant enough to prevent it, or energetic enough to arrest the culprit.

interest himself in, still less to spend his own money on, local improvements, such as roads and bridges, in a place which may know him no more during his whole official career. Some of the worst features of the Indian "nabob" system are thereby perpetuated.

Checks of various other descriptions have been devised for keeping the mandarinate in the path of rectitude. The literary examinations and the granting of degrees must always qualify an immense number of candidates for whom no immediate employment can be found, and besides these the number of officials temporarily out of office is always very large. These together form an army of expectants who congregate about every provincial capital on the chance of something turning up. They are at the disposal of the governor to fill chance vacancies *pro tem.*, to execute commissions, or to spy on the doings of other officials and make reports. It is in the ranks of these unemployed scribes that are found the chief literary assailants of foreign missionaries, and the fomenters of riots based on gross imputations which they circulate by placard and pamphlet.

A more organized form of precautionary measures is the institution of what is generally known as the "censorate," a body of men, fifty-six in number, who are appointed to "censure" in the various provinces and the capital itself whatever they see amiss in the conduct of any official, not even exempting the highest personages, and to watch over the welfare of the people. The memorials which these censors present are often wonderfully outspoken, and sometimes are efficacious for good. Occasionally, how-

ever, a too bold arraignment of the Imperial family draws down a fierce reprimand on the head of the author, and lucky for him if he escapes with that. It is interesting to know that the scheme of Republican government, as explained to the writer by Dr. Sun Yat Sen, includes the board of censors in a modified form.

From the forms in use and the evident care that has been taken by the Imperial legislators to secure pure and efficient government, one would be justified in concluding, on theoretical grounds, that the Chinese administration was a supremely good one; and those Western scholars who are engrossed in the study of Chinese lore have usually been inclined to that view. But between the theory and the practice in politico-ethical affairs there is necessarily a great difference, which is strongly accentuated in China by the enormous extent of its public service and the extraordinary length of time during which abuses have been propagating themselves. Not only are exceptions made to all salutary regulations—for instance, Li Hung Chang held one office for over twenty years—but evasions have become so systematized that, as in the giant forests of the Himalaya one is puzzled to distinguish between the parasite and the tree round which its luxuriant foliage is entwined, so in the Chinese administration the best principles are lost to view in a rank growth of false practice. Evasions have become legitimized by universal recognition. Peremptory orders are issued in the "tremble and obey" style. They are received with the profoundest obeisance, but they are not obeyed; and he who issued them forgets, or at

least ignores them, and there is an end. The war operations with Japan were carried on in this same fashion. Sham is the all-pervading element which reduces the finest precepts to naught, and as "they all do it," it seems to be considered that no one need feel aggrieved. Like a debased currency, it is as fair to buyer as to seller so long as it is current and no one is deceived. Perhaps one of the greatest difficulties to be faced by the Chinese reformer is the restoration of its face value to official speech.

To reach the heart of the national weakness, however, we must come to the apex of the pyramid, the central government itself.[1] In all grades of the provincial service there is, in spite of the resources of evasion, a certain sense of responsibility, an apprehension of being called to account, the Argus eye of a master personated by an army of spies, a wholesome influence in keeping up efficiency, and even, to a certain extent, purity. But in Peking these checks fail through sheer familiarity. There one has nothing higher to defer to, nothing unseen to apprehend. A dissolute parent may, notwithstanding his own lapses, exercise a restraining influence on his family; but *quis custodiet custodes?* It is in the action of the central government, therefore, that we should expect to find the greatest inconsequence, the greatest vacillation, where gravitation has lost its direction, where the needle has no pole to turn to. Only seclusion could hide the weakness and rottenness of the capital and of the Palace. The most casual

[1] This paragraph is left as written in 1897. The question of the central government is treated from the point of view of recent developments in later chapters.

visitor was met by proofs that the government of the city was far behind that of any provincial town. As a town, indeed, it was laid out on a magnificent scale, and it once had sewers of Titanic proportions. But the streets had become cesspools, worn into huge hollows, in which, during the summer rains, drowning was no uncommon thing for man and beast. Such as were the streets, such was the government. Its heart also had been worn away and become a receptacle for waste material.

The rebuilding of Peking after the Boxer rising indicates the arrival of a new era, but the modern Peking, with well-laid streets, buildings, police, and Western appliances, was not accompanied by a regeneration in Court circles. It is easier to re-create a town than a dynasty. The Court became more than ever an anachronism.

As has been well said by Mayers, the scheme of the central government of China was not to assume any initiative, but to control the action of the provincial administrators, to register their proceedings, to remove them, and degrade or promote them as occasion may require. No legislative change or progress seems to have been contemplated or provided for by the constitution. But as change was forced upon China from without, when the "barbarians" would no longer rest satisfied with intercourse with subordinate provincial officials, some accommodation had to be made by the Imperial authorities in order to admit of diplomatic relations in the capital. The first step in this direction was the establishment of what became familiar as the Tsungli Yamên by Imperial decree in January, 1861, which was orig-

inally composed of three ministers, who were also members of other boards. This new creation never acquired any status or authority until the pressure of external events compelled the Emperor's Council to make use of it, and to recognize it as an integral part of the government. It was only in 1890 that it first figured in the *Red Book*, a complete record of state departments. Owing to the pressure put on China by the foreign Powers after the Boxer rising, the Tsungli Yamên became the Wai-wu-pu. The change of name was practically the only difference.

Pressed also by the needs of the time, another board was constituted in 1890, which was to take the control of the navy out of the hands of Li Hung Chang. But there was no one connected with it who had any acquaintance with naval affairs; and when the Japanese War broke out in 1894, the members of the Board of Admiralty, none of whom knew a ship's stem from its stern, were fain to relinquish the control and let it revert to the one man who was deemed competent to take it. There was a talk of abolishing the institution after the war on the not unreasonable ground that there was no navy to manage.

Another office may be mentioned in connection with foreign relations; it is that of the two superintendents of trade—one for the northern and one for the southern coast. The former has been held since 1870 by the Viceroy of Chihli, whose official residence is at Tientsin; the latter by the Viceroy of the Laing Kiang, at Nanking. The first holder of the office in Tientsin was not, however, the viceroy (whose court was located in the provincial capital, Paoting

fu, a city some two hundred miles inland), but a Manchu of high degree, named Chunghow, known to fame in connection first with the Tientsin massacre of 1870, and next with the Livadia treaty, which was repudiated in Peking and very nearly cost the envoy his head. The odium incurred by Chunghow in connection with the massacre was scarcely deserved. The latest administrative change, also indicative of the important part played by foreign relations, was the appointment in 1910 of a commissioner for foreign affairs for each province, to take rank after the treasurer.

An interesting circumstance applying to the whole administrative system has been that the officials are intensely laborious, hardly ever get a holiday except in case of serious illness or the time prescribed for mourning the death of a parent—which is also liable to be abrogated when the exigencies of the service demand it—and there is no superannuation. They must work, like a cab-horse, till they drop. Amusements, also, are denied them. A minister seen at a theater would be promptly denounced by a censor. This severe régime is necessarily depressing to the whole official body. Its strictness, of course, has led to evasion, and the Peking *Gazette* was sometimes filled with the tragi-comic memorials of provincial mandarins, who enter into the minutest details of their pathological condition in order to obtain a brief holiday or to be excused from obeying the Imperial summons to the capital. The success of such appeals probably depends more on judicious palmistry than on the actual merits of the case.

Were it possible for us to set up the complete

skeleton of Chinese polity, of which we have presented a very meager sketch, we should still have gone but a short way toward a real apprehension of either its methods or its motives. For that, the dry bones must be clothed in flesh and blood, and we should need to know something of the cerebral functions of the organism, which experience alone can teach, and even that slowly and imperfectly. The closest observer will constantly be obliged to correct one observation by another, and the longer he lives the more he will feel the necessity of revising his generalizations. So much being premised, a few salient features of Chinese political psychology may be not unprofitably studied. The machine being fitted together, the dual question is, What sets it in motion, and what is it set to accomplish? To this, the general answer must of course be: The same impulse that sets every political machine in the world in motion, and for the same ends—individual ambition tempered by public spirit. Out of this combination the best and the worst results are obtained, depending on the proportions in which the two elements are blended. In the government of China hitherto we need not hesitate to affirm that the mixture has not been a favorable one, the personal being unduly preponderant over the altruistic factor. That government, moreover, exhibited the widest discrepancy of any known system between theory and practice, the purest ideal cloaking the grossest aims; a terrible example, in fact, of *corruptio optimi pessima*. And the preternatural exaltation of the ideal places it so far beyond the reach of the highest attainment in real life that the standard of public

duty, lost in the clouds of inflated verbiage, is wholly disconnected from practical affairs. It would, therefore, be quite in vain to seek the key to the politics of Peking in any theory which could be deduced from official utterances, constitutional formulæ, or codes of law. The remark applies, of course, to every government in the world. But the difference is that whereas in other countries there is still some relation between the profession and the procedure—as, for instance, when the minor is alleged as the major reason—this relation practically disappeared in China, and the substitution of the false for the true has become an organized system, already consecrated by unwritten law.

We have spoken of the reign of sham in the general administration; but it has had its roots in the central government. It may be laid down as a general rule obtaining throughout the public life of the Empire that things are never what they seem. Whether there may or may not be a real patriotic spirit in China among officials or people, there has been little outward evidence of it in the inner circles of the capital. Instead of defending the Empire and the Dynasty the natural defenders have seemed ready to sell both, and it is a problem how far even the Dynasty was true to itself. Each individual among the ministers of state and the princes of the Empire has been intent on "saving his own skin" by making friends of the strongest invader. For many years the politics of Peking were swayed by a bitter Palace feud, the young Emperor and his party on one side, the late Empress-Dowager on the other. Of a passionate nature and imperious will, inspired

by purely selfish considerations, the Empress-Dowager dominated and even terrorized the Emperor, who was of feeble physique and incapable of wielding the authority which belonged to him. Into this quarrel the courtier Li Hung Chang and the soldier Yuan Shih-kai were thrust. The position of the former nearly cost him his head on his return from concluding the humiliating treaty with Japan in 1895, for the Emperor's adherents endeavored to compass his death first by assassination, and next by quasi-judicial process on the ground of treachery. These designs were frustrated by the countermining of the Empress, who struck sudden terror into the opposite party, and then, to get her protégé out of harm's way for a while, manœuvered him into the post of special envoy to Russia in 1896. Quelled for the time, however, the conspirators waited an opportunity to revenge their defeat. Li Hung Chang's fate hung on the protection of her whom he served so long and so faithfully, and fortunately for him she outlived him. Yuan, on the contrary, lost his mistress and protectress at a most critical moment. But Palace intrigues and the warfare of powerful ministers interested the Chinese people less and less. They asked themselves how a government could voluntarily surrender its territory and itself to an invader without an attempt at resistance? Where matters have come to such a pass as that, we may almost as well discuss the machinery of the government of Babylon as that of Peking, so far as the practical interests of the day are concerned. China, like a pear, was most rotten at the core.

The woman factor is a potent one in Chinese

government, but never in a worthy sense. Historic courtezans become empresses make profitable subjects for literary portraiture and description, but they have usually marked the *débâcle* of a dynasty; and in meaner capacities women have played their part in the intrigues of court and camp. How much the collapse of China may be due to the personal qualities of the real but illegitimate ruler for years, the late Empress-Dowager, may not be known, but there seems to be no doubt that every surrender made to foreigners while she held the reins was dictated by her and her personal convenience. Remembering her experience when, as the secondary consort of the Emperor Hienfung, she followed him in his flight to Jehol, she resolved rather to yield everything than risk such an experience again. A threat of the invasion of Peking—if believed in—was always sufficient to bring her to terms. When the late Emperor was prepared to abandon the capital during the Japanese War, and resist to the bitter end, it was that imperious lady who insisted on peace at any price; and it was chiefly on her sensitive feelings that foreign threats took effect. The constant surrenders which were the features of Chinese foreign policy in her day were largely responsible for the growing discontent of the Chinese with Manchu government, and the Empress Tze Hsi, so eulogized by feminine press writers in Europe and America, certainly did a great deal to destroy respect for the Throne. Nevertheless, she was clever and strong-willed, and therefore had a better grasp of affairs than her successors.

Official and political corruption occupies such a

prominent place in most treatises on matters Chinese, that it is commonly regarded as something peculiar to that nation. The peculiarity, however, lies rather in the extent and the organization than in the nature, or even the form, of the Chinese system of peculation. In substance it is the same which prevails in the Western hemisphere, where it is called "perquisites." That this destructive parasite should have attained a higher development in China than elsewhere may very well be accounted for by the circumstances under which that country itself has developed. The extent of territory and relative difficulty of control, multiplied by the number of centuries during which customs (good and bad) have been growing, would yield a product adequate to account for both the magnitude and the methodization of Chinese embezzlement.

Though universally condoned, the system is, of course, illegal, and, just as certain forms of malpractice which are winked at in Western countries come, occasionally, into awkward collision with the judges, so officials who have enriched themselves in China continue to be at the mercy of blackmailers. The liability to denunciation and ruin which thus hangs over them goes a long way toward accounting for the universal timidity of Chinese statesmen. Yet the individual is as much to be pitied as blamed, for against the system which has come down from venerable antiquity it would be as hard to struggle as against one's personal heredity. Fair consideration should be extended to the rank-and-file implicated in a debasing system which it requires real heroism to resist; for here, as in the midst of a slave-

owning society or in the bondage of vice, there are those who would welcome a way of escape from the necessity of their lives, as well as those who revel in the full current of it.

The root of the matter, no doubt, lies in the fact that Chinese officials have, hitherto, been virtually unpaid, their merely nominal salaries being insufficient for their necessary expenses. Hence the official naturally obtained as much gratuitous service as possible, under the tacit understanding that his dependents must take care of themselves, while, at the same time, he must cast about for the wherewithal to maintain his family and position. From this simple beginning the whole complex system of what we call peculation may be traced.[1] The younger officials begin life, as a rule, in debt; they have frequently had to pay for their appointments, borrowing for the purpose at usurious interest, and they have to go on paying their official superiors on pain of being reported on. The highest personages in the Empire receive large gratuities from officials gazetted to the provinces, and become rich from that source. And when a term of lucrative service is over and the governor or prefect is graciously summoned to Court —an honor which he strives to escape, as a rule— it is in order that the sponge which has been absorbing in the provinces may be squeezed in the capital. The cow has been turned into the green corn, destroying more than she has eaten; she must come home to be milked. One highly lucrative post—

[1] Meadows assumes the highest mandarins to get by means of "squeeze" about ten times, the lowest about fifty times, the amount of their legal incomes.

that of Hoppo, or collector of native customs at Canton—was specially reserved for some worthy connection of the Imperial family, who was expected to amass so much in three years as to be able to deal handsomely by his kinsfolk on his return to the capital. This post was abolished in 1904 as "no longer profitable," owing no doubt to the regularizing of the customs service since 1901. An official incurs no odium and loses no good name unless his exactions are excessive or lead to public scandal. In the rare case of a veteran being made to publicly disgorge, it is only the computed excess that is dealt with. But, obviously, when such a matter is left to the conscience of the interested party (with no fear of an audit, unless he, from overweening confidence in his influence, is niggardly toward the censors) the door is thrown wide open to the most extravagant abuses. As no official is expected to render a true account, and there is no machinery for checking him that would not itself need, in turn, to be checked, the sovereign of an Oriental country—for China is no exception—would get no revenue at all under a fiduciary system. To meet this case, the revenue collection is simplified by fixed levies—taxes are farmed, monopolies are granted, and thus the most powerful stimulus is supplied to the concessionaires to raise as large a surplus as possible for themselves. The provinces are assessed in a similar manner for their quota of the Imperial revenue.[1]

[1] ". . . Each district has a fixed quota, which the magistrate must produce by hook or by crook, but beyond the minimum all the rest is practically his own, not to keep exactly, because if he holds a lucrative appointment he is expected to be extra liberal in his

The arrangement is, of course, clumsy and wasteful in the highest degree. It is beyond our purpose to follow its ramifications, and show in detail how extremely injurious it is to the national interests and how demoralizing to the civil service itself. A single illustration will show how the system operates on public affairs. Foreigners who serve the Chinese and have to get money for public purposes are sometimes surprised at the seeming contradictions in the official temper. They will, for example, plead in vain for small outlays for repairs or upkeep of buildings, while the demand for a large sum to erect new ones is granted readily. The reason is that no one is interested in the small expenditure, while the large one affords an opportunity of intercepting a worthy percentage. The lower official recommends the outlay, his superior sanctions it—and they share the profit or commission. The practice is, of course, ruinous in military matters, for it starves the service, while lavishing large sums on heavy guns and ships. Thus the Chinese had at Port Arthur and Talienwan, during the Japanese War, the heaviest fortress guns, enormously costly, the contracts for which made the fortunes of certain officials, but the men trained to use the guns were entirely neglected. The rule has

presents to the governor, to the literary chancellor, to the provincial judge, the treasurer, and so on, not to mention still higher dignitaries, if he wishes to get on. But there is no magistracy that does not at least make up its limits of taxation and leave something over, while the greater number leave a handsome surplus. To hand this over to the Imperial Exchequer is about the last thing that any one would think of doing. It is the fund out of which mainly the fortunes of viceroys and commissioners have been built up." (G. Jamieson, *Foreign Office Reports*, 1897).

been that the Chinese officials would promote that enterprise which afforded them the largest *douceur*, and the possibilities of material progress in China depended chiefly on the operation of that principle. Estimates are sometimes made of the loss of public revenue from wasteful modes of collection, a small percentage only of what is taken from the people being returned to the treasury. Yet it is doubtful whether the pecuniary loss is more ruinous to the country than the destruction, in the governing class, of public spirit, which is the necessary consequence of the wealth of the country being made the subject of a scramble in which every official of the Empire, up to princes of the blood, have heretofore been engaged. We know, by our own Western experience, how demoralizing is a scramble, no matter what the object of it may be.

The most important feature in most administrations is the method of raising revenue. As has been several times repeated, the central government in China evaded the principal difficulty by fixing the responsibility on the shoulders of the provincial officials. The Imperial revenue is derived from two main sources (apart from tribute and certain monopolies) — the contributions from provinces, and the Imperial maritime customs. As to the first, it is chiefly derived by the provinces from the land tax, which is an ancient institution in China, and was supposed to be proportioned to the original value in rent. In the year 1713 the Emperor, in a reckless and unprincipled effort to acquire popularity at the expense of future generations, decreed that the amount of the tax should be fixed and immutable for

all time, with only authorized reductions in case of drought and flood. But, though the assessment is made on a value of two hundred years ago, the occupier of the land (who for the most part will be treated as the owner) does not get off quite as easily as he might, for he has to pay a surcharge as "cost of collecting," and this is fixed by the tax-collector at an amount which allows a margin not only for himself but for the officials above him. This surcharge must be disputed between taxpayer and tax-collector each year, and forms the subject for bargains on both sides. Then there is an allowance to be made for meltage, as the money may have to be converted into other currency more than once before it reaches the Imperial treasury. The most reliable foreign observers, such as Mr. Jamieson and Sir Robert Hart, have estimated the taxable capacity of land in China considerably higher than the supposed yield. Under a different system of administration it is probable that the tax would have to be increased, since the central authority will obviously need a much larger revenue if it is to pay the officials instead of expecting them to help themselves. There is probably no feature of Occidental administration which is less congenial to Asiatics than what they consider our soulless cut-and-dried method of taxation, as inevitable and undiscriminating as old age! No chance of a bargain or evasion, no scope for individual skill—nothing but "pay, pay, pay!" Some such feeling as this will have to be encountered and overcome before China can place her administration of revenue on a proper footing. Only acquaintance with the advantages of good public services will

discount the aversion to paying for them steadily and systematically.

Customs receipts form the second great item in the Imperial budget. Statistics and information regarding what is known as the "native customs" are hard to come by. Land stations are established at various points; but their receipts are a matter only for themselves, so long as they transmit punctually the sum at which they are assessed. In 1901 all native customs within fifteen miles of a treaty port were transferred to the Maritime Customs Department, with the result that irregular collections are abolished and a full collection is made and reported. In view of the present situation it is interesting to inquire what are the principal sources of Imperial funds.[1] The land tax will be at the disposal of the central government, unless indeed the people, who usually connect revolution with "no taxation," refuse to pay. This is estimated at Tls. forty-nine millions.[2] The tax in kind on the provinces known as "tribute," commuted in some cases for a money payment, will not be paid in future. The tea and salt tax account for some Tls. forty-seven millions. The latter will be difficult to collect, being partly in official and partly in non-official hands, with a very confused and corrupt system. A large item is *likin*—Tls. forty-four millions—but this serious

[1] See Appendix III.

[2] The *possible* collection was estimated by Mr. G. Jamieson some twenty years ago as Tls. 375,000,000, and by Sir Robert Hart at Tls. 400,000,000; but Sir Robert Bredon (and he speaks with authority) estimates this, "with a crude resurvey of the land," at Tls. 100,000,000. Other authorities estimate it at a considerably higher figure.

barrier to trade has been abolished. A large and by far the most reliable asset is the revenue collected by the Imperial maritime customs — Tls. thirty-five millions *net* (given as Tls. forty-two millions in Imperial budget, 1911)—and there can be no more crucial question to-day than the problem of how this foreign operated and controlled department of the Chinese administration is to act while the future government of China remains undetermined and there is no real central power to deal with. The revenue could be legitimately raised, according to Sir Robert Bredon, late inspector-general of customs, by about Tls. eighty millions.

The Imperial maritime customs, under foreign direction, grew out of Chinese necessities, not foreign demands. The Taiping rebellion destroyed Imperial administration up to the gates of the foreign settlement of Shanghai; and, as there was no one to collect the dues, the foreigners themselves appointed a board of three inspectors to perform this duty and hand over the revenues. When Imperial authority was restored, a considerable section of the trading community wished to return to the old Chinese method, which they described as easier and less onerous, but instead of this a commission on tariffs decided that the foreign inspectorate should be extended to all the treaty ports. The man selected for this post was Horatio Lay, and when he failed to agree with his Chinese employers and fell, Mr. Robert Hart, who had acted for him during his absence, succeeded him (1861). The part played by the "I. G." in China during the second half of the nineteenth century, both as a most successful ad-

ministrator and the unofficial channel of communication between China and Great Britian, is a chapter of history which yet remains to be written.

The business of the customs is to collect duty, not only on imports from foreign countries, but also on exports, whether abroad or to other Chinese ports. They collect tonnage dues on shipping, transit dues on foreign imports conveyed inland, and, since 1889, *likin* on foreign opium. For a considerable period the superior staff was recruited entirely from foreign sources, but an increasing number of Chinese have been drafted in. Although such a system, under a man of different caliber from Sir Robert Hart, might have become an *imperium in imperio*, no such development has taken place. The service has always been as loyal as it is efficient.

Out of the Maritime Customs Department developed one of the most important reforms in China—the establishment of a modern post system, which has been administered for the past two years as an independent department, under a foreign controller, M. Piry. It is impossible to overestimate the part played by this improved service in the awakening of China. At present there are three departments under the inspector-general of customs—the Revenue Department, Marine Department (with engineer, harbor and lights' staff, for the construction and working of lights and for harbor and coast work), and (nominally) an educational department.

Attempts have been made during recent years to reform the currency, which is in a lamentable state of confusion. The coinage used by the people is the *cash*, forty of which go to one penny and nine thou-

sand six hundred to one pound. The *tael* or *liang* is a silver standard, the weight and quality of which vary in different parts of the country; the *Haikwan tael* (in which duties are paid to the Imperial maritime customs) has a value of about 2*s*. 8*d*. An Imperial decree of May, 1910, ordered that the *yuan*, or silver dollar, should be the standard, and that after twelve months all payments were to be made on that basis. An agreement for a loan of ten million pounds, to be devoted to the reform of currency and the industrial development of Manchuria, and to be advanced in equal shares by British, American, French, and German banks, was signed on April 15, 1911. A decree establishing a uniform system of weights and measures was issued in 1907, but the confusion in this respect is still an unabated chaos.[1]

A very fascinating article could be written on the methods and incidents in the transmission of letters and documents in China from prehistoric times. A literary people like the Chinese naturally did not neglect facilities for the exchange of written matter. It is well known that long before we had any such convenience they had adopted a system for transferring not only news but money about their vast country. It was only in the last years that government undertook postal duties for any other than official purposes. The official mail service and a foreign-initiated system to and from the treaty ports were in existence, but ordinary people belonged

[1] Those who wish to study the intricacies of these questions and of trade generally may be referred to Mr. H. B. Morse's *Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire.*

to postage hongs, run by merchants like any other form of business, and on the whole very efficient. The hongs find it yearly more difficult to flourish in competition with a cheap Imperial service, which is run at a loss. Uniformity of rates is not attractive to the Chinese, who, without meanness, always want to make a bargain. The letter hongs meet their views by having different rates for different classes of service. They do not have limited hours of service—essential in a government post-office—but keep open all day and the best part of the night. But despite all this there is no doubt that the hongs are doomed, and that the operation of a public service has enormously increased the volume of correspondence, and facilitated that disposal of newspapers and modern literature which has had so marked an effect on Chinese development. There are countries in the world, with nothing like China's area and population, which are not so well off for postal and telegraphic facilities.

This sketch of Chinese government and administration, slight as it must necessarily be, will give some idea of the anomalies and confusion existing in the year 1912. The Manchu dynasty, tottering to its fall (unless a miracle happens), typifies the old régime. The provincial parliaments and the reorganized postal system are at the other end of the scale. Whatever be the outcome of the present upheaval, no student of the progress of China along the path of political evolution in the last ten years can fail to recognize the energy and virility of her people. We have been accustomed to speak of stagnation in China; no one has ever suggested that, apart from

her rulers, China suffered from decay. The virility, the energy, and, in the present crisis, the self-control of the nation are self-evident; and China, which has long been a crying exception to the well-known aphorism, should eventually get the government she deserves.

IV

CHINESE DEMOCRACY

IT is natural that every serious observer of Chinese life should exercise his mind on the causes of the nation's longevity. Several of our best writers, including the more philosophical, have, with a considerable amount of confidence, assigned quasi-scientific grounds for the perpetuity of China in defiance of what over the rest of the earth's surface has been the "law of nations"—the succession of youth, maturity, and decay. It is due to the form of government, say some, the principles of government, the principle of selection of officials, the chain of responsibility, the literature, the maxims of Confucius and Mencius, filial piety and the promise attached to the Fifth Commandment (the *only* "commandment," the other nine being prohibitions) of the Mosaic decalogue, and so on. We cannot consider any one or all of these, or sundry other explanations, as satisfactory; neither do we presume to offer one. The true cause of Chinese permanence is probably very complex, and it will require a good deal more of sympathetic and persevering study before the philosophy of the Chinese race and policy can be formulated in any acceptable manner.

But of the contributory causes of a national

vitality which has vanished all conquerors, certainly not the least interesting is the faculty of local self-government which runs in the Chinese blood.[1] While it may help to prevent the development of nationality in its wide sense, this quality of the race keeps alive the constituents of nationality in separate small communities, and in a form as indestructible as protoplasm, which cannot in fact be broken up except by extermination. Or they may be likened to an infinite multitude of water-tight cells, which keep the whole mass afloat in the most turbulent sea. And supplementing the family and village groups which lie at the bottom of the national life, which are rooted in the soil and have their fixed rallying-points visible to the public eye, are an indefinite number of other groupings—special, variable, not territorially attached — which are the spontaneous outcome of felt needs, wherein professions, classes, interests, and aims form the organic pivot. This disposition of the Chinese people to arrange themselves in special organizations or coteries is clearly congenital and its action automatic, as in the elective affinity of crystals, for they carry it with

[1] "Amid all political convulsions the people have remained unchanged, and that mainly because they are a non-political people. They are indifferent to affairs of state, but intent on their own business. Yet they have the faculty of self-government developed in an eminent degree. They are quiet, orderly, and industrious; averse to agitation of any kind, and ready to endure great sacrifices for the sake of peace. Such a people are easily governed, and their instinct of self-government is one important element in their longevity as a nation: it has enabled successive dynasties, often weak and vacillating, arbitrary and corrupt, to control three hundred millions of people. This constitutes the elasticity by which they regain lost ground." (*The Siberian Overland Route*, A. Michie, 1864.)

them wherever they go; and of them it may be truly said that wherever two or three are gathered together they will promptly form themselves into a "society" of some sort.

In treating of the Chinese government in a previous chapter, the two heterogeneous departments —that which is indigenous to the soil and that which has been imposed from without or from above—were indicated. There can be little doubt which of the two is the more ancient, and, paradoxical though the statement may seem, there is equally little doubt which is the more authoritative. It is the peasant who rules, by a human right which no "Son of Heaven" dares to question. It has been the wisdom of successive dynasties to respect this "law of the land," to protect the people in all their privileges, and to base on this universal suffrage their own right to reign. In the *Shuking*—that most ancient classic—three canons of government are laid down, of which one is "That the people have the right to depose a sovereign who, either from active wickedness or vicious indolence, gives cause to oppressive or tyrannical rule." "Public opinion," says Huc, "is always ready to check any excesses on the part of the Emperor, who could not, without exciting general indignation, dare to violate the rights of any of his subjects"; and again, "though they are, in general, submissive to authority, when it becomes too tyrannical or merely fraudulent, the Chinese sometimes rise and bend it to their will." The evidently wide-spread discontent with the dynasty, which culminated in the 1911 revolution, can be traced to an interruption in this time-honored scheme of re-

lations between rulers and ruled. Foreign relations forced upon the central government not only a responsibility, but a line of action, in which the Chinese people were not—could not be—consulted. The cessions of territory to foreigners in itself constituted an abrogation of the rights of the subject. Confucius represents the sovereignty as a sacred mission intrusted for the time being to the "Son of Heaven," but a successful revolutionary easily becomes the Elect of Heaven.

The rights of the people are primarily the possession of their land, freedom of industry and trade, and the control of their local affairs. As to the land, the Emperor is in theory the sole proprietor of the soil—a convenient legal fiction; but in practice his right is limited to the collection of the land tax, except in case of rebellion or other cause of forfeiture. And it is a fundamental law of the Empire that the land tax can never be increased. No people in the world, says Richthofen, are more exempt from official interference.

Nevertheless, the two great systems, a centralized autocracy and a democratic self-government, are far from homogeneous; they resemble two extensive alien territories possessing a long common frontier. With the greatest submissiveness on the one side and the most prudent accommodation on the other, there must be friction and occasional aggressions. The benevolence of the Emperor, when filtered down through nine grades of officials, might be turned to vexation and sheer tyranny when it reached the last rank, which is in contact with the people. The question must therefore be never absent from con-

sideration how the people are to defend themselves from arbitrary officials; and, as the question must have arisen in primitive times, it has, of course, been long since answered by experience. In public affairs the people have no share whatever; the elective principle does not operate above the village or group of villages, whose head man is the go-between, the joint, between the people and the government. But it is a weak joint, quite inadequate to the duties expected of it, and is only maintained in working order by being spared, as much as possible, the strain of actual use. Having no representative system through which their grievances could be made known, the censors would appear to be the sole constitutional machinery for the protection of the people from rapacity or tyranny. But they number only two to a province as large as a kingdom, and they share in the common corruption, so that there is practically no means provided by the state whereby the oppressed may obtain a hearing in the superior courts. This seems a serious defect in a system which is so elaborate and which is based on popular content. But what the framers of the constitution have failed to supply in a regular manner the exigencies of their life have compelled the nation to provide by irregular means. In the absence of a tribunal they simply take the law into their own hands —a rough-and-ready, cruel, and often disastrous remedy for grievances. In small local questions the populace will sometimes resent an imposition by seizing the official sent to enforce it, dragging him by the heels out of his sedan-chair, pulling his official boots off—a great indignity—and throwing him into

the nearest ditch. That ends the matter: it is the last court of appeal. The magistrate who has failed is reprimanded as incompetent, and sent to another part of the country, although the governor who thus condemns him be himself the culpable party. In this we see how much officialism in China resembles that in Christian countries.

When the grievance is more wide-spread and is long continued and the officials are obstinate, there may be what is called a "local rising," which has to be put down by massacre, else the smoking flax may spread to a conflagration. And this, the ultimate remedy in the West, is the proximate remedy in the East, for want of any adequate intermediate machinery of redress.

Thus the sacred "right of rebellion" has asserted itself in China. Meadows, writing in the midst of the Taiping devastation and in immediate touch with its horrors, justified it by elaborate arguments, and showed historically that such outbreaks had been an essential feature in the nation's development. China has, indeed, been called the classic ground of revolutions, as many as twelve having occurred between A.D. 420 and 1644. Rebellions have been innumerable. The Empire is never, indeed, free from them; they are of all dimensions and of varied durations. During the past sixty years there have been many important ones. The province of Yunnan has been depopulated by them; likewise Kweichau; several times have serious rebellions, besides that of Yakub Beg, arisen among the Mohammedans in the northwest of China proper itself; the great Taiping calamity has been followed by numerous

smaller insurrections in a considerable number of the provinces.

In the rebellion of 1865—when China lost control of Shensi, Kansu, and Kashgaria—the operations were carried on in the usual desultory Chinese fashion. Tso, who crushed the rebellion, had as many as one hundred thousand troops under his command, and was more energetic than is usual; but it was by making roads, by starving out the towns, and especially by the employment of diplomacy—namely, by the judicious use of "rewards," and by winning over the Mohammedan religious leaders through titles and buttons—that the Chinese "strategy" eventually was successful.

The rebellion in Kansu, in 1896, was conducted in much the same fashion, but the Mohammedans were in smaller numbers and showed a less decided front. In their risings the Moslems have always failed for want of concerted action; they work in isolated bands, and therefore were only able to devastate the country, cut off straggling bodies of the Chinese troops, or massacre the inhabitants of outlying villages. Nothing could possibly have demonstrated more clearly in recent times the total absence, on the part of the Chinese, of the organization and discipline necessary in modern warfare than the campaign conducted by the Chinese in Kansu. And yet for the particulars of that civil war we are indebted to the missionaries, the whole episode hardly obtaining a paragraph in the Western press.

Whatever provocation there may have been for the original outbreak in any or all of these cases, it was completely eclipsed by the atrocities of the in-

surgents; and the conclusion that the average man would probably arrive at in balancing the pros and cons would be the very obvious one that the remedy was worse than the disease. Yet these scourges do serve a purpose—that of holding up to the authorities the risk of an uprising wherever there is misgovernment; a fear which weighs on all provincial officials and imbues them with their guiding principle of action, peace-at-any-price. The clearest line of demarcation must be observed between all previous rebellions and that of 1911–12. This has been, not a popular rising against local officials or against foreigners, but a combination of provincial officials, *literati*, and men of the highest standing against the Manchu race and dynasty. Whole provinces have "gone over" to the rebel side without a blow. Moreover, save for a few regrettable massacres of Manchus, the proceedings have been conducted in an orderly fashion.

The Chinese people, however, have other and less tragic methods of expressing themselves, and of maintaining democratic rights as against the aggressions of despotism. The most notorious are their secret societies. Some of these aim at revolution, as the great Triad Society (Heaven, Earth, and Man), which seeks more "light" (*ming*); but, as "Ming" was also the appellation of the last native dynasty, Giles suggests that the word is used in the latter sense. It is not easy to get at the real objects or the actual working of this and other "secret" societies; else were the epithet a misnomer. They have been frequently proscribed, and secrecy is maintained even as to membership. Some facts, however,

are obtainable respecting them where large bodies of Chinese happen to settle in British or Dutch colonies. Even there, also, the Triads were at one time feared and proscribed by law; but for many years past they have been recognized, as trade-unions have been in Great Britain, and perfectly good relations now subsist between them and the colonial governments of Hongkong and Singapore. Mr. W. A. Pickering, who, as Protector of Chinese in the Straits Administration, had special opportunities of informing himself regarding the organizations of the brotherhood, has given many interesting particulars concerning them. Some accounts of the establishment of the Triad Society in 1674 is given in the introductions to its manuals, and in a sketch of the history of the society since its creation, which Mr. Pickering had occasion to study. In its origin it was a purely political society; but it had in time become the refuge for doubtful characters, who use the organization for their own purposes, lawless or otherwise—for prosecuting vendetta warfare, and so forth. The funds are raised by general subscription, levied chiefly upon the gambling establishments in the various districts, and the "lodges" or branches are in effect so many rival organizations. A society which gained greater and more unenviable notoriety was the Boxers, of which mention is made elsewhere. At one time, under the guise of athletics, a good deal of time was spent by secret societies in drill and martial exercises. The anti-dynastic propaganda has been carried on vigorously through the medium of these clubs, and China is literally honeycombed with them.

Whatever the original aim of these societies, they have frequently wandered far from it, in the process of time and under changing circumstances, and have tended to become the tools of private schemers or the hobbies of busybodies and agitators. As the reason for their existence ceased (as is the case in British colonies) they became more and more degraded. But, so long as the organization was kept up and the ritual was carried out, the society was ready to be put to any use which might tempt its leaders. While waiting for higher game, the wire-pullers have busied themselves in plots to obstruct the execution of local laws, whether in China or in foreign countries where the Chinese congregate.

Some societies may be properly termed sects, seeing that they require a strict observance of certain rules of private conduct. Vegetarian societies are common, and the Tsai li sect, in northern China, which enjoins abstinence not only from animal food, but from alcohol and narcotics, is said to number two hundred thousand members. Even these, however, on occasion play a political part; and an outbreak in Mongolia in 1891, which became an insurrection, originated in a misunderstanding between the Tsai li sect and the Catholic converts and priests —a quarrel which had no relation to religion or morals, but to purely mundane interests.

The great fact to be noted, as between the Chinese and their quondam government, is the almost unexampled liberty which the people enjoyed, and the infinitesimally small part which government played in the scheme of national life. It is the more necessary to emphasize this, that a contrary opinion is not

uncommon among those who are unacquainted with the country. The Chinese have perfect freedom of industry and trade, of locomotion, of amusement, and of religion; and whatever may be required for regulation or protection is not supplied by act of Parliament or by any kind of government interference, but by voluntary associations. Of these the government takes no cognizance, though it may sometimes come into collision with them—never to the disadvantage of the popular institution. Every trading interest has its own guild, which maintains order among the members, acting as a court of arbitration, and for breach of regulations enforces penalties, which usually take the form of payment for a theatrical representation or a feast. When the local authorities propose to put a new or increased tax on merchandise, it is usually made the occasion for a conference and bargain between the parties; and, when these cannot agree, the particular trade affected brings the officials to terms by simply closing business until satisfaction is obtained. Foreign merchants also come occasionally into collision with the guilds, whose decisions in cases of dispute sometimes appear to them arbitrary and unjust, a notion which may be attributed to the opposite points of view from which the question is approached by the respective parties, as has been noted in a previous chapter. But it would appear that experience renders the foreign commercial bodies more tolerant of the Chinese guilds, as the colonial governments become more tolerant of the Triad Society; and in several instances the local guilds have even been appealed to by chambers of commerce in a friendly spirit.

Thus, in all practical matters—politics not being considered such—the Chinese genius for association has the freest play, and achieves most useful results. So thoroughly national, or racial, is the institution that individual isolation is unknown. Nobody stands alone, says Huc; and no commercial firm or bank stands alone. The system of association here fits in with the principle of linked responsibility, and provides a guaranty most valuable for business. As the London bankers came to the rescue of Barings, so do the Chinese sometimes unite to support a member of the guild. In the case of bankers, indeed, the guaranty is in constant action, all those who belong to the inner circle being strictly bound to aid each other in emergency and prevent catastrophe. This makes it virtually impossible for a bank of the first class to fail, except by some flagrant breach of propriety.

Benefit and tontine societies of all sorts abound throughout the country—anti-gambling societies, associations for protection from thieves, associations of girls who forswear marriage and agree to take poison rather than be forced into that "honorable estate," vigilance committees, and hundreds of others. In a word, the country is full of societies of every kind, which fill up a very important space in the life of the Chinese people.

Even the poor, as Huc tells us,

> are formed into companies, regiments, and battalions, and this great army of paupers has a chief, who bears the title of "King of Beggars," and who is actually recognized by the state. He is responsible for the conduct of

his tattered subjects, and it is on him the blame is laid when any disorders occur among them that are too outrageous and dangerous to public peace to be endured. The "King of the Beggars" at Peking is a real power. . . . Whilst they swarm about like some devastating insects, and seek by their insolence to intimidate every one they meet, their King calls a meeting of the principal inhabitants, and proposes, for a certain sum, to deliver them from the hideous invasion. After a long dispute, the contracting parties come to an agreement, the village pays its ransom, and the beggars decamp, to go and pour down like an avalanche upon some other place.

Doolittle explains the diplomacy of the "King," who is enriched by the industry of his subjects:

A head man of the beggars may make an agreement with the shopkeepers, merchants, and bankers within his district, that beggars shall not visit their shops, warehouses, and banks for money, for a stipulated time, and the beggars are obliged to conform to the agreement. Religious mendicants or refugees from other provinces do not come under these regulations. The head man receives from each of the principal business firms with which he comes to an agreement a sum of money, from a few to ten or twenty dollars per annum, as the price of exemption from the importunities of beggars, and in proof of the agreement he gives a strip of red paper on which is written or printed: *The brethren must not come here to disturb or annoy.*

The beggars, in their rags and loathsomeness, are unpleasant objects; but they know that, however aggressive they may be, even to pawing a smart foreigner with their scaly fingers, they are immune

from chastizement, and they naturally presume on their immunity. They may be abused with the full artillery of Chinese objurgations, but that makes no impression on them. Yet even they are ruled by etiquette, and have their professional code, like all other sections of society. They must not call at private houses, except on certain special occasions of mourning or festivity, but that privilege may be also compounded for by a covenant between the head of the family and the chief of the beggars. The roadside is always free to them, and visitors to Peking know how the main approaches to the city are lined with the whining fraternity. They are sometimes really enterprising, and Doolittle relates the circumstance of the burial of a native Christian in Fuchau, when "a company of beggars and of lepers gathered around the grave and demanded twenty thousand cash as the condition of allowing the coffin to be lowered. One of the rabble actually got down into the grave, and thus prevented the lowering of the coffin." They eventually compromised for eight hundred cash.

Nor does the faculty of association end with the Beggar Guild. The thieves are also organized, and have their codes of honor, more elaborate than Dick Turpin's. There are certain matters in which ignorance is more affected than knowledge, at least by the respectable Chinese, and no one of them can be found to boast of his acquaintance with the articles of association of the fraternity of thieves, but these are known by their fruits. Even foreigners, who know so little of the real life of the Chinese, have observed some curious phenomena in connection with their

own residence in China. It is customary to keep a doorkeeper and a night-watchman. The duty of the latter is to jog round the premises at long intervals, beating the watches on a rattle or gong; then he subsides into the sleep of the man who has done his duty, for half an hour or an hour, as the case may be. Every opportunity and encouragement is thus offered to the house-breaker, but he does not take advantage of it. Let the householder, however, seeing—what is perfectly evident—that his watchman does not "watch," only part with that functionary, and then it is ten to one if the burglar does not promptly make his presence felt. A blind and deaf old dotard may prove an economical form of insurance!

The potency of the Thief Guild is felt in many ways. In the north of China, for example, highway robbery is not unknown; indeed, is sometimes alarmingly prevalent. But there is a valuable traffic on wheels, a very slow traffic, over exceedingly bad roads, most favorable for attack. Between Peking and Tientsin, in particular, there is a constant exchange of silver bullion for gold, and large amounts of treasure are conveyed on government and mercantile account. The conveyance is the common traveling-cart of the country, the custodian an ill-paid driver. There may sometimes be an extra man, with a rusty spear or an antiquated musket, riding on the shaft of the cart. But no harm ever comes to those expeditions of the precious metals. Whence comes their security? The livery stable, or "cart company," which undertakes the conveyance makes none of those exceptions to its liability about "acts of God" and

"King's enemies," and a host of other matters, which make the modern bill of lading such a voluminous document. The Chinaman undertakes absolutely to deliver the treasure. He guarantees it against all accidents whatever; and the remarkable feature in the transaction is that, for the transport, including plenary insurance, the charge is ridiculously small —not a per "centage" but a per "millage" on the value. Yet the business is remunerative, the owners of carts and mules prosper, and are men of substance sufficient to make good any loss that may be brought home to them. But evidently *they* make no losses. Out of their fractional charge they no doubt spare a trifle for some occult personage, as one would pay to gain the favor of the King of the Fairies, and thus all the world is content. Weird stories are sometimes heard of the diplomacy of the king of the thieves, and the efficacy of a dingy little flag to protect untold wealth in silver and gold, but that is a subject on which it is precisely those who know the most who have the least to say.

It is only fitful glimpses which strangers are able to obtain of the inner working of Chinese national life—quite insufficient to form a coherent theory of the whole, except by supplementing what is known by inferences drawn as to the mass which remains unknown. But the data ascertained seem sufficient to warrant the inference of a vast, self-governed, law-abiding society, costing practically nothing to maintain, and having nothing to apprehend save natural calamities and national upheavals. Perhaps the least-understood feature in the Chinese democracy is the sentiment by which the innumerable societies

are held together, and by which, in fact, the whole scheme of self-government is sustained. That is a proposition which is, *prima facie*, contradictory of many observed facts; it is opposed to the common opinion which has been so well illustrated by Arthur H. Smith in his chapter on the "Absence of Altruism"; yet it is established on no less incontrovertible evidence than this, that the principle of self-sacrifice is an essential element in the preservation of Chinese social institutions. It is often cited as an example of Chinese eccentricity that a substitute may be hired to undergo capital punishment. But if we consider the number of occasions on which self-immolation is practised to gain an object, we can hardly dispose of them all as eccentric freaks. They proceed from some principle which we do not as yet understand. Suicide, which is penal under English law, is meritorious in China. The sacrifice of a widow on her husband's demise, whether by hanging, poisoning, or drowning, still exists, and such widows receive posthumous honors. The devotion of a daughter who, in despair of other remedy, gives her sick father her own flesh to eat, is always highly commended in the Peking *Gazette*. To be avenged on his adversary, a man will commit suicide on his enemy's threshold. It is related of Cheo and Chang, leaders of a riot in Ningpo to reduce taxation, that they surrendered themselves to certain death—although they defeated the government forces—in order to gain their object and put an end to the contest without the further shedding of blood. Two governors who disobeyed the orders of the Empress-Dowager to exterminate foreigners did so with the

knowledge that their lives must pay forfeit. In acknowledging their acts they asked only that their families might not suffer. And so we find, running like a thread through the complicated web of Chinese social life, a constant readiness to die when the need arises, and one cannot but consider this an element of strength and stability in the Chinese nation, especially if we regard this spirit of sacrifice in its relation to the family cult, which is to the Chinese the realization of immortality.

Whether or no this spirit is sufficient to replace the tie to the Throne as the bond which kept China one remains to be proved. Dr. Sun Yat Sen and his followers believe that it is, and are prepared to reorganize their country as a democracy not in spirit only, but in form. No one with any care for his reputation would care to prophesy on the subject, and naturally everything depends on the precise form the new republic takes and the men who direct her government. But that China has some surprises in store for the world is a prediction one can safely make.

V

THE NATIVE PRESS

IN the state of ferment into which the Chinese nation has been thrown by the pressure of recent events it is reasonable to expect that new social forces will come into play, while old ones may assume a new development. The future is therefore full of interest, and there may be many unlooked-for developments in the process of adjustment to new conditions on which China has now entered. Among the factors in the new evolution none deserves more attention than the Chinese press, which, though only in its infancy as yet, has shown such signs of vitality that its influence on the course of events in the Empire must henceforth be taken seriously into account.

Although of Western origin, for the most part owned by foreigners and printed with foreign appliances, there is no civilized institution that has so really commended itself to the non-official classes of the Empire as the modern daily paper. The Chinese Peking *Gazette*, however, is the oldest newspaper in the world, compared with whose hoary age the *Times* with its hundred summers is but of yesterday. This doyen of newspapers began, and is still carried on, with the special object of supplying the people with news regarding the acts of the government.

More valuable illustrations of political and social institutions may be gathered, as Sir Rutherford Alcock contended, and a clearer insight may be obtained of the actual working of the governing machinery, by a careful study of the Peking *Gazette* than from any other source. And the glimpses it affords into Chinese life, manners, and customs make it singularly valuable as a guide to further inquiry. Sir Rutherford says:

If the visitor at Peking extend his researches into the Chinese city, and even penetrate into one of the narrow side streets near *Lieu-li-chang*, the Paternoster Row of the capital, he may pass the door of one of the offices whence the printed copies are issued. This is the quarter of booksellers, and their associate instruments, bookbinders and wood-engravers. On entering the shop, cases of wooden-cut characters may be seen ranged against the wall, and sorted according to the number of strokes in each. Some of frequent occurrence together are arranged as double characters, such as "Imperial edict," mandarin titles, the official title of the reign, etc. About a dozen of these printing-offices suffice to issue several thousand copies, from whence they are distributed, as in London, to their customers, or despatched in batches to the different provinces. But these offices are all private, and trust to the sale of copies for their reimbursement and profits. For six dollars a year the Pekingese may keep himself posted up in al that the government thinks it desirable he should know as to its acts, or the course of events in the provinces. Or he may hire his *Gazette* for the day, and return it if he does not approve of the cost of purchasing.[1]

[1] *Frazer's Magazine*, 1873.

Although in origin and aim somewhat similar to our own newspaper, in one respect there is a vast difference: never was there need in China for men like Dr. Johnson to listen to debates in parliament and carry them home in their retentive memories to be furbished up, for the government itself orders copies of Imperial decrees, rescripts, and papers that have been presented before the Imperial Council to be placarded upon boards every morning, for the information of the people. These papers are permitted to be printed and circulated, but without comment, and, as was to be expected, constituted, before the advent of the regular newspaper, the staple news and almost only subject of discussion among literary men throughout the Empire, the veto against written criticism doubtless giving all the greater zest to criticism by the living voice.

One would have thought that the next step would be the general newspaper; but, as in the case of several of the arts and inventions, the Chinese seem to have been suddenly arrested on the threshold of a great discovery and forced to bide their time until circumstances bade them take a fresh departure. There has, however, always been in the hands of the people, through the anonymous proclamation and placard, an effective instrument by which popular wrongs were ventilated and the object of hatred denounced. During times like those of the Franco-Chinese and Chino-Japanese wars squibs and pasquinades, written with endless satiric force and fun, were freely passed from one to another; and illegal placards, in which official corruption and incapability are exposed to the indignant people, are found

on many a blank wall. There is no doubt that many local disturbances in various parts of the country have been caused by those potent though irresponsible appeals. A single placard has been known to suddenly change the attitude of a whole district toward foreigners. Huc says:

When it is desired to criticize a government, to call a mandarin to order, and to show him that the people are discontented with him, the placards are lively, satirical, cutting, and full of sharp and witty sallies: the Roman pasquinade was not to be compared to them. They are posted in all the streets, and especially on the doors of the tribunal where the mandarin lives who is to be held up to public malediction. Crowds assemble round them, they are read aloud in a declamatory tone, whilst a thousand comments, more pitiless and severe than the text, are poured forth on all sides, amid shouts of laughter. "We Chinese," they say, "print whatever we like—books, pamphlets, circulars, and placards—without any interference from government. We may even print for ourselves, at discretion, provided we do not find it too troublesome, and have money enough to get the types carved."

As it was a combination of historical and other circumstances that led to the successful adoption of the discovery of Gutenberg or Faust in the West, so in far Cathay the native newspaper is the outcome and legitimate result of foreign intercourse, and of the moral pressure exerted, often unconsciously, by consular agents, merchants, and missionaries who have resided along the coast since the time of the treaty of Nanking. Without this pressure, and

without the mechanical appliances of the foreigner, the native press would not have come into existence. One difficulty in its way was the Chinese method of printing from wooden blocks, employed as early as A.D. 581. This was practically surmounted by the East India Company, which defrayed the cost of casting successfully a font of movable metallic type, in the year 1815, for the use of their factory at Macao, but more particularly for the printing of Dr. Morrison's invaluable dictionaries and other works bearing on Chinese subjects. This font was destroyed by fire in 1856. It is said that movable metallic types were made in China and Japan centuries ago—as far back as A.D. 1040, but they were *articles de luxe*, not intended for popular use. The cost of casting fonts of movable Chinese type prevented the more extended use of what has since proved to be a success. The task of providing cheap type was reserved for another class of men. The more enlightened missionary bodies, being fully alive to the fact that most of the grosser superstitions of the Chinese were due to ignorance, to an incorrect apprehension of "natural truth," began, soon after their settlement in China, to issue works of useful knowledge; but, as the cutting of blocks and printing from them was both costly and tedious, not to mention other inconveniences connected therewith, means had to be devised to print from metallic type; and the result is that, through the enterprise of British and American missionaries, elegant fonts of type of every description are produced by electrotype and other processes, with ease and cheapness, in every way suitable for the purpose of a daily newspaper.

As, however, every governor in his province, indeed every prefect in his department, is almost an independent satrap, invested with vast powers to crush any attempt at independent criticism of the acts of the Imperial or the local government—for such a proceeding is against the letter, though not the spirit, of Chinese law and institutions—some position was necessary from which papers could be published with safety—near enough to be sent into the Empire, yet beyond the jurisdiction of its officers. Such a position was found in our colonies of Hongkong and the Straits Settlements, and in the foreign concessions at Shanghai; the fact that the papers were in many cases owned by foreign capitalists being an additional element of security. A considerable part was played in the recent revolution by the circulation of journals and other literature printed in Japan, Europe, and America and circulated in China.

Such are the successive steps that have accompanied the establishment of a native press, in our sense of the term. As has already been said, the newspaper, from the first, commended itself to the people, conservative though they are in education and character, and has become one of the necessaries of life not only to every intelligent and thoughtful native at the treaty ports and provincial *yamêns* and to Chinamen living abroad, but to the dwellers in the most remote provinces of China. The circulation of periodic literature has been facilitated by the improvement in postal and other communications, and the result has been the creation, for the first time in China, of a genuine national consciousness and the foundation of an intelligent public opinion.

The issue of the first independent Chinese newspaper, while it heralded the dawn of a brighter day for the whole Chinese people, held out hopes especially for one class, which individually, though not collectively, has always deserved our sympathy—the disappointed "scholars of fortune." These men collectively constitute the *literati*, a class that wields enormous power in virtue of the deference spontaneously accorded to letters, and of its being socially at the head of the four classes — namely, scholars, farmers, artisans, and merchants—into which the population of the Empire is divided. Impecunious though they generally are, they are still able to wield with effect the power thus placed in their hands—a power that has been likened, and with some truth, to the influence exerted by the squirearchy and country clergy in Britain before reform acts disturbed the repose of rural parishes. When all the possibilities of the newspaper press dawn upon the minds of this hungry horde of educated paupers, this poverty-stricken, restless, intellectual class, who is there dare venture to foretell the results upon an active and inquisitive race like the Chinese? It seems likely that the story of the Japanese native press will be again repeated, but with a power in direct ratio to the vastly greater forces that are sure to be exerted in China. It will be remembered that after the abolition of the feudal system in Japan thousands of the lieutenants and retainers of the Daimios, the very flower of the intellect, the pick of the prowess of the country, unable to procure employment under the altered conditions violently introduced by the new system, found themselves

homeless and helpless. They could not dig; to beg they were ashamed. The native press, brought into existence with the restoration, was a God-sent gift to such men. Old samurai of bluest blood, who had lived lives of lettered ease in feudal castles, wielded the pen in the editor's sanctum; and swordsmen,who had made stand with their lord for Mikado or Shogun, now stood at the composing-case and printing-press, admitting and permitting no loss of dignity, conscious that they were working, as of yore, for the glory and advancement of Dai Nippon. It was a wonderful revolution, of which even yet only some of the results are apparent. So may it be in the phenomenal revolution which the forces of modern civilization are effecting in China, though the results may be widely different.

The number of literary men, graduates, aspirants for office who, out at elbow, throng every city and village—some years ago there were at Lanchau, in Kansu, nearly a thousand such "expectants"—will, it is to be hoped, find in journalism something more useful, more honorable, and more conducive to self-respect than writing odes on fans or composing scrolls for some native Mæcenas. And as, while waiting for office, they constitute the unrecognized opposition, and by far the ablest critics of those in office, the newspapers will afford them an opening for their talents and energies, and an unfailing means of criticizing measures before they have been confirmed for good or evil and have passed beyond recall. Such action is quite in harmony with the existing Chinese institutions, and is merely a popular extension of what has obtained in China for ages.

And here the mind recurs not merely to Confucius and Mencius, who are nothing if not political critics, but to the College of Censors, their legitimate descendants. It may be expected that a growing public opinion will hedge in these journalists with privileges, just as the government has recognized the prerogatives of the censorate; and as long as literary ability is applied to public and moral ends, and to the reform of existing institutions, it will find wide countenance. The adoption of a reform of government on Western republican lines must, of course, enormously increase the power of the press and the literate class.

It has been my endeavor to indicate the possibilities open to newspaper enterprise in the vast field of China as soon as the people may be able to override the high-handed proceedings of the mandarins and to insist that this growth of freedom should be directly grafted on a plant grown on Chinese soil. That a Chinese press would, if altogether left to itself, be moral in tone and endeavor to elevate the people might be assumed from the almost unsullied purity of Chinese classic literature from the days of Confucius to the present time; but the street literature, it must be confessed, hardly justifies this assumption. The influence of the *literati* and particularly the attitude of the censorate have been alluded to elsewhere, and the episode there cited—that between the celebrated Censor Sung and the Emperor Kiaking—shows that even censors may be bold, and at the risk of life, and that outspoken criticism will always exist.

Apart from local intelligence, advertisements, and

other items, we may divide the contents of native papers into four chief divisions—articles on purely Chinese affairs; leaders on international relations, and, if there be a war on hand, of course also war news; translations from the foreign press; and précis from the Peking and provincial *Gazettes*. Considered as a whole, they are truly strange amalgams of ancient political and philosophical maxims and curiously distorted statements of modern facts, reflecting closely indeed the Chinese method of dealing with matters —accepting words for facts, the shadow for the substance.

It is, however, in criticism of purely native affairs that the Chinese journalist is at his best, that his previous training tells, that he is on solid ground. As his readers, like himself, have read the very same books, in the very same order, elucidated by the very same orthodox commentators, the writer can easily sway their minds by reference to the well-known but never worn-out principles laid down by the Sages, according to which kings reign and princes decree justice. He appeals frequently, indeed almost in every passage, to the teachings of history, stimulating his readers' feelings by calling to witness their long line of ancestors who have distinguished themselves in a not inglorious past.

From a literary point of view these articles are the most valuable, as they are the most difficult, part of the paper. The *simplex munditiis*, the simple elegance of the classics, is the point aimed at. The theme of an able Chinese literary man, by means of the monosyllabic form of the language and its ideographic writing, acquires a concentrated energy

exceedingly difficult to describe, indeed impossible to convey to the Western mind, appealing as it does to the eye, the ear, and the intellect. Chinese prose style sparkles with epigram, antitheses, and the other figures of speech depending on brevity for their force. It abounds with *curiosa felicitas;* and nothing delights writer and reader more than the suggested quotation aptly hidden in the text, just apparent enough to give a delicate archaic aroma to the period. As Sir Stewart Lockhart states in his *Manual of Chinese Quotations:*

One of the chief characteristics of the written language of China is its love of quotation. The more frequently and aptly a Chinese writer employs literary allusions, the more is his style admired. Among the Chinese it might almost be said that style is quotation. With them to quote is one of the first canons of literary art, and a Chinese who cannot introduce, even into his ordinary compositions, phrases borrowed from the records of the past might as well try to lay claim to literary attainments as a European unable to spell correctly or to write grammatically. Letters on the most common subjects and newspaper paragraphs detailing ordinary items of intelligence are seldom written without the introduction of quotations; and, if these quotations are not understood, it is impossible to grasp the meaning of the writer.

And what have been the practical results of all the newspaper criticism of the officials? At first the mandarins by no means liked this outspoken expression of opinion, and it took them rather by surprise to find their acts, hitherto above open criticism,

subjected to hostile comment. The newspaper, much to the chagrin of the hangers-on about the *yamên*, was at first forbidden; but when the great man learned that his brother prefect in the adjacent department was also coming in for a share of the lash, under which he himself had been writhing, curiosity and the appreciation of the misfortune of one's friends got the better of dignity, and the paper was restored—and there it still remains.

The history of the *Shên Pao*, or the *Shanghai Gazette*, started in 1870, is instructive. This, the leading native paper in China, distinguished itself in successfully exposing official abuse. It spoke out manfully against torture, no matter by whom inflicted, whether by high-placed mandarin or underling of low degree. More than this, it succeeded in securing the reversal of unjust decrees of provincial governors by the supreme authorities at Peking, in spite of the etiquette and dilatoriness of Chinese law, and, above all, the obstructiveness at the capital of the friends of the officers attacked, for every official has his band of friends—they are necessary to his existence. In another direction it did excellent work in encouraging liberality, by publishing the names of the donors to relief funds, as, for instance, when the famine ravaged the provinces of Chihli and Shantung, and on other similar occasions. During the forty years of its existence it has shown the way to many reforms, and by means of its ability and independence has acquired a comparatively large circulation, attaining to a position of real influence unequaled by any other native paper.

It has not, however, been all plain sailing with the *Shên Pao*. Many attempts have been made to suppress or ruin it by subsidizing official rivals, but in vain. A special effort was made by the Governor of the Chekiang province, who had been attacked in the paper for being involved in a disgraceful case of judicial murder. He appealed to Prince Kung, then head of the Tsungli Yamên, to suppress it. The prince's reply was a snub to the governor and a vindication of the *raison d'être* of the paper. He intimated that it was rather a ticklish thing for him to deal with a foreign-owned concern published in a foreign settlement, and pertinently added, "We rather like to read it in Peking."

The native papers in Hongkong have exerted a similar though a far inferior influence in south China. The *Tsun-Wan Yat-Po*, or *Universal Circulating Herald*, while under the editorship of the Chinese "teacher" of Dr. Legge, late professor of Chinese at Oxford, was remarkable for the emphatic and almost savage way in which it attacked official abuse and misconduct.

Reform is steadily making its way by means of the press, directed by the right class, the younger educated men. When the Reform Club was closed at Peking in the winter of 1895–96, the spirit of reform, which exists in China as elsewhere, had not been killed, as was assumed; it had merely been scotched. Suppressed at Peking, the leaders moved their headquarters to Shanghai, where an active propaganda was conducted, chiefly by means of a magazine entitled *Chinese Progress*. At first published every ten days, this journal has become a daily paper.

It commands a large staff of writers, and is supported by some three hundred students and eighty benevolent societies pledged to support the reform movement. Nor is this support merely from the younger and non-official classes; even viceroys and lesser officials subsidize the society by subscriptions and letters of recommendation, not always, it is true, without some ulterior motive, for there is such a thing, or will be, as "capturing" the press in China. The tiny paper of earlier days, with its four narrow pages, has already grown into thirty broad leaves, with a circulation of ten thousand throughout the provinces, as against the former edition of one thousand chiefly sold at the capital.

In their treatment of international questions and of matters connected with the Franco-Chinese and Chino-Japanese wars, or the Boxer rising, the writers of native papers are seen at their worst. Here it is that their insufferable literary conceit, which begets in them a contempt for everything outside their own literature, stands in the way of progress. Refusing to recognize the altered conditions around them, and shutting their eyes to what has been actually accomplished within their own borders, many of them have continued to treat any matter in which foreign interests are concerned as if no foreigner had settled along their coast-line—as if China, secure in its isolation, were still the suzerain of all the many lands once hers. Incredible as it may seem, the British colony of Hongkong, even in 1898, was still marked in many Chinese maps as part of the Empire of China!

In the Franco-Chinese campaign of 1884 the

French were considered merely "outside intruders" or filibusters egging on traitorous Tongkingese vassals to rebellion, and in the Chino-Japanese War the Japanese were the "little dwarfs" attacking the Chinese "Goliath," and were to be driven into the sea at one fell swoop of the Chinese army. A very different estimate obtained after Japan's victory over Russia; but, indeed, that epoch-making event has altered the perspective of world-questions all over the globe! The British are still known as "the red-furred devils," while Europeans generally are termed *Kuei Tsze*, "devils." Needless to say, these views are no longer found in enlightened Chinese circles, and even among the more ignorant there is an awakening to the futility of the attitude of vainglory so common in China in the past.

The military tactics recommended to Chinese generals were, till recently, abstracted from works of a thousand years ago—while archers were still effective soldiers—when not borrowed from the altogether impossible "stratagems" (on a par with the Trojan horse) of the heroes of the remotest antiquity. The attitude of the Chinese press in time of war has been one of uncompromising chauvinism, which neither disaster nor incapacity seemed to modify. This may be merely an easy method of earning a reputation for patriotism, or it may arise from a desire to "save face"—that universal trait of the Chinese character, at all times and under all circumstances—but probably there is a complexity of causes to account for it. How was the Franco-Chinese War fever kept alive? Both newspapers and officials concealed the truth and pandered to the

popular taste. They described battles—always a pet subject with literary men in China, as elsewhere—that had never been fought; they sang pæans of congratulation over victories that were never won; and illustrations of the audacious "barbarians" being driven back pell-mell at the point of the Chinese trident were widely circulated among eager purchasers. They raised enough fervor of patriotic enthusiasm to make it dangerous for a Chinaman even to hint at the possibility of victory being on the other side. The populace were unanimous in allowing themselves to be fooled—they seemed to like the process. At the suggestion of the press, in 1884 a patriotic fund was established to be subscribed to by Chinese emigrants oversea. Large sums were at once raised from men who had already contributed to war expenses through the representatives of their clans in the villages of their own country. From Cuba and Peru and elsewhere contributions came pouring in from those who were the survivals of the fittest of the nefarious and despised "coolie trade." The rich "companies" of San Francisco also subscribed most liberally for the defense of the Canton province. Editors were not slow in driving home the lesson. "These men," wrote one, "have encountered the wind and waves for thousands of *li* to earn a living in a foreign land. Yet when they hear that their country is involved in war, intolerant of delay, they at once raise a subscription to aid the government and assist the revenue. Alas! when men living outside the borderline act in this way, what should we do that live within the country itself? We respectfully write

this appeal, urging all public-spirited men to go and do likewise. I should add that there is no deception," continues the writer, "as to the amounts, as the list of donors is published, and the committee of management are all honorable men." Not only did the editors do their best in sober prose to stir up the war feeling, but the aid of song was also invoked, one of the poets being no less a personage than a commander-in-chief.

In international questions the Chinese editor relies on foreign papers. Articles on contraband, blockades, duties of neutrals, and so forth, can all, as a rule, be traced to a foreign source. The opinions of the *Times* during the Franco-Chinese and Chino-Japanese wars were well known, and were referred to with respect, our newspapers generally being alluded to as "Western friends"—the equivalent of "our contemporary." It is in the department of the paper dealing with foreign matters that grave mistakes are made, mainly through the seer ignorance of the translators, who are too often incompetent for their posts. Except the *Shên Pao* and one or two other papers which have had foreigners to advise on all foreign questions, the translations on which the editor bases his "leaders" are made, for the most part, by English-speaking Chinese who have not been out of China. Their ideas of "things foreign" are inaccurate, but not quite so inaccurate, perhaps, as many of our ideas regarding matters Chinese. The newspaper translator handles the most abstruse and delicate subjects, those requiring special knowledge, with the utmost assurance; and, as most things are seen through the spectacles

of his own prejudice, the accuracy and value of the translation may be estimated. The less conceited carefully avoid pitfalls, and confine themselves to what is plain sailing.

Some high officials have been fully aware of the unreliability of native newspaper accounts of foreign affairs, and have engaged more competent translators to give them the news direct from the English press. On the whole, there is decided improvement in the native press; and, as the Chinese now know that there is money to be made through a successful newspaper, it may be anticipated that ere long, when communications open the country, the better-class papers will engage competent men to deal with foreign affairs. Telegraphic information is "conveyed" from their "Western friends," though not infrequently Chinese versions of foreign affairs are written by secretaries or hangers-on of the *yamêns*, who increase their scanty pay by forwarding their rendering of some telegram to the papers in Shanghai or Hongkong.

Along the upper border of the newspapers, where in the West is placed the title and date, is written the exhortation, "Please respect written paper, the merit is boundless"—an exhortation always heeded, for papers are carefully filed in shop and office, and are read and reread until at last they almost fall to pieces. Then comes the man from the society that makes written paper its special care—for there is in China a society for this, as for everything else under the sun—and takes away the well-thumbed printed rags and tatters, to be reverently burned in a crematorium attached to the *Wen Miao*,

the Literary Temple. These usages are mentioned as instances of the delicate regard of the Chinese for their sacred letters. The native news-sheet, though printed on paper with foreign appliances, already receives a welcome wherever it goes in China.

What will be the evolution of the native press in China it would be rash to prophesy. It may yet rouse a nation which has been too long under the spell of the dead hand and the dead brain; may teach it to break away, not from the characteristics stamped on them by nature and environment, but from the benumbing conservatism which has succeeded so long in preventing the progress of liberalism; may teach the people to understand that there is an intellectual and moral life more active and more restless than their own; may teach the most literary nation in the whole world—too long spellbound by past great names and great reputations—to at last think for itself. And when such a nation once begins to think—![1]

[1] This paragraph has been left exactly as written in 1897. Already the native press has accomplished some of the feats predicted. The revolution of 1911-12 is largely its work.

VI

THE NEW LEARNING

THE old system of education in China is too well understood now to need anything more than a brief reference. It was founded on—nay, practically consisted of—a memorizing of the classics; nor was there any teaching, in the Occidental sense of the term. The study of mathematics, for instance, had to be attacked by the student through books, and it is recorded by China's greatest mathematician, Professor Hua, that it took him years to learn addition and subtraction in this way. The principal feature about the old system of education, however, was that only through the portals of official examination could the class be reached from which officials and civil servants of all kinds were selected. The poorest boy, if his parents were able to make sacrifices sufficient to permit him to sit for examination, might rise to the highest post; but, although talent and industry of an extraordinary kind might be needed for the feat, yet the general effect of the system was certainly to stifle and deaden all initiative, to foster pedantry, and to keep the most powerful class in the land in the swaddling clothes of an outworn classicism.

When *China in Transformation* was first pub-

lished there was very little sign of any change in this age-long system. The few Chinese who, in mission schools or foreign settlements, acquired a foreign education had little prospect of employment in their own country. Impulses, which in 1880 led the Viceroy of Nanking to send some forty students to the United States with a promise of employment on their return, had ended in disappointment and disillusion. A better fate awaited the forty-six students who, in 1876, were sent out by the Foochow Arsenal to study ship-building and navigation. Some were drafted into the diplomatic service, others became distinguished in various lines of work. But, on the whole, the foreign-trained student of the 'eighties had few prospects. The writer had an interesting instance of this in the person of a man, very intelligent, highly educated on Western lines, and an accomplished writer, who was engaged to act as interpreter on an exploration in southern China. He was uncongenial and overbearing to his own fellow-countrymen, and grumbled so much at the hardships of the expedition that he was finally sent back. His after career was one of disappointment, and ultimately he returned to Chinese dress and habits and became violently anti-foreign. The position of this man, who in a homely phrase was neither fish, fowl, nor good red herring, owing to his training on Western lines at a period when China still clung to her conservatism, is in strong contrast with the policy recently adopted, whereby not only do we find that the Court had begun to send Imperial clansmen to study overseas, but, more remarkable still, a foreign-trained Christian Chinese

has been proclaimed President of the provisional republic.

The real change began after the Chino-Japanese War of 1894–95, and the first definite sign was an edict of the Emperor, promulgated by the Tsungli Yamên in 1896, commanding the study of foreign mathematics and science in all colleges of the Empire, and that all candidates at the literary examinations should qualify in at least one of the science subjects, while every candidate must pass in mathematics. The despatch of Chinese students to Japan began at this time, the government setting the example. The *coup d'état* of 1898 temporarily checked the impulse from above, and it has been evident to all competent observers since that time that reform in China, though sanctioned under pressure by the Manchu dynasty, must come from below and be accomplished by popular will and pressure. This has been the case. The Commercial Press, a Chinese printing and publishing enterprise, was founded in 1897. Its phenomenal success is detailed elsewhere. Other channels for the dissemination of "Western learning," and especially the press, helped to swell the rising tide of the demand for a more catholic and up-to-date system of education. The work accomplished by the Christian Literature Society has been remarkable, and that of the mission schools must not be overlooked. Considerable controversy rages over the question of how far the Chinese benefit by the preaching to them of Christian *doctrines;* and, considering the devotion and faith of propagandists, the results can hardly be pronounced to be satisfactory. But the policy of

Protestant missionaries of late years has been to bring education—medical, technical, and scientific —to the doors of the Chinese, and, when his attention and interest have been engaged and his prejudices overcome, to attempt the work of evangelization. The religious aspect of this question is treated elsewhere: it is enough here to say that, when China comes to look back on the years of her awakening, she will realize what she owes to Christian missionaries in letting in the first rays of the new learning. And even those who do not wish to see China forsake the ancestor cult, which is the root of her whole social fabric, must acknowledge that she has gained enormously from the presentation to her of Christian civilization at the hands of missionaries.

The *coup d'état* of 1898 and the reactionary wave at Peking were answerable for the flight of reformers, many of whom went to Japan, whence their writings were very widely disseminated. The favorable impression made by the Japanese troops in the Boxer rising of 1900 led to a rapid increase in the number of Chinese students in that country. At one time it was estimated that at least fifteen thousand were there, and they cultivated extreme revolutionary doctrines with a crudity due to a far too hurried and ill-digested course of the so-called "Western learning." This tendency led to a restriction in the number permitted to go there, and to an effort to divert the stream rather to Europe and America. It was not till after the Russo-Japanese War that the government sent students to Great Britain; but after the Boxer rising the American government refused part of the indemnity awarded on condition that the

money should be spent on education, and this led to the despatch of students to American colleges. The Viceroy of Wuchang, Chang-Chih-tung, sent students to Belgium, Germany, and France; and Yuan Shih-kai also sent some to France on the invitation of the French government. Yuan was always a keen promoter of education in his own province, and both he and Chang-Chih-tung hold honorable places as the foremost of Chinese educational reformers.

The impetus given to education after the Boxer trouble was undoubtedly due to the shock given to Chinese self-sufficiency and to the fears of the Empress-Dowager and her advisers. Having actually given orders at one time for the extermination of all foreigners in two provinces (an order which was altered in transmission by two patriotic officials, who paid for the act with their lives), the opportunist Tze Hsi made a complete *volte face* as to foreigners, and in 1902 she permitted the inauguration in Peking of a university on Western lines. The University of Shansi, which until it reverted to the Chinese did most excellent work, had been already founded. But the Russo-Japanese War must be regarded as the true turning-point in the fortunes of Chinese reform. Not only did it revolutionize the theory of relations between East and West, which, despite Chinese obstinate vanity, had been gradually forcing itself upon the minds of her better-educated people, but it drove home the moral of Chang-Chih-tung's celebrated pamphlet, so largely circulated ten years before. Education was, indeed, "China's only hope." The flood of light thrown through the medium of "the printed word," even to the hitherto obscure corners

of China, enabled thousands to realize the truth of that saying. The eagerness of the people of all classes for the "new learning" far outstripped the power of government to supply teachers. It must be acknowledged, even by China's best friends, that the difficulty of reconciling the growing desire for "Western learning" with an equally strong anti-foreign bias has handicapped Chinese education. The growth of the national, or "China for the Chinese," movement has prevented the employment of foreigners in a great many capacities, and their places have been filled by half-educated Chinese or Japanese, whose acquaintance with the "new learning" was extremely superficial. At the same time, this new type of *literati* either forgot or neglected his national literature to such an extent that even the works of Confucius are now rarely in evidence in Chinese bookshops and libraries. A recent observer, who visited both missionary and government colleges, comments on this feature, and adds that the majority of instructors are not qualified to do much more than to teach colloquial English, and go as far in science-teaching as their apparatus permits.[1]

In a desire to follow the popular will the Imperial government issued various educational edicts, and in 1906 a system which is almost perfect on paper was evolved, including not only the essentials of the "new learning," but a proper attention to what is best in national literature and philosophy. The curriculum adopted throughout the system has no special features to distinguish it from that of Western

[1] Leslie Johnston, *The East and the West*, January, 1912.

countries, and includes physical as well as mental training. At the present time the skeleton of national education (on paper, at all events) is very complete. Elementary education, technical, agricultural, and scientific schools are established in many provinces, and each is to have its own university. So far only three universities are actually established by the Chinese, though nine are maintained by foreign missions, as well as twenty-five colleges. There is a military training college at Peking, and a medical college founded in 1906 largely through missionary effort. Engineering has received special attention, the courses given (for instance, in the Peiyang University at Tientsin) covering much the same ground as similar graduate courses in Europe or America. The school founded at Tangshan has three foreign professors, and is considered to give a good training; and there are courses in different branches of engineering to be had also in the Peking Polytechnic and in the University of Shansi. There are, moreover, no fewer than seven industrial collleges, according to government returns. Finally, as perhaps the most significant reform of all, it must be stated that girls are sharing in this national education, special schools and normal colleges being provided for them. When, in 1905, five commissioners visited the United States, Harvard, Yale, and Wellesley universities offered scholarships to Chinese students. An examination was held at Nanking in July, 1907, and out of six hundred candidates thirteen were chosen, of whom three were women. At the present time twelve women are studying in Great Britain; two lady

doctors, trained in the United States, are in charge of a hospital for women in Kiukiang; a third is the head of a hospital in Foochow; and a fourth edits a paper in Peking. Another examination was held for students to be sent to America at government expense, in 1909, and again there were six hundred candidates, but only forty-seven successful in qualifying, and in 1910 fifty were selected. The standard, judging from some sample questions, is very high, and demands a general education of a very catholic nature. It has been settled that one hundred students are to be sent to the United States for four years (from 1909), and fifty in succeeding years for a period of twenty-nine years.

The graduates have to pass an examination on return to China, and are classed in three grades, and those not in the first class must present themselves again in the following year. Official appointments are dealt out to them in order of merit. It is through the portals of literary examination, therefore, that Young China, like Old China, will reach the coveted goal of official employment, but the difference in training and experience will be vast. It is hoped that the successful candidates will be able to take their places in the new social and political order and lead their country on the path of reform. As to this, experience only can show. That it is an ideal arrangement no one with any knowledge of education would be prepared to admit. The doubts entertained among educationists as to the value of any educational system which is founded on competitive examination are too well known to be elaborated here, and there is a wide-spread feeling in Great

Britain that our own services would never have attained their present efficiency under such cut-and-dried conditions. The writer, who entered the administrative service by a side door, at a time when such short cuts were not only possible but usual, is perhaps not an unbiased judge. Japan adopted a rather different system. Her ruling classes went abroad and returned home to reassume, in different ways, the leadership they had exercised before by force. China could not work in this fashion, but must keep the path of advancement open to all. Nevertheless, the best hope for her lies not in getting as many machine-made civil servants as possible out of a Western-education-sausage-machine, but in the knowledge acquired by her own better classes, a large number of whom now send their sons as students to Western or Chinese universities. Reference has already been made to students sent specially to study naval affairs, and it must be understood that this practice has been steadily continued, though the numbers are small. Military students go to France, Austria, and Germany. There are also opportunities for special studies afforded to Chinese born in the Straits Settlements, of whom several have taken up important posts in their motherland.

In this necessarily brief outline of educational progress in China it is impossible to attempt any estimate of the work done or the influences set to work; but attention must be drawn to certain important features. The influence of Japan during the years 1895–1908 appears as the most vital factor. That period saw the rush of Chinese students to Japan. Now the number there is reduced from fifteen thou-

sand to three thousand; and, while Japanese influence is still strong, it is evident that it is no longer the only one. The adoption by the revolutionaries of a republican form of government, even though the model is not quite that of the United States, indicates a swinging away from Japanese ideas, and indeed must be extremely unwelcome to that country in which the monarchy is the central fact from a political, social, and religious point of view. Japan has always favored the moderate reforming views of Liang Chi-chao. Dr. Sun Yat Sen, the provisional President, has resided in the United States, and has many friends there. At the present time there are seven hundred and seventeen Chinese students in American universities, colleges, and schools, of whom four hundred and forty-three are private and the rest government students. The flow of these students will be continuous, and is guaranteed for nearly thirty years. A certain number go to Germany, France, and Belgium. There are only one hundred and forty Chinese government students in the United Kingdom, for we did not, like the Americans, embrace the opportunity offered by the indemnity to secure a share in molding China's future. We asked less than we were entitled to, and insisted on having it paid, thereby securing odium for ourselves. There is a considerable number of private students in the United Kingdom, but when it is remembered that we have a large Chinese population in the Straits and Hongkong, the number is not remarkable. The Hongkong University, which owes its inception largely to the generosity of a Parsee gentleman, will probably attract many

students in the south, since it is near their own shores, and there is already a tendency not to send so many government scholars abroad, but to encourage their going rather to one of the Chinese universities. The necessity that the men who are to interpret the "new learning" should have it pure from the source makes it desirable that the stream to Western universities should be kept up for a time, at all events, but it is essential that properly qualified foreign instructors should be employed in the early days of the new Chinese universities.

This last essential has been realized by friends of China in Europe and America, and already Yale College has founded a school at Changsha, in Hunan, once the seat of the most rabid anti-foreign propaganda, which is to have fourteen fully qualified foreign professors and a large staff of Chinese instructors. A more ambitious scheme is the one fathered by the Rev. Lord W. Gascoyne Cecil. The British public is asked to subscribe one hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds to endow an educational center in China as far as possible on the lines of a British university, and a similar sum is to be raised in America. The idea—an excellent one—is to have a thoroughly equipped college in the heart of China, among their own people, and using the best traditions of China and of Western schools. The special aim of this scheme is to bring the less material forces of our university system to bear on Chinese character, in order to counteract the rather mundane tendency of the present training. The inclination, already noted, to reject altogether the Chinese classics is accentuated in non-government

schools by the difficulty, first, of meeting the demands of the students for a "practical" training; and, second, by the fact that really good Chinese teachers are mainly in official employment. The result is an exotic and denationalizing type of education. It has been said, very truly, that in taking from us only the so-called practical side of education the Chinese are getting the husk without the kernel, and it is hoped that, by providing a central university to which might converge students from every kind of mission school or college, the gulf might be bridged between the teaching of certain subjects and education in its true sense. Whether any transplantation of university customs or even personalities can supply the atmosphere of Oxford or Cambridge remains to be seen, and it is more likely that the frank materialism and the more democratic methods of American universities (in which so large a proportion of Western-trained students will graduate) will flavor the new China too strongly to allow of a more subtle and delicate aroma. Very likely, however, the Chinese, even more than the Japanese, will eventually evolve an atmosphere and an aroma of their own; and, when they do so, it will be upon the shoulders of the young graduates of to-day to lead the way. Their education is a matter of vital importance to the future of the Empire, and it should be as liberal as possible.

Having in view the philosophic basis of their national life and their artistic achievements in the past, we must hope that the finer and more delicate of their national characteristics will survive the inevitable rush to secure the greatest possible measure of that modern shibboleth "efficiency."

VII

FOREIGN RELATIONS

THE subject of the earlier foreign relations with China can only be dealt with here in the briefest manner possible—merely so far as to enable the reader to understand the later relations between China and the outer world. Those readers who may be anxious to acquire some further knowledge of this interesting subject will find in the works of the Jesuit Fathers, of Davis, Yule, Richthofen, and other writers, a large fund of information.

At eras far apart China has been distinguished by different appellations, says Yule, "according as it was regarded as the terminus of a southern sea-route coasting the great peninsula and islands of Asia, or as that of a northern land traversing the longitude of that continent. In the former aspect the name applied has nearly always been some form of the name Sin, Chin, Sinæ, China. In the latter point of view the region in question was known to the ancients as the land of Seres; to the Middle Ages as the Empire of Cathay."[1]

[1] "The region of the Seres is a vast and populous country, touching on the east the ocean and the limits of the habitable world; and extending west nearly to Imaus and the confines of Bactria. The people are civilized men, of mild, just, and frugal temper; eschewing colli-

Besides Ptolemy, Pliny has notices of the Seres, whose country he places upon the eastern ocean of the extremity of Asia. The information contained in these two authors was all that was available down to the time of Justinian, and, though the account given by them was not of a very comprehensive character, their description of the Chinese of that time is, as Yule remarks, applicable to-day. The old reputation of the Seres for honesty is frequently referred to by Yule: "Indeed, Marco's whole account of the people here [in Kinsay] might pass for an extended paraphrase of the Latin commonplaces regarding the Seres." The reputation of the Chinese for integrity and justice, in spite of much that has been said against it, must have had some solid foundation, he truly says, for it has prevailed to our own day among their neighbors in various parts of Asia which are quite remote from one another.

The early Chinese writings make frequent mention of trade relations with a land called Tatsin-Kwoh, believed to have been the Roman Empire, and emissaries passed between Rome and China. The traffic in the rich productions of China and India was the chief stimulus to trade adventure, and the gradual springing-up of this commerce led to the Nestorian missionaries penetrating those regions,

sions with their neighbors, and even shy of close intercourse, but not averse to dispose of their own products, of which raw silk is the staple, but which include also silk stuffs, furs, and iron of remarkable quality. It seems probable that relations existed from the earliest times between China and India, and possibly, too, between China and Chaldæa. The 'Sinim' of the Prophet Isaiah is by many taken to mean China, and Ptolemy's 'Sinæ' are generally understood to have been the Chinese." (Yule, *Cathay.*)

which they did from Persia in the seventh century, seemingly through the northwestern region of China. These Nestorians disappeared from the face of history, leaving no trace but that of a stone—the famous tablet of A.D. 781—which till lately was to be found in the yard of a temple at Sian fu. This monument, excavated in 1625, which is held to have attested the ancient propagation of Christianity in China, was inscribed partly in Chinese and partly in Syriac. The story that a holy man named Olopüen went from the country of Tatsin to China in the year 636 of our area, and that he was well received by the Emperor, who caused a Christian church to be built, is wrongly treated by Voltaire as the merest fiction. "Il y a assez de vérités historiques," he says, "sans y mêler ces absurdes mensonges."

In the ninth century China was visited by two Arabs.[1] The travels of Buddhist pilgrims from China to India, notably those of Fahien (399–404), of Hiuen-tsang (628–645), and of Hwui-sing (518), contain much information regarding the peoples of central and western Asia. The most recent explorations in central Asia, especially Dr. Aurel Stein's excavations of buried cities, confirm the ac-

[1] "Abu Zaid [one of the Arabs], like his predecessor," says Yule, "dwells upon the orderly and upright administration of China while in its normal state. This, indeed, seems to have made a strong impression at all times on the other nations of Asia, and we trace this impression in almost every account that has reached us from Theophylactus downward; whilst it is also probably the kernel of those praises of the justice of the Seres which extend back some centuries farther into antiquity. And the Jesuit historian, Jarric, thinks that 'if Plato were to rise from Hades he would declare that his imagined republic was realized in China.'"

curacy of these early travelers, and more particularly of Marco Polo. The official histories from 300 B.C. to A.D. 900 give useful information regarding Syria and Persia, Greece and Parthia; but the information is fragmentary, the position of places uncertain, and the generalization from mere outlying borders both incorrect and unwarranted. A few embassies, up to the year 1091, are noted by Pauthier; and the Russian Bretschneider has established that the visits of the Arabs were frequent down to the Sung and Tang dynasties. He gives much interesting information regarding the Chinese medieval travelers to Western countries between A.D. 1220 and 1260.

The Franciscan monks sent on missions to the Great Khan about the middle of the thirteenth century were the first to bring to western Europe the revived knowledge of a great and civilized nation lying to the extreme east, upon the shores of the ocean; and a Franciscan monk was made archbishop in Khanbalig (Peking), and the Roman Catholic faith spread. Friar Odoric made his way to Cathay at the commencement of the fourteenth century, and from Zayton journeyed northward to Peking, where he found the aged Archbishop Corvino, and remained some three years. The journey homeward was through Lhassa, and probably by a route *via* Cabul and Tabriz to Europe, ending at Venice in 1330. Many now well-known characteristics of the Chinese, unknown or unnoticed by other travelers of his time, are given by Odoric.[1] Ibn Batuta, the Moor,

[1] "His notices of the custom of fishing with cormorants," says Yule, "of the habits of letting the finger-nails grow long, and of

traveled in China about 1347. The Far East was, in fact, frequently reached by European traders in the first half of the fourteenth century, "a state of things," says Yule, "difficult to realize when we see how all those regions, when reopened only two centuries later, seemed almost as absolutely new discoveries as the empires which, about the same time, Cortes and Pizarro were annexing in the West." European missions and merchants were no longer to be found in China after the middle of the fourteenth century, at the period when the Mongol dynasty was tottering before its fall. The voyage of Nicolo di Conti, the Venetian, who traveled "quite through India," returning home after an absence of twenty-five years, is considered apocryphal. Having, according to his own account, made denial of his faith to save his life, he had to seek absolution of the Pope in 1444. Much information is given by Mayers regarding Chinese explorations of the Indian Ocean during the fifteenth century.

The existence of a Jewish colony in China was discovered by the Jesuit Fathers in the seventeenth century, if not even earlier; Kaifung, some four hundred and fifty miles southwest of Peking, being the headquarters of this colony. When Martin visited the place in 1866, he found the synagogue (supposed to have been built in 1164) in ruins; the Jews had

compressing the women's feet, as well as of the divisions of the Khan's Empire into twelve provinces, with four chief viziers, are peculiar to him, I believe, among all the European travelers of the age. Polo mentions none of them. The names which he assigns to the Chinese post-stations, and to the provincial boards of administration, the technical Turki term which he uses for a sack of rice, etc., are all tokens of the reality of his experience."

dispersed, some having become Mohammedans, and not one being able to speak a word of Hebrew. In 1850 certain Hebraic rolls were recovered from the few remaining descendants of former Jews, but little really seems to be known regarding this Jewish colony, and the chief information on record is found in a memorandum on the subject in the *Lettres édifiantes*.

There is no need to deal at length with the wonderful journeys accomplished by Marco Polo, who visited the court of Kublai Khan in 1274. The Venetian, as is well known, became a favorite with the Emperor, and spent in all some twenty-one years in the East, returning to Venice in 1295. In his edition of Marco Polo, Yule has given to the world the most erudite, and also the most charming, annotation of the great Venetian traveler's life-work. On nearing the provinces of Cathay, Marco Polo passed through towns containing Nestorian Christians, who were met with again in Yunnan and other parts of the Empire.

In 1644 the Manchus completed their conquest of China. In 1627, while in possession merely of Liaotung, an edict was issued compelling their Chinese subjects, under penalty of death, to adopt their mode of wearing the hair, as a sign of allegiance, and the custom thus compulsorily established became the fashion long held in such esteem by the Chinese. It was not only this custom of the coiffure which was introduced by the Manchus. The opinion prevalent in the West is that the exclusive and anti-foreign feeling met with in China is something peculiar to the Chinese character and dating from remote antiquity. It is clear that it was the conquering

race, the Manchus, who forced this spirit upon the Chinese people, in the attempt, so long maintained, to hermetically seal the Empire against the intrusion of the foreigner. From the brief summary already given it will be seen that, before the advent of the Manchus, China maintained constant relations with the countries of Asia, traders from Arabia, Persia, and India trafficking in Chinese ports and passing into the interior. The tablet of Sian fu, already mentioned, shows that missionaries from the West were propagating the Christian religion in the eighth century; in the thirteenth not only was Marco Polo cordially received, but held office in the Empire, the Christian religious ceremonies being tolerated at Peking, where there was an archbishop. To the close of the last Chinese dynasty the Jesuit missionaries were well received and treated at the capital, and, as Huc remarks, the first Tartar emperors merely tolerated what they found existing. This would seem to show conclusively that the Chinese did not originally entertain the aversion to foreigners which is usually assumed. The explanation given by Huc that it was the policy of the Manchus—a small number of nomad conquerors holding in subjection a vast population—to preserve China for themselves by the exclusion of foreigners, seems reasonable; and Huc foretold that this very policy, which served to establish the Manchu power, would eventually lead to its destruction.[1]

[1] "The Mantchoos, it is evident, were, on account of the smallness of their numbers in the midst of this vast empire, compelled to adopt stringent measures to preserve their conquest. For fear that foreigners should be tempted to snatch their prey from them, they

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The history of Russian intercourse with China may here be briefly recited.

The first record of Russians appearing at Peking is that of two Cossacks who made their way there in 1567, and fifty years later another Russian reached the capital, both visits being without any result. It was not till about the year 1643, at a time when the Manchus were engaged with the war which ultimately made them masters of China, then in the throes of rebellion, that commanders of the Russian settlements north of the Amur Valley commenced exploring expeditions, regarded as hostile excursions by the Chinese. In 1649 Chaboroff made an incursion into Chinese territory. The Tsar Alexis sent an envoy in 1653, who refused to perform the act of obeisance and was dismissed; and Stepanoff made a fresh expedition across the border. But, shortly after, the Manchu-Chinese army, inured to warfare by the campaigns in China, defeated the Russian troops, which were then numerically weak. In the

have carefully closed the ports of China against them, thinking thus to secure themselves from ambitious attempts from without; and in the interior of the empire they have sought to keep their enemies divided by their system of rapid and constant change of public officers. These two methods have been crowned with success up to the present time; and it is really an astonishing fact, and one, perhaps, not sufficiently considered, that a mere handful of nomads should have been able to exercise, for more than two hundred years, a peaceable and absolute dominion over the vastest empire in the world, and over a population which, whatever may be the common opinion respecting them, are really extremely stirring and fond of change. A policy at the same time adroit, supple, and vigorous could alone have obtained a similar result; but there is every reason to think that the methods which once contributed to establish the power of the Mantchoo Tartars will ultimately tend to overthrow it." (Huc, *The Chinese Empire.*)

years 1658, 1672, and 1677 trading caravans reached Peking, and, disputes between the Russian and Chinese soldiers and settlers along the banks of the Amur having become frequent, hostilities for the possession of the river were maintained in a desultory manner. After a five years' war, China imposed peace upon Russia by the treaty of Nerchinsk (in 1689), when a frontier between China and Russian Siberia was agreed on, by which the whole of the Amur Valley was placed in the hands of the Chinese Emperor Kanghi, Russia retaining merely one bank of a portion of the Argun River, an upper affluent of the Amur. The frontier thus decided upon was watched closely, the Chinese commander at each frontier-post having daily to inspect the posts on the line of demarcation. "Only in this manner," says Plath, "could the frontier be kept for a hundred years against the Russians. Across the rivers horsehair ropes were drawn for the same purpose." The Tsar sent a Russian embassy in 1692, under Eberhard Ides, to Peking. In 1715 a considerable number of Russians, who had been taken prisoners by the Chinese, were permitted to settle at Peking, and four years later Peter the Great sent Ismailoff to arrange certain questions regarding trade. In 1727 the frontier was again demarcated, leaving the eastern boundary as it then was, but rectifying that lying westward from the Argun; and this arrangement remained unaltered till the middle of the last century. The Russians were allowed to erect a church and school at Peking which developed into a permanent mission. The early diaries of de Lange, who accompanied Ismailoff to Peking, throw light on the first relations of the Russians with the

Chinese Court. It was under the 1727 treaty that a caravan was allowed to make its way to Peking every three years. It appears, however, that these caravans met with so little success that, though in the first twenty years six journeys were made, they became afterward less frequent. The general policy of Russia seems to have been one of inaction or (as Prjevalsky calls it) subserviency toward China until Muravieff and Ignatieff appeared on the scene in the Amur region. In 1858 Muravieff obtained for Russia a large territory, the Amur province, while General Ignatieff in 1860, by a dexterous use of the victory of the Anglo-French troops at Peking, with a stroke of the pen transferred to Russia the whole coast of Manchu-Tartary, from the mouth of the Amur River to the frontier of Korea.

Russia's objective—an ice-free port on the Pacific, and the acquisition of territory suitable for the continuation in a southerly direction of her transcontinental railway—appeared to be in sight in 1895, when the Chino-Japanese War revealed the weakness of the Chinese government. After some years diplomatic pressure at Peking, and largely owing to the cynical views of Li Hung Chang (who was prepared ~~the~~ to purchase peace with Russia at almost any price), the lease of the Liaotung peninsula was acquired in 1898 for twenty-five years, which gave Russia control of Port Arthur and Talienwan and the adjacent territories. After the Boxer rising in 1900 a fresh advance was made by "regularizing" the occupation of Manchuria, which had been proceeding under the guise of peaceful penetration; and it was this state of affairs, coupled with Russia's obvious intention to

round off her eastern Asiatic sphere with Korea, which led, in 1904, to the declaration of war by Japan. The comparatively inefficient character of Russia's occupation of Manchuria was revealed in the war, and, as a matter of fact, the economic conquest by the Chinese was actually proceeding faster than the converse political movement. The Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 bound Russia and Japan to evacuate Manchuria except the Liaotung peninsula, where Japan succeeded to the leasehold and other rights held by Russia. Moreover, the railways were divided, as to control and administration, between the two quondam combatants; and although Manchuria was thus nominally restored to China, its alienation, with Japan and Russia in competition, has gone on much faster than before. Nevertheless, China's rights under the treaty of Portsmouth are inexpugnable, with this proviso—that she cannot enforce them unless she is strong enough to maintain law and order in the territory. Turned back in the Far East after the disasters of 1905, Russia became quiescent for a time, but has once more resumed her former activity. A fresh development in Russo-Chinese relations was an ultimatum presented by St. Petersburg in 1911 regarding some alleged infringements of Russian rights in a district of Chinese Turkestan. The demand for an answer within three days resulted in assurances being immediately given. The most recent development is the move in Mongolia, long contemplated by Russia.

To turn for a second to the intercourse of China with Holland, Portugal, and Spain. The trade of the Dutch with China commenced after they had

achieved their independence in Europe, when they made war upon the Oriental possessions of Spain, capturing Malacca, the Spice Islands, and other positions. In 1622 they were repulsed at Macao, but established themselves in the Pescadores, and a couple of years later in Formosa. The Portuguese first visited a port of China in 1514; and three years later took place the trading expedition to Canton under Andrada, conveying the unfortunate Ambassador Perez, who died in fetters in China. Besides Macao, Formosa was included among the Portuguese dependencies, but the former was the only permanent foothold of Portugal in China. From 1543, the date of the capture of the Philippines, the Spaniards carried on a trade between Manila and the Chinese coast, and in the next century two Spanish forts were established in Formosa (Spain and Portugal being at this time under one crown). The Dutch drove the Spaniards out of that island in 1624, but twenty years later were themselves expelled by the Chinese pirate Koxinga, and thenceforward held no possessions in the Chinese seas. In 1732 Danish and Swedish traders, in 1736 French, and in 1784 Americans appeared at Canton.

Of all Western countries it has been the intercourse of France with China which, apart from trade, has been considerable; and both the earlier knowledge of the West acquired by China and that of China acquired by the West were mainly achieved by French missionaries, who have played an important part politically. No French government sent a mission to Peking merely to seek advantages of trade as others have done, but as early as 1289 Philip the Fair

received despatches from Persia and China suggesting common action against their enemies, the Saracens. Some four centuries later Louis XIV. addressed a letter to the Emperor Kanghi, whom he termed "Most High, Most Excellent, Most Puissant, and Most Magnanimous Friend, Dearly Beloved Good Friend," signing himself "Your most dear and good friend, Louis." In 1844 an important mission, under the direction of M. Lagrené, proceeded to Peking, and a treaty was signed between France and China. The French Treaty of 1858 was supplemented by a convention signed at Peking in 1860, which led to controversy between the French and Chinese, culminating in an understanding in 1865, the formal ratification of which, however, was only procured in 1894. Further conventions were concluded in 1885, 1887, and 1895, the latter two containing important clauses affecting southern China.

The initiation of a Chinese policy on the part of France may be said to have begun seriously with the expedition of Doudart de Lagrée in 1867, described in the most charming manner by the gifted Louise de Carné, when it was first seen that France could acquire in Tongking one of the keys of China. The colonial policy of France, after her defeat at the hands of Prussia, turned her eyes to the East; and in 1884 the Franco-Chinese War in Tongking took place, partly owing to a misunderstanding as to the terms of an agreement arrived at by the diplomatists. A terrible incident in the war was the attack on the river forts of the Min River by Admiral Courbet. In 1885 peace was declared, China giving up all claim on Tongking. In 1898 France obtained a

ninety-nine years' lease of Kuaug-chau-Wan (opposite Hainan), and next year two islands commanding the entrance to the bay.

The relations of Germany with China are of recent date. The first Prussian expedition was undertaken in 1861, under Count von Eulenberg. Some years later German traders in China suggested that their government should seize a portion of Chinese territory—Formosa or Korea—in order to found a "German Australia." Treaties were concluded in 1861 and 1880. But nothing was accomplished in this direction until Kiaochau was occupied in 1897–98.

This act of aggression was, perhaps, the most brutal manifestation of the "mailed fist" policy in which even Prussia has ever indulged. Nominally in return for the murder of two German missionaries in Shantung, Germany demanded and secured from the weak Manchu government the ninety-nine years' lease of a port in Shantung—the harbor, town, and hinterland—with rights of railway construction in the province itself. A great deal of money has been spent on Kiaochau, and the German thoroughness and mastery of detail are evidenced in all the arrangements; but the German merchant and trader continue, on the whole, to perfer the more elastic system to be found in ports not under the German flag. In 1900 the German ambassador was killed in the streets of Peking during the Boxer rising, and possibly it should be placed to Germany's credit that, instead of demanding a province as compensation, she merely exacted a monetary payment and various acts of humiliation on the part of the Peking government.

English intercourse with China commenced later than that of some other maritime Powers of the West, but has grown to great proportions. The history of British trade with China preceding the direct connection with India is that of the East India Company, which in 1613 established a factory in Japan, and some two years later opened agencies in Formosa and Amoy. An attempt in 1627 to commence trade with Canton through Macao proved unsuccessful, owing to the opposition of the Portuguese, who had been established there some seventy years. Nominal participation in the trade of Canton was granted to the British in 1635, but little progress was achieved until Oliver Cromwell concluded the treaty with Portugal by which free access was obtained throughout the East Indies. When the Ming dynasty was replaced by that of the present rulers in 1664, a complete contempt for trade and strong antipathy to foreigners was a marked trait of the new ruling house. The company's factory at Amoy was destroyed in 1681; but the agents (in those days called "supercargoes"), finding that the Manchus permitted trade to be carried on provided their supremacy was humbly acknowledged, sent ships to Macao, re-established the factory at Amoy, and soon after founded another on the island of Chusan. Till that time every vessel upon arrival was boarded by an officer of the Hoppo (the Imperial Superintendent of the Native Customs) and by an officer of the Imperial household, who were propitiated by a *cumshaw*, or present, upon the amount of which depended the extent of the rates and duties to be levied. When the mutual difficulties had been

overcome, after the employment of arguments usual on such occasions, the ship proceeded to Whampoa, at that time the port of Canton, where trade was opened through the intermediary of a Chinese trader who was officially recognized.

The East India Company having appointed a chief supercargo, who was also to act as king's minister or consul for China, the Manchu government nominated an official, with the title of the "Emperor's Merchant," to supervise foreign trade. This officer was naturally far from being a *persona grata* with the supercargoes and traders. A contest arose between the two officials, and every endeavor was made by the Chinese to depreciate the position of the king's minister, and to reduce him to the level of a mere *taipan*, or chief manager. The foreigners had now to placate not merely the Hoppo and his many underlings, but also the "Emperor's Merchant" and his horde of hangers-on. The Manchu commissioner became not merely the intermediary between the foreigners and the native merchants, but also the means of communication between them and the local Chinese authorities. Thus was established a powerful Chinese combination, which maintained itself by submitting to a heavy "squeeze" at the hands of the Viceroy and Governor of Canton on the one hand and of the Hoppo on the other. The office of the Hoppo was a remunerative one, but he in turn had to purchase his five years' term for collecting the customs, both foreign and native, by a heavy payment to Peking. Foreign trade was therefore carried on under great disabilities; but notwithstanding all obstacles commerce flourished, and by the

year 1715 British ships commenced to sail direct to the Bogue, where, after the settlement of fees and duties, the required "chop," or stamped permit, was obtained, and permission granted to proceed to Whampoa for the purposes of trade.

In 1720 a fresh change was made in the conduct of foreign trade, the "Emperor's Merchant" being replaced by a body of Chinese traders known as the "Co-Hong," with power to levy an *ad valorem* duty of four per cent. on imports and exports. The Co-Hong was under the superintendence of the Hoppo, and responsible to the viceroy and governor for their share of the profits and the solvency of each member. The members of the corporation, moreover, were answerable for the payment of all fees and duties, and even for offenses and crimes committed by the ships' officers or crews. An import duty of three taels per *picul* was sanctioned by Imperial edict in 1722, and an attempt made shortly after by the Imperial government to introduce a fixed tariff; but the condition of affairs was not improved, the tariff being treated with contempt by both the Hoppo and the Co-Hong. A special tax of ten per cent. on foreign imports and exports followed, concerning which a strong appeal was made by the foreigners to the Throne—in the attitude of humble, or rather abject, suppliants, be it noted—but not till 1736, on the occasion of the accession to power of the Emperor Kienlung, was exemption obtained from the impost. The vessels of nationalities other than the British now commenced to trade with Canton.

A fresh disability was introduced twenty years later, making it imperative for ships to obtain the

security of two members of the Co-Hong. The powers of the combination were extended, all dealings of foreigners with small traders and purveyors of provisions being prohibited, especially with native junks before entering the river, as had been the practice. And this restriction was further emphasized by an Imperial edict entirely prohibiting trade anywhere outside the Bogue. An attempt was made by the chief supercargo to avert the ruin of the Amoy agency thus threatened, which, however, completely failed. The interpreter, Mr. Flint, who had been charged with the Amoy negotiations, proceeded to Tientsin and laid the whole case, involving serious reflections on the local authorities at Canton, before the Throne. The appeal was nominally successful, and an Imperial commissioner, accompanied by Mr. Flint, was despatched to Canton to remove the Hoppo from office, to abolish illegal extortion, and to hold a full investigation, with the inevitable result that the commissioner was "squared," and grave charges were formulated against Mr. Flint of having set at defiance the Imperial edict. He and the supercargoes who had been summoned to the Yamên were attacked and maltreated and compelled to perform the *kotow*. Mr. Flint was detained in prison; and a special mission to Canton to obtain his release having proved unsuccessful, a heavy bribe being refused, he was actually kept in confinement till the year 1762, when he returned to England.

The system of bribery and corruption, coupled with submission to gross indignities, continued until, in 1771, permission was accorded to foreigners to

reside at Canton during the winter, the business season. At this time the supercargoes gained a decisive victory over the Co-Hong, obtaining its dissolution by means of a *cumshaw* of one hundred thousand taels, the contributions due to the authorities having fallen into arrears. Some ten years later the old institution was revived in another form by the creation of "Hong merchants"—native brokers who bore the title of "mandarin." The sole difference between the old system and the new was that in lieu of the earlier common financial responsibility there was now a *Consoo*, an association or guild fund, established in order to supply, by means of a special tax on foreign trade, the guarantee provided for.

A fresh impost to meet the requirements of coast defense was imposed in 1805. In the year 1818 there arose a serious difficulty over the "exportation of bullion" question. The balance of trade had been yearly diminishing as foreign commerce grew, and the Chinese authorities restricted the exportation of silver by any vessel to three-tenths of the excess of imports over exports. In view of the alarming export of silver, the authorities, in 1831, imposed such crushing restrictions that the supercargoes threatened to suspend operations altogether, later, however, submitting to the Chinese officials.

The foreign trading community in Canton were now chafing more and more at what they considered the weakness of the East India Company, and showing signs of resentment at its monopoly, while they evinced an increasing disinclination to submit tamely to the exactions of the Chinese authorities. The restrictions were evaded by the vessels outside the

Bogue, where stationary ships were anchored to serve as warehouses. Smuggling grew apace, and the emoluments of the local authorities seriously suffered. It became apparent to the Chinese that there was a growing determination no longer to play the earlier submissive rôle, and that with the cessation of the East India Company's monopoly, then imminent, foreign trade would be placed on an entirely new basis. Both the Imperial and the local authorities took a serious view of the position, and in 1832 appeared an edict directing the maritime provinces to place their coast defenses and ships of war in repair, "in order to scour the seas and drive away any European vessels (of war) that might make their appearance on the coast." Collision with the foreigners was, in fact, felt by the Chinese to be inevitable.

For over two centuries the general relations of the East India Company toward the Chinese government were those of the suppliant trader humbly acknowledging the supreme sovereignty of the "Son of Heaven." Commerce was beneath the contempt not merely of the Court, but of the *literati* and officials, trade being fit only for the lower, or rather the lowest, classes. Even to the "outer barbarians," however, the Emperor of China was pleased to be clement. They were permitted to trade, under certain disabilities, being only allowed to reside for brief periods at intervals in the suburbs of Canton; they were neither to enter the city gates nor travel inland; they could only entertain in their service the lowest class of Chinese, the boat population, who are forbidden to live on shore or to compete at

literary examinations. Under such humiliating conditions were trade and intercourse maintained.

In fairness it must be admitted that the Chinese certainly saw little of the better side of the strangers from the West, whether hailing from Europe or America. To them the foreigner was a man thinking of nothing but gain by trade, gain at any price; a man of gross material pleasures, a coarse and vicious being, with no appreciation of Chinese philosophy, literature, or history, and not even the most elementary acquaintance with Chinese etiquette. To the Chinese, therefore, the foreigner appeared densely ignorant—a mere savage; he was the "outer barbarian," the "foreign devil." The Chinese had their eyes rudely opened, in 1741, to the fact that, whatever their deficiencies might be, foreigners were possessed of some advantages. In that year the first British man-of-war the *Centaur* made its appearance. Under circumstances of considerable danger Captain Anson passed the Bogue, pushed on to Whampoa, and still further astonished the Chinese by calling, as an officer of King George II., upon the Viceroy of Canton, audaciously reminding the Chinese officials that etiquette must not be overlooked. To the discomfiture of the Chinese officials, the viceroy received him. Fifty years later the situation had not improved, and when two British ships arrived at Canton, the officials absolutely refused to allow them to enter the Bogue. Some time later, in 1816, Captain Maxwell, of the *Alceste*, made his way to Whampoa, after returning the fire of the forts which had opened on his vessel—an incident discreetly ignored by the Chinese.

The embassies sent with costly gifts by King George III., and carried out with much pomp, accomplished nothing. Both the embassy of Lord Macartney, in 1792, and that of Lord Amherst, in 1815, were treated as mere "tribute-bearing" deputations. As a concession Britain was admitted by the Court chroniclers to an official position in the roll of "tributary nations," a fiction which was actually maintained till recent years. Even the reception of ministers by the Emperor at Peking, secured after protracted struggles, was held till recently in a building associated with the reception of subject nations.

The more frequent visits of British men-of-war, the protection of Macao against French attack, and the gradual increase of naval forces impressed the Chinese and enabled the British to take a firmer stand against the Chinese assumption of political and judicial supremacy. Never officially acknowledged (though in fact admitted), this was now formally contested, and the Chinese were informed that foreigners on principal declined longer to submit to it. From that time no foreigner was surrendered to the Chinese authorities to be dealt with.

In view of the impending non-renewal of the charter held by the East India Company, of which the Viceroy of Canton in 1831 had been notified, that official asked that a British officer should be sent to Canton to control trade. An act of Parliament was passed two years later to regulate trade with China and India, declaring it expedient, "for the objects of trade and amicable intercourse with the dominions of the Emperor of China," to establish "a British

authority in the said dominions." Three superintendents of trade—Lord Napier, Mr. Plowden, and Mr. (afterward Sir) J. F. Davis—were appointed, one of them to preside over "a court of justice with criminal and admiralty jurisdiction for the trial of offenses committed by her Majesty's subjects in the said dominions, or on the high sea within a hundred miles from the coast of China." The superintendents were forbidden to engage in trade, a tonnage duty being sanctioned to defray the cost of their establishment. Extra-territorial jurisdiction was thus established, and the China War of 1841 became inevitable. Lord Palmerston instructed Lord Napier "to foster and protect the trade of his Majesty's subjects in China; to extend trade, if possible, to other ports of China; to induce the Chinese government to enter into commercial relations with the English government; and to seek, with peculiar caution and circumspection, to establish eventually direct diplomatic communication with the Imperial Court at Peking; also to have the coast of China surveyed, to prevent disasters"; and "to inquire for places where British ships might find requisite protection in the event of hostilities in the China Sea"—an injunction which led to much controversy later on.

A serious mistake was made in associating with Lord Napier, as joint superintendents, two gentlemen who had been in the East India Company's service, and who, therefore, were most unlikely to receive consideration at the hands of the Chinese. The policy adopted was temporizing, vacillating, and ended in Lord Napier finding himself in a false position and

being abandoned by his government. The cabinet, with all its opportunities, had learned nothing from the history of the East India Company, and committed the additional blunder of acting under the advice of the directors of that company, who had already so gravely mismanaged affairs. The sad story of Lord Napier's mission need not be recapitulated here; enough that, after suffering all sorts of indignities at the hands of the Chinese authorities, he was at last permitted to leave Canton and proceed to Macao, where he died—of a broken heart, it is said.

Sir J. F. Davis succeeded Lord Napier, and in 1834 recommended that a despatch should be sent to the Emperor of China by a small fleet, and, in the event of failure, that measures of coercion should be employed. The British community, supporting this view, proposed that a plenipotentiary should proceed, with an armed force, to demand reparation of the Emperor and to arrange trade questions. Then followed the "quiescent policy" of Davis and his successor. Gradually, however, the idea grew that an island must be acquired on the coast as a colony, Chusan being first in favor, later Ningpo, then Formosa. The relations between English and Chinese, however, became more and more strained, the importation of opium being one of the grounds of dispute, and open hostilities took place in 1839. In January, 1841, the island of Hongkong was ceded by the Chinese commissioner, Keshen, and, though repudiated by the Chinese government, the cession was confirmed by the treaty of Nanking in 1842, whereby five ports—Canton, Amoy, Fuchau, Ningpo,

and Shanghai—were opened to British trade. Possession of Hongkong was taken in 1841; the next year it was proclaimed a free port, which it has since remained; and in 1843 it was constituted a Crown colony.

The so-called "opium war" was really waged to put a stop to grievances which had been accumulating for a hundred and fifty years. No protest against the drug being treated as contraband by Imperial decrees was made; but when commands were issued to the Queen as a vassal of China, and her subjects treated with violence, the question entered upon another phase.

In 1856 war again broke out between Great Britain and China, in consequence of the capture by the Chinese of a "lorcha," the *Arrow*, flying the British flag. Lord Elgin was sent to China as minister extraordinary, and after a series of warlike operations, including the taking of Canton, the treaty of Tientsin was signed in 1858. Peace was only temporary, however. In 1859 the British ambassador was obstructed when on his way to Peking to obtain a ratification of the treaty, and it was only after the Anglo-French expedition had forced the passage of the Pei ho, captured the Taku forts, and camped at Peking, that the convention of Peking, ratifying the Tientsin Treaty, was signed in 1860. The treaty and convention form the basis of the relations between Great Britain and China. Additional ports in China were opened to British trade, provision was made for the permanent residence at Peking of a British representative, and Kaulun, opposite Hongkong, was ceded to Britain. In 1867

China despatched her first embassy to foreign countries, consisting of two Chinese and the American, Anson Burlingame, who died at St. Petersburg. The object of the mission was to obtain more favorable treatment from the Occidental nations and to foster the impression that the Chinese were anxious to embark upon a policy of reform. In 1876 negotiations, arising out of the Margary murder, resulted in the Chifu Convention. This secured, *inter alia*, compensation, an expression of regret for the murder of Margary, a promise of improved regulations of the opium traffic and trade, and the opening of four new treaty ports, with six new ports on the Yangtze. In 1890 was executed the Tibet-Sikkim Convention, recognizing the British protectorate over the Sikkim state and laying down that official relations must be carried on with permission of the British government. By the Burma Convention of 1897 the Chinese government agreed to the connection of Chinese railways in Yunnan, if made, with the Burmese lines, to the appointment of a consul in Yunnan, with right of British subjects to residence and trade. By a special article, Wuchau (in Kwangsi) and Samshui (in Kwangtung) were opened as treaty ports and consular stations, with freedom of steamer navigation.

Among the more important instruments which have affected the relations of China and Britain are a series of conventions regarding opium, the last, in 1911, being the culminating point in the attempt to prohibit the import of opium into China. This involved a self-denying ordinance on the part of India, which has derived a large revenue from the export of opium. Accordingly, after a period in

which the amount sent from India was reduced each year, a commission sat to examine whether China herself was reducing her production. Despite the enormous difficulties entailed, it is proved that she is not only in earnest on this subject, but that her officials, even those formerly addicted to the habit, have, for the most part, carried out the regulations, and accordingly it was agreed, in 1911, that in seven years the export of opium from India shall entirely cease to those districts of China which have given up the cultivation of the poppy.

Another phase of British-Chinese relations is connected with the "sphere of interest" policy which at one time dominated the international situation in the Far East. The "break-up of China" was believed to be imminent, and in the mêlée of claims by the Powers, which China was too weak to resist, three concessions were represented to the British public as remaining to our credit in the settling-up. They were the territorial extension of the island of Hongkong to the limits necessary for its effective fortification; the lease of Wei-hai-wei (whose *raison d'être*, save as a health resort, has never been made clear); and the establishment of a "sphere of influence" in the Yangtze Valley. As for the last, which was a shibboleth of our Far Eastern diplomatists for many years, it appeared that it rested on no concession or agreement with China, for no such document ever existed; but upon an offhand reply to a query of the British minister to the Tsungli Yamên as to whether China was prepared to alienate her great central zone. The reply was, "Of course not!" and this diplomatic correspondence had to be carefully pre-

pared and edited for publication in order to "save face," not for the Oriental, but for the Occidental statesmen. At the same time Great Britain had, at that period, a position in the Yangtze which, if properly utilized, might have secured those British interests which lie in the improvement of trade relations and facilities, and not in territorial aggression. The writer passed through the Yangtze region in 1899, and his observations of the conditions there, as expressed in "The Overland to China," reveal the weakness of the policy which, practically from the time of the death of Palmerston onward, has handicapped us in China. In the whole province of Szechuan, with a population of some sixty millions, and one of the best markets for British goods, there was, early in 1899, not a single British consul or vice-consul. Experienced officers had been despatched elsewhere, and the vice-consul at Chungking had been sent off to investigate the murder of a missionary in a remote district of another province. The trader is never the spoiled darling of British diplomacy, despite our tradition as "a nation of shopkeepers," and the British merchant in the Far East has had to watch while the trade which might have been his has been gradually absorbed by others with more sympathetic and watchful governments. British diplomacy at this period, and since, has been exclusively occupied with Peking, the Manchu dynasty, Li Hung Chang, or Yuan Shih-kai.

The relations of Japan with China is a subject too vast to be summarized with any real perspective. The briefest references must suffice. Japan was the pupil of China in arts and letters, and the relations

of the two people have retained, on the Chinese side, that attitude of superiority, despite the defeat of 1904–05 and subsequent proofs of Japan's efficiency as a modern state. Korea was the *casus belli* in 1894, and the treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) recognized the complete independence of Korea, and ceded to Japan the southern portion of Fengtien (adjoining Korea) and the islands of Formosa and the Pescadores. China, moreover, in 1896, by a treaty of commerce and navigation, agreed to the reception of a Japanese diplomatic agent at the Court of Peking, and to the residence of consular officials and subjects throughout China wherever opened to foreign residence and trade. Japanese subjects were to have the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other nations under the most favored nation. Japanese vessels were to have the right of landing and shipping at all ports of call already opened or to be opened later. Japanese subjects were to have the right of travel in the interior under passports issued by their own consuls. The tariffs and tariff rates with Western Powers were extended to Japan. Some seven years later (in 1903) a supplementary treaty for the purpose of promoting the commercial relations between China and Japan was executed, following on the supposed advantages obtained by the Mackay Treaty of that year. This dealt chiefly with *likin*, trade-marks, and cognate questions, and the right of navigation on inland waterways—a most important concession—and the opening of Changsha in the province of Hunan, a region hitherto closed against the foreigner. After the defeat of 1895, China began to realize the necessity of reform, and

naturally turned to her nearest neighbor for examples of how to accomplish it; but it was only after the Boxer rising, when the disciplined action of the Japanese roused Chinese admiration and gratitude, that the "boom" in Japanese models set in. Yuan Shih-kai and other provincial authorities engaged Japanese instructors for their schools and for their troops. The rush to Japanese universities and the development of the press under Japanese tutelage are described elsewhere. The defeat of Russia by Japan (1904–05) accentuated the successful reorganization of the latter, and the vulnerability of the Great Power which had hung so long over China like a cloud. But although China humbled herself to take instruction from her former pupil, it must not be supposed that she has departed from her old standpoint, nor will she adopt Japanese methods *en bloc*. A Chinese student has expressed very well a prevalent view of Japan. It was easier for her to imitate, he said, than for China, which had always originated, whereas Japan had borrowed practically all her ideas from others. Chinese renascence will be possible only on strong national lines. The situation in Manchuria does not conduce altogether to harmony between the two governments, and a whole group of questions, including the Yalu River timber concession and the Sin-ming-tun railway, have led to strained relations, ending in what was practically an ultimatum from Japan.

The status of Manchuria was settled by the treaty of Portsmouth between Japan and Russia, and China had no choice save to confirm this in the additional agreement of 1905 between her and Japan; but

whereas in her previous agreements with other foreign Powers it is she who has striven to "interpret" the clauses in a manner favorable to herself, or to find loopholes for evasion, in this case she has to deal with another Oriental Power strong enough to adhere to its own view of what the situation should be.

The most important event in the history of foreign relations was, of course, the Boxer rising of 1900, and its sequel in the expedition of the allied armies and the capture and sack of Peking. For ten years anti-foreign feeling had been on the increase, and in 1891 anti-foreign riots took place in many parts, largely instigated by a scholar named Chow-Han. The Chinese government usually had to pay money compensation for these attacks, but the method of punishment generally allowed the real culprits to escape. The acts of foreign aggression which followed the war of 1894–95 were fuel to the fire of popular resentment, and the Boxer movement was certainly, in its inception, what it was represented to be by the central government—a popular rising against foreigners in the guise (so familiar to the Chinese) of a secret society. They began to attack Christian churches and missions in Shantung, but very quickly the flames spread to Chihli; and, when it became apparent that foreigners in the capital itself were threatened, neither the Empress-Dowager nor her principal advisers saw fit to offer any opposition. Indeed, it is clear that they alternated between a desire to use the Boxers as their instruments and fear of the possible consequences.

The foreigners in Peking took refuge in the British,

American, and adjoining legations, where they were besieged under most trying circumstances, and defended themselves with courage and skill. Nevertheless, it is doubtful if they could have held out if the Chinese had been united in desiring their downfall. The behavior of Chinese Christians, thousands of whom suffered martyrdom at this time, was often exemplary. The relief of Peking was first attempted by a force from the British and American warvessels, which were stationed off Taku, but this force was compelled to retreat and narrowly escaped annihilation. So far the Boxer movement had had ostensibly no connection with the Chinese government, but after the despatch of the expeditionary force the commanders of the foreign fleets off Taku summoned the Chinese to surrender the forts, and on their refusal bombarded and took them. The Peking government then declared war, and more openly took sides with the Boxers. The Powers thereupon despatched strong forces to China, and a relief expedition entered Peking on August 14. Next day the city was occupied.

The motives which prompted the Empress-Dowager and her advisers in their fatal policy were as complex as their action was weak and disastrous. The spoliation of China after 1895, as has been said, roused indignation all over China, which was not abated by the rush for railway and mining concessions by foreigners. Peking at this period was filled with a horde of concession hunters and mongers, and more than one legation appeared to exist for the purpose of feeding these gentry. Chinese indignation with the foreigner certainly had much justifi-

cation. But the Empress and her advisers must have had some inkling of the avalanche they were bringing down on their heads, and cannot have been altogether deceived into the belief that with one great effort they could rid themselves of foreigners forever. It is far more likely, and in accordance with the tactics they pursued (sending fruit and complimentary letters to the besieged embassies one day, and orders for their extermination another), that they designed to divert from themselves the growing dissatisfaction in which their impending doom was already foreshadowed. The entry of the allied armies into Peking, their progress through the Forbidden City, and the subsequent spoliation of Peking, are a chapter in Chinese history which no nation can recall with entire satisfaction. But it was not the Chinese people who were defeated and humbled, but their Manchu rulers. Peking is their city; her fall tore the last vestige of prestige from the dynasty, and only the personality and real ability of Tze Hsi kept the Throne intact in the following years. The price China had to pay for the Boxer outrage was the erection of a statue in Peking to the German ambassador, Baron von Kettler, who was killed in the streets; the despatch of an imperial clansman to apologize for this to Berlin; and the payment of an enormous indemnity, part of which the United States agreed to cancel on condition that the money should be spent on education—a step which may bring very great influence as its result.

This action on the part of the United States illustrates the difference which she has always striven to maintain between her attitude and that of other

Powers in China. Her position in the Philippines actually brings her into close proximity, but her main objective has always been trade across the Pacific, and not territorial acquisition. She has executed four commercial treaties with China, and has established a very considerable position in that empire. During the tenure of office, as foreign secretary, of the late John Hay the United States began to play a leading part in diplomatic negotiations with China. There is, however, one crucial feature in Chino-American relations—the question of Chinese immigration. As early as 1880 the United States became alarmed at the influx of Chinese into her Pacific region, and sent a commission to China to secure the regulation of cheap labor. As a result the United States secured in a convention the power to regulate, limit, or even suspend, if necessary, the incoming of Chinese laborers. In 1894 she had become more determined, and China had to consent to the prohibition of her nationals for ten years. In 1904, when the arrangement had to be renewed, China attempted in vain to secure better terms, and the result was a boycott of American goods. This did not last long, but it was the occasion of a display of national feeling and even of national solidarity which was a sign of the times.

The review of the relations of foreign Powers with China, while it reveals the evils and dangers of the policy pursued by the government at Peking, does not leave any nation with grounds for special self-congratulation. As the period of attempted exclusion is now at an end, and as we shall probably see the whole of China opened to foreign trade as soon as

there is a central government strong enough to enforce the necessary regulations, we need not dwell too much on the struggles which were necessary to overcome the policy of exclusion. But it is clear from history that this policy was not indigenous to China, where in earlier times foreigners were welcomed, but was due to the Manchu rulers, who imposed it for their own purposes. Unfortunately, in the course of the relations which grew out of that mistaken policy, foreign nations had to take action which involved them in hostilities with the Chinese. Then, as it became obvious that the Manchu government was as weak as it was bigoted, foreign nations took by force more than they would have demanded had they been met differently. The result was that anti-foreign feeling which, though under better control, still constitutes an element of bitterness and suspicion in the relations of China to the outside world.

VIII

DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE

ALTHOUGH a minister plenipotentiary was appointed by Great Britain after the signature of the treaty of Nanking in 1842, the office was merged in that of governor of Hongkong, and the diplomatic function remained practically dormant until after the convention of Peking in 1860, following the treaty of Tientsin in 1858. In fact, the war of 1856–60 might be said to have been undertaken for the purpose of establishing diplomatic relations with the central government. Up to that time there had been no intercourse except at the five ports opened to trade by the treaty of Nanking. At four of these ports, where the influence of one or two strong men in the newly established consular service had been stamped on the new relations between the Chinese and British authorities, and where a natural development of commerce had taken place, everything was peaceable and prosperous. But at the principal port, Canton, where, most of all, firmness and consistency were needed, these qualities were unfortunately lacking, and the result was that an intolerable state of things was allowed to grow up. Taking full advantage of the weakness of the British attitude, the Chinese authorities became more and more in-

solent and aggressive, until at length, in 1856, the cup of their iniquity overflowed, and reprisals had to be undertaken. The right to enter the city, which is the seat of a governor and governor-general, had been waived for a term of seven years, in deference to what was represented as the uncontrollable turbulence of the people. At the end of that period the reasons for still further postponing the privilege had, of course, grown stronger, and entry into the city and intercourse with the authorities were still denied to the representatives of Great Britain. Serious troubles had ensued consequent on this anomalous situation. There had been assassinations of Englishmen for which no redress was obtained, insults of every kind accumulated, and the more submissive the foreigners showed themselves the more were they treated as savages and slaves. The whole mercantile community were kept in what was virtually a prison, their peregrinations being confined within the area of what was somewhat euphemistically called a "garden." It was only a question of time as to when this unbearable tyranny must lead to a catastrophe. The spark that ignited the gunpowder was the seizure of the crew of a "lorcha" or schooner belonging to Hongkong and flying the British ensign.

The consul for Canton, Mr. (afterward Sir Harry) Parkes, happened to be a man possessed of two great qualities—clear insight and iron resolution. He demanded prompt redress, and received insolent replies. The Chinese authorities did not comprehend the change that was involved in the succession of a strong man, and were for "continuing the treatment," as the doctors say in chronic cases. When

the matter was put into the hands of the British admiral he limited himself to a single demand—*i.e.*, the treaty right of entering the city and of conferring with the authorities. This being refused with scorn, Sir Michael Seymour made his own way to the yamên of the Viceroy Yeh, but did not find his Excellency at home. Thus began the "war"-like operations which dragged on, with intervals of false peace, until they culminated in the occupation of the Chinese capital. The primary object throughout, or, to use the military phrase, the objective, of the hostilities which extended over a space of four years (from October, 1856, till October, 1860) was nothing more or less than to obtain by direct intercourse with the Peking Court a remedy for the grievances which British subjects and officials had so long and so patiently—pusillanimously would not be too strong a word—endured in the provincial capital, Canton. Further extension of trade as an ulterior object was, of course, never lost sight of by the British statesmen of that time.

The future of British interests in China being thus closely bound up in this sovereign remedy, the inauguration of diplomatic relations acquired a character of crucial importance. It was by no means a thing "to be taken in hand unadvisedly, lightly, or wantonly." It was an incursion into an unsurveyed territory, where the greatest circumspection was called for. The success of the new experiment depended on the skill with which it was carried out, and more especially on the first step, which would give tone and direction to the whole course of future international relations. The conditions under which

intercourse was to be conducted were, of course, unknown—had, in fact, to be evolved by actual experience. The Chinese Court was called upon to break with all its traditions and to discover a platform on which it could treat foreign nations on terms of equality. This was no light matter; it was a revolution in the most conservative body in the known world. The importance of the demand was felt equally by both negotiants. To the British envoy access to the Imperial Court was the *sine qua non* of his mission; to the Chinese it was the last ditch, the point on which they could make no surrender. Both sides understood this; and when the Chinese gave way in order to get rid of the British envoy and the naval squadron supporting him at Tientsin, it was only to draw him into an ambush. The treaty of Tientsin was, from the Chinese point of view, simply a device to gain time in order to bar the way of access against the minister whom they had covenanted to receive. The temporary success of this expedient was signalized in the British repulse before the Taku forts in 1859. The resistance to the advent of a British representative was finally overcome, so far as mere force could overcome it, by the Anglo-French campaign of 1860, which resulted in the capture of Peking, causing the flight, followed soon after by the death, of the Emperor Hienfung.

Although, therefore, nothing was known of the machinery or the forms under which the new diplomatic intercourse was to proceed, there was no room for doubt as to the spirit in which the foreign ministers would be received. As they could not be excluded by material force, they would be neutralized

as far as possible by moral expedients. The series of deceptions which the Chinese—not without justification, being the weaker party—had practised on the intruders during successive negotiations afforded ample proof that the high officers of the Court differed in no way from the high officers in the provinces, of whose manners and customs British officials had had ample experience. The lesson which twenty years had taught was that the Chinese were friendly and reasonable under a firm hand, but insolent and aggressive when met with deference and weakness. It was no new lesson, but simply the teaching of all human experience since history began.

It might have been expected that there would be no repetition, on the new stage of Peking, of the mistaken policy which had been followed for so many years, with such unhappy results, at Canton: that the ministers who filled the new posts would never forego the advantage which they had derived from following in the suite of an irresistible military force. The plain fact is, however, that they actually did these very things, and in establishing themselves in the Chinese capital they ignored not only the results of all the experience gained at Canton and the other open ports and of their own personal experience in the negotiations at which they had assisted, but also that knowledge of the laws of human action which every man of the world possesses. They assumed, and acted as if they believed, that a miracle had suddenly reversed the Chinese character, turning negative to positive and positive to negative; and to this initial error may be traced thirty-eight years of a policy of hallucination, which has been one of the

efficient factors in bringing the Chinese Empire near disruption and British interests there into a parlous state. It is not always easy to isolate the acts of British diplomacy from those of the other Powers; but it is fair to hold British policy responsible, because Britain possessed and maintained the lead until some thirty-four years ago. Beyond doubt the false move made, the false direction taken at the beginning, was chiefly due to the British line of action at Peking.

Whether it was a kind of remorse for the act of vandalism committed in the destruction of the Chinese art treasures in the Summer Palace or a peculiar and misdirected sentiment on the part of individuals, the attitude of the British minister in Peking was more that of the representative of a defeated Power than of a victorious one. For a long time Peking was treated by him as a sacred place which would be profaned by the intrusion of travelers or visitors, and severe regulations were promulgated for the restraint, under penalty, of inquisitive British subjects. The motive, of course, was unimpeachable, but the idea of obliterating the memory of the burning and pillage of the Summer Palace, the whole justification and utility of which depended on the memory of it being kept fresh, by punishing an inoffensive tourist for looking at the ruins, was not very practical. Nor were the obsequious efforts to conciliate the Chinese, of which this was but a type, calculated to have any other effect than to inflate them with an already too confident conceit, and to render all rational business with them impracticable. This is the result which was naturally to be expected,

and it is precisely what happened, the circle of evil consequences having gone on widening during all the subsequent years. The metropolitan ministers never, indeed, resorted to the offensive language to which the provincials had become addicted, but the evasiveness of the Foreign Board has, if possible, exceeded that of the provincial yamêns, while their superior manner of intimating a *non possumus* has been no less exasperating. The urbanity of the Peking Yamên, indeed, was carried to almost comical excess at times, as, when sitting placidly and listening to the objurgations of a foreign minister driven to despair by their impassiveness, they would help him out with the opprobrious expressions which came with difficulty to his tongue. It is not desirable to concentrate on any one name the blame which should be shared by many, but as the first accredited minister to China after the war of 1856–60 was one whose prestige was quite exceptional, he had a free hand to shape his course in Peking without the guidance of the home government. It is Sir Frederick Bruce, therefore, who is mainly responsible for the truckling policy; and he was the first to feel and deplore its disastrous results. No doubt a minister, placed as he was, and as any minister to China is to-day, is largely dependent on his secretaries and sinologues, just as the home government is dependent on him; but if he is to elude responsibility by sheltering himself behind a subordinate, it were better to make the secretary minister, so that the public might have the satisfaction of knowing who is responsible for its affairs.

The lesson of our many years' experience was as

clear as the day. It was simply that the Chinese government should be compelled to fulfil its engagements, not only in the interest of foreigners, but in its own. This policy had never failed of success in the hands of British consuls of the stamp of Alcock, Parkes, Medhurst, Alabaster, and one or two others. The yielding policy had always failed, both in the object aimed at and in retaining the friendship of the Chinese officials to whom we yielded. No more favorable conditions could be conceived for impressing and influencing the government of China than those which existed at the close of the campaign of 1860. They had been routed, the Emperor had fled to Jehol, those who were left to carry on the government were trembling for their heads. They were in the condition of a horse that has been strapped up and thrown by a horse-breaker. Anything could have been done with them. This is testified to by Mr. H. N. Lay, who was present and in a better position to know than any one else who has yet chosen to utter his opinion. This is what he says:

> When I left China the Emperor's government, under the pressure of necessity and with the beneficial terror established by the allied foray to Peking in 1860 fresh in their recollection, was in the best of moods, willing to be guided, thankful for counsel, grateful for help, and in return for that help prepared to do what was right by the foreigner.

And within two years this was the state of things:

> What did I find on my return? The face of things was entirely changed. There was the old insolent de-

meanor, the nonsensical language of exclusion, the open mockery of all treaties. . . . In short, all the ground gained by the treaty of 1858 had been frittered away, and we were thrust back into the position we occupied before the war—one of helpless remonstrance and impotent menace . . . the labor of years lost through egregious mismanagement. The Foreign Board looked upon our European representatives as so many *rois fainéants*. . . . Prince Kung was no longer accessible . . . he professed to be engaged with more important matters.

We have dwelt on the opening of foreign diplomatic intercourse at some length because it constitutes the substratum of subsequent history, including all crises in Chinese affairs; and what follows in this chapter will require constant mental reference to the foregoing remarks in order to make it intelligible.

The omission to implement the treaty of Tientsin of 1858 by at once placing a representative in Peking, an omission which caused the naval disaster at Taku in 1859 and necessitated the campaign of 1860, was not repeated in that year. The minister himself did not remain during the winter, there being no suitable quarters for his accommodation; but a junior official in the consular service, Mr. Atkins, was left in charge. The legations were formally opened in the spring of 1861, Sir Frederick Bruce, younger brother of the Lord Elgin who had negotiated both the treaties, representing Great Britain. In the Chinese government departments no provision existed for the totally unforeseen contingency of receiving foreign representatives otherwise than as tribute-bearers; but the necessity for doing so having been at last recognized by the Imperial government, the board or office

known as the Tsungli Yamên was established in January, 1861, and was ready to transact business on the arrival of the foreign ministers. It did not take rank with the Six Boards, and bore at first a tentative character. It has been aptly called a species of cabinet, composed of members of certain state departments. The head of the institution then, as until the day of his decease, was Prince Kung, the sixth son of the Emperor Taukwang, who was brother of the Emperor Hienfung—then in retirement at Jehol, where he died in October, 1861—and uncle of the late "reforming" Emperor. The prince was from the first a reasonable and sober man of affairs, courteous in manner, whose character inspired hopes of the regeneration of the Chinese state. But probably the member of the Tsungli Yamên who approached nearer to the ideal of a patriot, was serious and intelligent, and had almost more than an ordinary statesman's grasp of affairs and their possibilities, was Wênsiang, between whom and the foreign legations a greater intimacy sprang up than has ever been possible with any Chinese or Manchu statesman since his death, which occurred in 1875.

The intercourse between this enlightened and patriotic man and the foreign representatives, more especially the British, who in this connection may be held to include the head of the Imperial maritime or foreign customs, was fruitful in an exchange of views of a highly interesting character, both oral and written, which, if collected, might form the basis of a new political philosophy. Whoever studies the works of Buckle, Spencer, or other writers who endeavored to

generalize from world-wide data is constantly reminded of a great gap in their chain of reasoning, because a fourth of the human race is virtually excluded. Dr. Pearson is an exception to this, but he also fails to master his Chinese data. For the first time a genuine representative of the ethnic consciousness of China, with four thousand years of continuous accumulated history and tradition behind him and a practical problem of extreme exigency in front of him, was brought into sympathetic communion with wise men from the West, bringing in their persons the mellow fruit of their two thousand years of strife and progress; and the result of the contact, if given to the world, could not fail to be highly instructive. But this was unfortunately a mere episode, which led to nothing but disappointment, felt the more deeply on account of the high hopes which had been not unreasonably raised. There was no successor to Wênsiang. The Tsungli Yamên fell into the condition of an ordinary government department, with special vices of its own—an institution for the prevention of business. The numbers of its members, originally three, increased, and varied from seven to nine, but its fatal incapacity lay in the fact that it was a body without a head; for, though there was always a nominal president, he absented himself when he chose from the daily attendance. The principle of responsibility being carried to such lengths in China as cannot be understood by the mere use of the same word in the West, the vice which detracts so much from efficiency among Western officials, the habit of evading responsibility, is so fully developed there that it seemed as if the new

Foreign Board in Peking had no other reason for its existence. The yamên, until forced into greater activity by the pressure of events resulting from the Chino-Japanese War, served merely as the cold water which extinguished the hot irons thrust into it by the ardor of the foreign agents. To transact business with the board was declared by Sir Harry Parkes to be a physical *tour de force*. Sir R. Alcock more minutely described it in the *Fortnightly Review*, May, 1876:

It is beating the air to talk to them of treaty rights and obligations, the claims of justice, or the benefits that would accrue to them, as to us, by a more progressive and liberal policy. The tyro in such work is at first charmed with the courtesy and patience shown in listening to what he hopes may prove convincing arguments. They are even met, in reply, with a certain show of appreciative intelligence and willingness to be convinced or better informed. When, however, many such interviews and interminable correspondence in further elucidation have exhausted the subject, and the time has arrived for action or definite result, the disillusion quickly follows. Perhaps at a final meeting for the purpose of settlement, when there is nothing more apparently to be said on either side, his proposal to settle the terms of agreement is met by a request in the blandest accents, and with a perfectly unmoved countenance, to explain what it is that is wanted, as he is ready to hear!—all that passed in weeks of discussion is as though it had never been. It is simply ignored, and the whole argument, in which days or weeks have been consumed, has to be begun *de novo*, or abandoned as hopeless. What diplomacy can avail against such adversaries?

And the *modus operandi* was still more minutely depicted by a correspondent of the *Times* in 1884, cited in the *Life of Sir Harry Parkes*, by Stanley Lane Poole:

They commence by the delicate *plaisanterie* of offering refreshments which they know their visitor will not touch, and the attendants know the art of killing time by bringing in the repast, dish by dish, with infinite fuss and ceremony. The visitor sits meanwhile, more or less patiently, on a hard seat in a cheerless room, grimy with venerable dirt, the north wind moaning through the crevices. Fortunately the etiquette of the country permits the hat to be kept on, and necessity compels the visitor to wear a thick ulster with the fur-lined collar turned up to cover the ears, if it be winter. At last, when the melon-seeds and sugar-plums have been distributed in saucers all over the only table on which the foreigner would have liked to spread his papers, business is supposed to commence, half an hour having been happily consumed in arranging sweetmeats. "And now," observes the visitor, "what is your answer about the robbery of merchandise belonging to Mr. Smith at Nam-kwei, and the beating of his servants for refusing to pay the illegal extortions of the officials?" One of their rules is that no one shall speak first. So they take sidelong glances at each other and keep silence until one, bolder than the rest, opens his mouth, as much to the surprise as relief of his comrades, who watch the reckless man in the hope that he will drop something which may serve hereafter to put a sting into some surreptitious charge against him. What he does say is, "Take some of these walnuts, they come from the prefecture of Long-way, which was celebrated for the excellence of its fruit!" Then follows a discussion on the merits of walnuts, which is, however, not nearly

such excellent fooling as Lord Granville's discourse on tea-roses to the gentleman who sought an interview on some important question connected with China, but it fulfils the same purpose. When they do speak, they all speak at once, and, like Mr. Puff's friends, their unanimity is something wonderful, and their courage rises to heroism. What they do say can, of course, be neither understood nor answered; so much the better, since time has been killed, with the arrow of controversy still in the quiver. The foreign minister's lips begin to grow pale, and other signs of exhaustion warn the courageous ones that it is time to shout louder if haply they may stun their auditor with their noise.

Obviously, then, the so-called Foreign Office of China was a negative quantity, having the faculty neither of initiation nor appreciation. Its attitude toward foreign ideas was that of a deaf person in regard to sounds or of a blind man in regard to colors. The phenomenon is not so very uncommon even among men of Western race and education when strange subjects are for the first time expounded. A delusive grammatical comprehension of the phraseology is constantly mistaken for a real intelligence of the matter, which, however often explained, still leaves the auditor, who lacks the necessary faculty, puzzled to know what it is all about. The impossibility of imparting to even highly trained and eagerly receptive minds in the West a conception of the life of the Chinese and of their cogitations on matters of national policy or sociology might have suggested to foreign ministers possible mitigating circumstances in judging of Chinese obstructiveness. It was not a simple quantity, but a mixture of mulish-

ness, blankness, and dread of personal responsibility. The fact, however, remains that a stone wall would have been about as effective an instrument of policy as this coterie of Chinese statesmen; and an early recognition of the true state of the case might have saved much gratuitous heart-burning in the first and more fatalistic callousness in the later incumbents of diplomatic posts. Moreover, a more general recognition of the facts would have saved foreign governments, the British in particular, from profound misguidance in their Far Eastern policy. These have all, except one, lived on delusions which events of the most drastic character have failed altogether to dispel. In the incompetence and impracticability of the officially appointed medium is to be found the reason, though not the excuse, for trusting to unorthodox substitute channels of communication which have led to no satisfactory results, and in the nature of things could never do so.

Diplomatic intercourse in China opened under a cloud, which exercised a most adverse influence over its early, and by consequence over its whole, development. That was the absence of the Emperor, who had fled before the invading host in 1860 and had not been induced to return to his capital when he died in the autumn of 1861. The government was in commission, and consequently weak. In one way this fact rendered it pliable, while in another it disposed the foreign representatives to a forbearance which proved fatal to good working relations. There was no sovereign to whom ministers could deliver their credentials; hence the question of audience was postponed. Matters were not improved when the

throne became occupied by a child and the Regents were two women. Neither did the "audience question" improve by keeping; in fact, international relations were stamped with a provisional character during the whole time of the minority. The first audience granted by the Emperor Tungchih was in 1873; it was purely formal, everything being done on the Chinese side to minimize its importance, and its practical effect on business was absolutely nil. All the hopes of improved relations which had been based on it proved illusory; there was only the Tsungli Yamên, with the imbecility of age grafted on to the ignorance of youth, as at this day.

There was another cloud which cast a depressing shadow on Chinese affairs, the Taiping rebellion, which from trivial beginnings in 1849 or 1850 had spread havoc over the richest and most populous provinces of the Empire. How near the dynasty came to be shaken by this movement is only a matter of speculation, but the paralysis of order in the provinces, added to the humiliation of the Emperor by foreigners, formed a combination which was anything but speculative. It was not only the Chinese government that was paralyzed by these calamitous circumstances; the foreign representatives in Peking and their governments at home found themselves in what may be well called an impossible situation. While they ought to have been pressing and molding the central government into the forms which were calculated to insure good relations in the future, they were as much concerned as the Chinese themselves in checking the ravages of the rebellion, and both directly and indirectly the French and British

governments assisted in the final suppression of the movement. The patient had first to be cured of his disease before being corrected in his manners, but the convalescence was so protracted that the opportunity for correction never came.

An incident in connection with the rebellion, and one which brought into sudden prominence certain features in the new international relationship, deserves a passing notice. That was the commissioning of a steam flotilla manned by British seamen and officered and commanded by British naval officers, known as the "Lay-Osborne fleet." The ships were ordered by Prince Kung through Sir Robert (then Mr.) Hart, the *locum tenens* of Mr. Lay, the first Inspector-General of Customs, who was in England on leave from 1861 to 1863. The immediate purpose of the fleet was the suppression of the Taiping rebellion by the capture of Nanking and other cities on the banks of the Great River. The ships arrived in command of Captain Sherard Osborne, R. N., but the contracts which Mr. Lay had made with Captain Osborne and the officers under the direct sanction and supervision of the British government of the day were not ratified by the Chinese, and the force was disbanded and the ships sold, while Mr. Lay decided to resign the Chinese service. It is not necessary to enter into the merits of this abortive transaction, but it is interesting to note what was the cause of the difference between Prince Kung and Mr. Lay which led to the break-up of the scheme. It was precisely the same kind of misunderstanding which twenty-seven years later, with all our added experience, led to the resignation of Captain Lang from

the Chinese service. Mr. Lay had acted on the belief that, as his authority came from Peking, he was organizing an Imperial fleet for China; he refused, therefore, to have it placed under the orders of provincial mandarins, and he testified to the sincerity of his convictions by throwing up a promising career rather than sanction the employment of such a military weapon at the pleasure of local officials. Had Mr. Lay not been affected as others also were by the glamour of a central government, he would perhaps have suspected from the first that Prince Kung could not really intend what he said in the sense in which he (Mr. Lay) received the communication. It was a case of words being understood in different senses, not, perhaps, without a secret intention of misleading. But Mr. Lay's misjudgment was venial compared with that of the British officials responsible for the engagement of Captain Lang, whose services were lent, some twenty years later, by the British to the Chinese government for the special purpose of organizing the Chinese fleet. He was not only placed under the orders of Li Hung Chang, but was made subordinate to the Chinese admiral, with whom he had been induced to believe he was associated on equal terms. The whole Lay-Osborne incident was promptly disposed of in the summer of 1863, and ceased to disturb the even flow of diplomacy; and Captain Lang, having found his position untenable, sent in his resignation. That these two separate incidents, involving such important issues connected with naval supremacy in the Far East, should have ended so disastrously illustrates the strange fatality which has attended our dealings with China.

It is important to observe that the sapping of Occidental influence in Peking, through the deferential tactics of the diplomatists there, ran for a number of years parallel with the remarkably clear and strong policy of the British government at home. From the time when its assertion was rendered necessary by the insults at Canton in 1856 until several years after the final suppression of the rebellion by Gordon, our government followed a course both in China and Japan which was at once bold and prudent, eminently conducive to the best interests of Great Britain and the civilized world, and to the peace and welfare of the Chinese Empire. The rebellion in China was really put down by Lord Palmerston, for it was in full faith of his loyal support that the British officers on the spot were emboldened to take the decided course which led to such great results as the practical opening of the river Yangtze to the commerce of the world, the suppression of piracy and all other forms of disorder, and the covering with myriads of white sails of that vast expanse of water which, in 1861, was as desolate as the Arctic Ocean. This resolute and compact policy was most exhilarating to all foreigners engaged in commercial pursuits or mission work in China; not to those of British nationality alone, nor even to foreigners exclusively, but to all Chinese—and there are vast numbers of them—who came within the influence of the British system. It was a wholesome, manly, and inspiring influence, and to the men of that generation it seemed as permanently established as if it were part of the order of nature. They even ceased to be thankful for it, taking it all as a matter of course, like light

and air and water. The policy, indeed, was attacked on party grounds, and on grounds which, narrow as they were, went beyond mere party controversy, by Bright and Cobden, who advocated our retirement from the Chinese ports to some peaceful island whence we could conduct our trade, represented by them as of a very petty nature. But the straightforward and business-like expositions of Lord Palmerston, his perfect mastery of the whole question, and his lusty large-heartedness, easily swept away opposition; and the country settled down comfortably in the feeling that, however little it understood of these far-distant affairs, their management was in competent hands. This happy state of things came to an end, and it is sad to have to look back upon so recent a period as a golden age little understood by the generation then living. It is now easy to see how the mere progress of the world must in any case have brought about changes in the balance of power in the Far East, but it is also not difficult to assign a date when British supremacy there received its death-blow: it was on October 23, 1865, when Lord Palmerston expired. It is true he left behind him that most experienced foreign secretary, Lord Clarendon, who was able to indite despatches which cannot even to this day be surpassed for literary finish and absolute correctness of doctrine. But the soul had departed from the ministry of foreign affairs, as was seen within three short years—as soon, in fact, as Lord Clarendon was confronted with a test; and, with the exception of a very short interval, it has remained absent.

This brings us to another singular phenomenon

which appeared in Peking toward the end of 1867. The representative of the United States, Mr. Anson Burlingame, accepted an appointment from the Chinese government as special envoy to Western countries, having resigned by telegraph his post as American minister. He was accompanied by two Chinese officials, who were no doubt really the envoys, Mr. Burlingame being the attendant. His mission was to persuade the governments of the West that China was not in a condition to be pressed, that if left entirely to her own devices she would do everything that was proper. In particular, he inveighed, with the turgid eloquence of which he was a master, against any coercion being resorted to for the redress of injuries in the provinces, "the throat policy," as he termed this process. He also made extensive promises on behalf of China, with one eye directed toward the mercantile and the other toward the missionary sentiment of the English-speaking nations. "The Shining Cross," in his glowing phraseology, was to be planted on every hill and valley throughout China. It so happened, however, that while Mr. Burlingame was on tour outrages on missionaries and on merchants in widely separated portions of China had been adequately and effectively redressed after a very slight display of force, following, but by a long interval, the vigorous action which had proved so salutary in Shanghai two decades earlier. Lord Clarendon, apparently without consulting his own paid and responsible agents in China, seemed to accept Mr. Burlingame's inspiration without a grain of salt, and addressed severe reprimands to certain consuls, who, in the opinion

of all foreign residents in China, had rendered valuable services to humanity while defending the immunities of British subjects. It was the first public pronouncement of the death of the Palmerstonian tradition, and of the relapse of Great Britain into an effeminate, invertebrate, inconsequent policy, swayed by every wind from without or within and opposed to the judgment of her own experienced representatives—the policy which has beyond doubt led to the decline of British prestige in Asia. The genesis of the Burlingame mission is somewhat obscure, its precise object scarcely less so; but its putative parents and actual sponsors are believed to have deprecated its consequences as having gone far beyond what was hoped or intended when it was despatched.

The new departure of the British government in 1869 was received with consternation by the foreign communities in China. Instructions were sent out forbidding her Majesty's ships to land their men under any circumstances, except to take the British residents on shipboard when they were threatened with danger. The dismay of the residents was tempered with mirth provoked by the impracticable nature of the new order, which was scarcely less absurd than would be one to embark the population of Brighton on board a couple of Channel steamers. The alarming feature in the case—for there was no officer in the British navy who would have carried out the instructions—was the ignorance displayed by the British government of the actual conditions of life in China, ignorance which would have been impossible in the lifetime of Lord Palmerston, who

was never at fault in his appreciation of the common facts of the Chinese question. That the same inacquaintance with facts has prevailed till now there is reason to believe, notwithstanding a succession of highly paid representatives in China, with an extensive and capable staff of consuls, all possessing a knowledge of the language. Once our government entered on the course of taking its information from every source but the legitimate one, it necessarily landed itself in a perpetual fog, in which it became more and more dependent on such information as might be volunteered from extraneous and not always disinterested sources.

From what has been said it may be inferred that diplomatic intercourse in Peking has always been of a hide-bound character. There was never any give-and-take in it, because such a thing as equality of standing could not enter into the conception of the Chinese ministers, and they could not in their hearts either extend fair treatment to foreigners or expect such at their hands. Hence the attitude of the Chinese has been mere resistance tempered by fear. For some years, indeed, with a few exceptions, until the Audience deliberations of 1891, the diplomatic body acted together; and had they always done so, their will would have been irresistible. But their unity could never carry them very far: in the nature of things their interests began to differ, and their policy still more. Then the Chinese saw their opportunity of pitting one Power against the other, and of profiting, in their short-sighted manner, by the mutual jealousies, not always of the Powers themselves, but of their local representatives. These di-

visions in the aims and policy of the foreign Powers, which began to show themselves as cracks and fissures not very perceptible from a distance, have now widened into yawning chasms. For many years, too, the Chinese ministers were naturally accustomed to rely, especially in their controversies with Great Britain, on the advice and mediation of their own paid servant, the Inspector-General of Customs, who often succeeded in blunting, if not breaking, the weapon leveled against his principals. The touchstone of all discussion has been force; and the Chinese long remained true to the character which the late Lord Elgin gave them, of "yielding nothing to reason but everything to fear." The same testimony has been borne by his successors in the representation of Great Britain in Peking. Accordingly, whenever a question reached the point of urgency they would simply ask their referee, "Does it mean war?" If the answer was yes, they would instantly yield; and if no, they refused to give way. Had foreign Powers understood the true state of the case—and it was often enough explained to them by their agents—their diplomacy might have been greatly simplified. The nearest approach to a threat of war was when, failing to obtain redress for the murder of Margary on the Burmo-Chinese frontier, Sir Thomas Wade left Peking. He was promptly followed to Chifu by Li Hung Chang, and a settlement was come to. It was a settlement injurious to the interests of Great Britain, the state of affairs in Europe in 1876 operating greatly in favor of the Chinese negotiator, for, though the British minister was supported by a naval demon-

stration, his antagonist had private information that no coercive action would be taken. It was purely a question of force, nevertheless, and but for the natural reluctance of Li Hung Chang to return empty-handed to Peking, and the desire on both sides to put an end to a troublesome controversy, no treaty at all might have been concluded at Chifu.

The unreasoning resistance of the Chinese was never, of course, so absolute but that some impression could be made upon it by foreign ministers who combined ability with perseverance. There have been one or two such personalities among the various legations, and some who inspired the Chinese government with confidence. General Vlangali, who represented Russia in the seventies, was more than once appealed to in after years, when he was in office in St. Petersburg, by Li Hung Chang, as man to man, and he never uttered an uncertain sound. Herr von Brandt, who represented Germany for an unusually lengthy period, gained great influence with the members of the Tsungli Yamên, and was one of the few who were able to cultivate personal relations with some of those highest in rank, who visited him privately at his residence. It has always been one of the obstacles in the way of a good understanding that private intercourse was barred by custom and etiquette, and that all conversations and negotiations had to be carried on with a group, each member more concerned to make the approved pose before his own jealous colleagues than to clear up the business in hand. Even in returning official calls the Chinese ministers were accustomed to hunt in

couples, like sisters of charity collecting subscriptions; hence it was an important step to get in touch with a single individual, a thing not unknown in the provinces, but virtually proscribed in the metropolis.

It was only by, so to say, capturing a single responsible minister, and withdrawing him entirely from his colleagues, that anything like secrecy could be secured for any negotiation. Business transacted at the Tsungli Yamên might almost as well have been conducted in the market-place, and the foreign ministers who took the trouble were able to inform themselves accurately and promptly of all that passed between Chinese and foreign diplomatists. They were not all equally well served in this matter, mainly because they were not equally liberal in the use of means.

After the Japanese War, which ceased in 1895, there was less and less diplomacy, and more and more force, applied to the government of China. As was said by a Russian official, "It is not a question what China will grant, but what foreigners will take"—a question of force, and that alone. The progress of the Audience question is only another illustration of the same thing. Most reluctantly, and by the slowest steps, were the doors of the Imperial Palace opened to the foreign representatives; points of ceremony were yielded with rigid parsimony, beginning with the function of 1873; suspended, during the long minority of the present Emperor, until 1891; and only after the harshest possible treatment by the "mailed fist" of Germany were full honors for the first time accorded to Prince Henry of Prussia. The various treaties, agreements, and conventions of the

last twenty years are dealt with in other parts of this book. After the Boxer rising and the subsequent entrance of the allied troops into Peking, the last shadow of a pretense that China occupied a different position from other Powers was abandoned, and the late Empress-Dowager and puppet Emperor gave audiences, and received foreigners far more freely. The former, indeed, developed a taste for being "interviewed."

But, although the pliability and amiability of the Manchu government filled diplomatists with joy, there was no real sign of what is known, in some religious circles, as a "change of heart." The Mackay Treaty is an instance of this. Negotiated in 1903 by Sir James Mackay, it provided for a whole range of reforms, including the abolition of *likin* and the reform of the currency muddle. No single article was ever put into operation or got beyond the provisional stage. Concessions of various kinds, some already begun, in which large amounts of British capital were engaged for works really needed in China, were, and still are, hung up on various pretexts—blocked by official prevarication. The weakest side of British diplomacy in China, and one for which the Chinese people have no reason to thank us, is the readiness to secure "concessions" and the unreadiness to enforce them. Such a diplomacy has helped to demoralize the Manchu government, while at the same time enabling them, by shifts and evasions, to conceal part of their own weakness, and so prolong an enfeebled and mischievous existence.

IX

THE GEOGRAPHIC QUESTION

VICTOR COUSIN has said, "Tell me the geography of a country and I will tell you its future." For either theoretical or practical purposes a knowledge of the topography of a country is a necessity, and its practical value is at once apparent whenever an attempt is made at laying down a system of communications, either by road or rail, or when some serious political question is under examination. The physical characteristics are as yet but imperfectly understood both in Europe and the United States, though the Jesuit surveys, the narratives of many recent travelers, and especially the masterly studies of Richthofen, have done much to make the Western geographer, if not the general public, acquainted with the subject. Yet maps of China are to this day to be found on which are projected systems of railways carried across quite impracticable ground, in ludicrous defiance of mountain systems and other obstacles. Our political geography, too, seems to be quite as much at fault.

The Chinese Empire comprised till lately: China proper — composed of eighteen provinces — Manchuria,[1] Mongolia, Tibet, eastern Turkestan, and Korea.

[1] A viceroyalty with three provinces since 1907.

It extended over sixty degrees of longitude and thirty-five degrees of latitude. The total area was some 4,400,000 square miles; and the eighteen provinces of China proper, including the islands of Hainan and Formosa, constituted about one-third of the whole Empire, containing, however, eleven-twelfths of the total population and most of the wealth of the country, the central Asian dominions forming a very serious burden on the Chinese exchequer. Not very long ago the country as far north as the Yablonoi Mountains belonged to China. In 1858 a large slice of territory—namely, the Amur province, situated between the Yablonoi Mountains on the north and the Amur River on the south—passed into Russian hands, followed, in 1860, by a large and most valuable region, the Maritime or Coast province. Since the Chino-Japanese War (1895) China has lost Formosa, Korea, and (practically) Manchuria, regarding which a good deal has to be said later.

The enormous tracts lying outside China proper, still almost *terræ incognitæ*, are, excepting Manchuria, beyond the radius of profitable commercial intercourse for Britain. Tibet, if opened up, must be approached through India. If not done from that quarter, Tibet will be occupied by the Russians, crossing the Kirghis highlands, the necessary steps having been taken for the purpose. The hill districts of Kokonor, the Gobi Desert, and great portions of Mongolia are all unsuited for advantageous trade relations. These table and high lands are in great part hill and desert, poor and sparsely peopled; where fertile and moderately inhabited they are too

distant. But they have a great strategical importance. Manchuria is now for all practical purposes Russian or Japanese; Mongolia and Turkestan are the Tsar's whenever he chooses to stretch out his hand for them. Korea will never again be ruled by the "Son of Heaven."

But we are dealing with the China of to-day, and therefore the region which interests us is comprised by the eighteen provinces of China proper. These are Chihli, Shansi, and Shensi on the north; Yunnan and Kweichau on the southwest; Kwangtung and Kwangsi in the south; Kansu and Szechuan on the west; Shantung, Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Fukien on the east; and Honan, Anhwei, Hupei, Hunan, and Kiangsi in the center. China proper, speaking roughly, is bounded on the east by the Yellow and China seas, reaching from Korea to the Tongking Gulf; on the west by Kokonor and Tibet; on the south by Tongking and the Shan states; and on the north by Mongolia, Russia, and Japan. The principal islands still remaining to China, of the hundreds which fringe the coast, are Chusan and Hainan.

The area of China proper measures about fifteen hundred thousand square miles, being about half the size of Europe, seven times that of France, and seventeen times that of Great Britain. Each of the eighteen provinces, therefore, is, on an average, almost as large as England. This once realized, the reader will have gone far toward understanding the Chinese problem. Though not so densely peopled as at one time supposed, it is thickly populated.

In China proper itself, dismissing the more or less savage tracts forming a fringe to the west and north,

there still remains a vast empire of most varied character. The chief physical characteristic of China is that, in the region north of the Yangtze, it is divided (eastward and westward) into two almost equal sections, near the 110th degree of longitude, representing, roughly, the level and mountainous country. South of the Yangtze the interior is shut off from the sea, as regards trade purposes, by what may be termed a palisade of very broken hills running generally parallel to the seaboard. The main features of China include high table-lands, broken mountainous country, rivers breaking through stupendous ranges, and the deltas of the Pei ho, the Yellow, the Yangtze, and the Si kiang (West) rivers. Looking at the map it will be seen that the whole country, with the exception of the Great Plain and the deltas, is divided into a number of compartments, each of these being cased in by impounding hills. The gorges, by means of which the drainage is carried through these inclosing ranges, especially those on the Yangtze, form a marked and imposing feature in the character of the hill country.

A few words are necessary regarding the general mountain system of China. Knowing, however, that though "geography is good, brevity is better," one must be brief. The ranges that penetrate the region south of latitude 45° N. may be said to have their nucleus in the Pamir plateau, the "Roof of the World." From this plateau extend the Tien Shan, or Celestial Mountains, separating Mongolia from Chinese Turkestan and the Gobi Desert. To the south of the Tien Shan the Kuenlun range takes its exit, and, proceeding due east, separates Chinese

Turkestan, the desert of Gobi and Kokonor from Tibet, ultimately striking the Yungling Mountains near 104° E. At the southeast corner of the Pamirs a huge range leaves the plateau, and, joining the Kuenlun with a cross-spur, forms the western border of the central Tibetan table-land; thence, making a great curve, it continues as a barrier round the southern and eastern sides of the high plateau, until it joins the Kuenlun about 95° E. Under the name of the Himalaya it separates that portion of Tibet drained by the Sanpo or Bramaputra from India, some of its peaks being 30,000 feet in height. East of Assam it is broken through by the Bramaputra. Continuing in an easterly direction, it throws out a huge arm southward, which forms, with its plateau and mountain ranges, the primary base of Indo-China. This arm is cleft lengthwise by the Salween and Mekong rivers, and partly in its length and in part transversely by the Yangtze and its branches. The Irrawaddy rises in its western armpit; the Si kiang (West River) and the Song koi (Red River) in its eastern one. The main range then continues in a north-northeast direction, and, under the name of the Yungling, impinges on the Bayan Kara, which springs in 95° E., 35° N. from the eastern flank of the hill barrier that incloses the central Tibetan table-land. Running nearly due east, and known on most European maps (but only there, as Richthofen has shown, for "ling" is applied in China only to a mountain-pass) as the Pehling and Tsingling ranges, it forms the water parting between the Yangtze and Yellow River systems. The mountainous belt of the southeastern provinces

forms the northern watershed of the Canton River, and is the divide between it and the Yangtze system. All the ranges which penetrate China proper, with the exception of the mountains of Shantung, which jutt out south of the Gulf of Pechili, are connected with the western Tibetan system. The heights of the western China highlands vary from 3,000 feet to 15,000 feet.[1]

The chief rivers of China, from south to north, are: The Si kiang (or West River) and its tributaries; the Ta kiang (Yangtze)[2] and its affluents; the Hoang ho, or Yellow River, called "China's sorrow"; and the Pei ho. The Min River in Fukien and the Tsien Tang in Chekiang may also be mentioned, but they are of quite minor importance.

Regarding the rivers of western China draining southward, such as the Salween and the Mekong or Cambodia, little need be said here. They are mighty in dimension, but quite unnavigable, and therefore do not come within the present discussion. Of the Chinese rivers the Yangtze, one of the great rivers of the world, is indisputably the most important, being the main artery, indeed the only real channel for trade, between eastern and western China. It has a navigable length of perhaps fourteen hundred miles,

[1] These may be roughly given as follows: The Pamir plateau, 15,000 feet; Tibet, 15,000 feet; Kokonor, 10,500 feet; The Mongolian plain, 4,000 feet; the Shansi table-land, 3,000 feet to 6,000 feet; Yunnan, 5,000 feet to 7,000 feet.

[2] The Yangtze kiang, usually called by the Chinese the Ta kiang (great river) or Kiang (river), is the "Quian" of Marco Polo. Like other rivers in China, it bears different names in different parts of its course, the name Yangtze being properly applied only to its lower reaches.

of which the six hundred miles between Shanghai and Hankau are now traversed by large sea-going and river steamers, while Ichang, some three hundred and sixty miles beyond, is regularly reached by light-draught vessels, and Chungking, another four hundred and fifty miles farther on, has been proved to come within the navigation limit. Indeed, the chief obstacles lie between Ichang and the Szechuan frontier, a distance of about one hundred miles; beyond that being plain sailing, not only as far as Chungking, but even to near Sui fu, some two hundred miles farther west. Of the Yangtze something more will be said hereafter.

The Hoang ho, the river of northern China, which has so often, and with such terrible results, shifted its mouth (since 600 B.C., nine times), may be said to be nearly unnavigable. The amount of silt brought down by it is encroaching on the sea at the rate of one hundred feet annually. The basin of the Pei ho is formed by a number of streams, flowing mostly in independent channels to within a short distance of the coast, where they converge toward the treaty port of Tientsin. For purposes of navigation it is only practicable for light-draught boats. Surveys and travels have enabled us to estimate the value of the Si kiang (explored and mapped by the author in 1882), which traverses the entire provinces of Kwangsi and Kwangtung and part of Yunnan. Information regarding this waterway may be found elsewhere; but, briefly, the river can be ascended some three hundred and fifty miles by light-draught steamers, more than half the distance from Canton to the navigation limit. On the upper portion junks can

travel two hundred and fifty miles to the borders of Yunnan. The importance of this river to China and the advisability of opening it effectively are self-evident.

The peculiarities of Chinese nomenclature are remarkable. No river or chain of mountains has the same denomination throughout its length; no town even keeps its primitive name from one dynasty to another. "There is no national term to designate China itself, or its inhabitants," says Reclus; "every one of the names in common use at different periods has kept its former meaning and can be replaced by synonyms; not one has yet been transformed by use into a purely geographical appellation. It is the same with the names of mountains, rivers, provinces, and towns; these names are only epithets—descriptive, historical, military, or poetical—changing with each régime and replaced at will by other epithets."

The population of China has long been a subject of controversy, and seems no nearer solution to-day than it ever was. In recent times the earlier assumed figure of about 400,000,000 (in 1906 the Imperial Maritime Customs estimate was 407,000,000) was reduced by Mr. Rockhill, American minister at Peking and a Chinese sinologue, to as low as 270,000,000, and the latest Chinese estimate gives 331,000,000.[1] On the other hand, however, the Chinese Imperial Customs gives the total population (1909) as 439,000,000.

The amount of population at first sight seems a

[1] The *Minchang pu* (Ministry of Interior) census, 1910, is taken, but the figures are quite unreliable.

large one, but the extent of population is not excessive, and, it must be noted, its distribution is most remarkable. The pressure upon the eastern seaboard and on the great waterways, where they open out into valleys and deltas, is marked. Away from these the population diminishes rapidly. The most densely peopled province—namely, Shantung—has as many, it is believed, as 528 per square mile, the average being 216. The most thinly populated provinces are those of Manchuria, Kwangsi, Kansu, and Yunnan. The latter, which before the Mohammedan rebellion counted some 16,000,000 inhabitants, has now only some 8,500,000, although the province has had a revival of its former prosperity. The eastern part of Szechuan is very populous; but the west, abutting on Tibet, is mountainous and poorly peopled. The density of the population will be found to be in some degree an index—but by no means an unfailing one, owing to the defective communications—to the agricultural capabilities of the country. No estimate of the area available for cultivation can be made, even approximately, at present.

The metropolitan province of Chihli, with an area of about 115,000 square miles and an estimated population of 32,000,000, is the most northern portion of the Great (delta) Plain, with the exception of the ranges defining its northern and western frontiers. On the east it is bordered by the Gulf of Pechili and Shantung, on the south by Shantung and Honan, on the west by Shansi, and on the north by Inner Mongolia and Liaotung. This province contains the present capital, Peking, and the chief

northern treaty port, Tientsin, situated on the Pei ho.

The province of Shansi—the original seat of the Chinese people—is bounded on the north by Mongolia, on the east by Chihli, on the south by Honan, and on the west by Shensi. It occupies an area of 81,000 square miles, and contains besides its capital, Taiyuen fu, eight prefectural cities. The population is returned as being 11,000,000. The configuration of Shansi is noteworthy, its southern portion, including the region down to the Yellow River—in all an area roughly estimated at about 30,000 square miles—forming a plateau elevated several thousand feet above the level of the sea, the whole being one vast coal-field. In agricultural products the province is poor and, the means of transport being so inefficient, is liable to famine.

The province of Shensi is bounded on the north by the Great Wall, on the west by the province of Kansu, on the south by the province of Szechuan, and on the east by Shansi, from which it is separated by the Yellow River. It contains an area of some 75,000 square miles, and its population, said to number upward of 10,000,000, before the outbreak of the Mohammedan rebellion of 1860–75, is said to be 8,800,000. Its capital, Sian, is next to Peking in importance and enjoys the distinction of having been the capital of the Empire for a longer period than any other city. The Wei basin,[1] in Shensi, is

[1] The cause of the vitality of the Wei basin, remarks Richthofen, is that "Singan fu (Sian) occupies a dominant position, such as few inland cities enjoy that are not built at the places of confluence of navigable rivers. It is situated at the confluence of those few roads

the greatest agricultural region of the northwest, and on this account, as well as its geographical position, has played a prominent part in the history of China, especially in its early epochs. It is well termed by Col. Mark Bell the center of gravity and resistance of mid-China. Cut off from the rest of China by the Yellow River and its bordering mountainous region to the eastward, and the Tsingling shan range to the southward, the Taiping rebellion never was able to cross from the south into northern Shensi, nor did the Mohammedan rebellion of Kansu and Shensi ever spread southward. As regards products and commercial intercourse, the two districts have also been widely divided. The political importance of the region to China is evident, and railway connection with the eastern provinces is a necessity, for it requires no special insight to see that China is especially open to attack by the very road from central Asia which she herself in the past always followed in her invasions.

The province of Yunnan lies in the extreme southwest of the Empire, its southern and western borders forming the northern frontiers of Tongking and

of traffic which are the only possible connections for mediating the intercourse between the Wei basin and the eastern and nothern provinces, and occupy, therefore, in some measure, the place of rivers." The antiquarian finds nowhere in China, says the same authority, such opportunity for collecting objects of interest as on the classical soil of the Wei basin. At a comparatively recent epoch of Chinese history, during the Tang dynasty, arts and sciences flourished at the Court of Chang-ngan, the present Sian fu. Of this celebrated line of princes, Dr. Wells Williams says: "During the 287 years they held the throne, China was probably the most civilized country on earth, and the darkest days of the West formed the brightest era of the East."

Burma respectively. On the north it is bordered by Szechuan and on the east by Kweichau and Kwangsi. It is the third largest province of the Empire, its area measuring 146,000 square miles; but, as already remarked, owing to the devastations of the Mohammedan rebellion and ensuing plague, its population was greatly reduced. Yet its mineral wealth is greater and more varied than that of most of the provinces. Its capital is Yunnan, between which town and Burma, Tongking, Canton, and the upper Yangtze a considerable trade was once carried on.

The other southwest province, Kweichau, is the poorest of the eighteen in agricultural products, but in minerals it is nearly as rich as Yunnan. The population is given as 11,300,000, and the area some 67,000 square miles. The means of communication, however, are so defective that its resources have hitherto been almost undeveloped.

The province of Kwangtung lies between Kiangsi and Hunan on the north, Fukien on the northeast, Kwangsi on the west, and the ocean on the south. Its area is over 100,000 square miles, with a population estimated at over 27,700,000. The capital is Canton, on the Pearl River, the largest town in China and the one best known to Westerners, as it was long the only place to which foreigners were allowed access, and is easily visited by the itinerant traveler from Hongkong. The natural facilities of the province for internal navigation and an extensive coasting trade are considerable, its long littoral affording many harbors, and its waterways, radiating into the districts west and north, even beyond the provincial frontiers.

The province of Kwangsi extends westward of Kwangtung to the border of Tongking, and has an area of over 77,000 square miles and a population of 6,500,000. Both Kwangsi and Kwangtung are fairly well watered by the West River and its tributaries, and intercourse is easy. Wuchau and Nanning, on the main river, are the largest trading towns in the province.

The province of Kansu projects like a wedge into the Tibetan plateau, and is second in area of the eighteen provinces, measuring 125,000 square miles, with a reported population of 5,000,000. Its importance politically is considerable, commanding as it does the highway between central Asia and China proper.

The largest of the eighteen provinces, Szechuan (referred to elsewhere), is one of the richest and in parts most populous. It is bounded on the north by Kansu and Shensi, on the east by Hupei and Hunan, on the south by Kweichau and Yunnan, and on the west by Tibet and Kokonor. Its area is estimated at 218,000 square miles, and its population at 23,000,000.[1]

The province of Shantung, concerning which something is said elsewhere, is bounded on the east by the Yellow Sea, on the south by Kiangsu and the Yellow Sea, on the west by the province of Chihli, and on the north by Chihli and its gulf. A population variously estimated, but officially numbering as many as 29,600,000, is found within its area of 55,000 square miles. Possessed of enormous mineral wealth, Shan-

[1] Estimated in 1904 by Sir A. Hosie at 45,000,000, and by the Customs Department in 1910 at over 78,000,000!

tung is also a great agricultural province, as is proved by the revenue from the land tax, the largest derived from any of the eighteen provinces.

South of Shantung lies the province of Kiangsu, between the ocean on the east and Anhwei on the west, with Chekiang to the south. Its area comprises 38,000 square miles, with a reported population of 17,000,000. A great portion of the province is covered with lakes and marshes, but it is generally very fertile. Among its many fine cities are Shanghai, Nangking (twice the capital[1]), and Suchau. Suchau is situated close to the Tahu Lake, whence streams and canals place the city in communication with various parts of the province, especially with Shanghai; and the road between the two cities is a continuous line of towns and villages. In 1859 Suchau was a city which for industry and wealth was not to be matched in China, and had then a population estimated at over 1,000,000. Suchau and Hangchau (in Chekiang) represented to the Chinese the terrestrial paradise. "To be happy on earth," said they, "one must be born in Suchau, live in Canton, and die in Hangchau."

Following the coast-line southward, the next province is Chekiang, bordered by Anhwei and Kiangsi on the west and Fukien on the south. It is the smallest of the eighteen provinces, being only 36,000 square miles in extent, but its population is given as 17,000,000. Chekiang is renowned for its fertility, its forest and fruit trees, its populous towns, and its salubrious climate. Hangchau, the capital, one of the finest

[1] From A. D. 317 to 582 Nanking was the metropolis of China, and once again during the Ming dynasty, from 1368 to 1403.

towns in the Empire, is described by Marco Polo, who visited it in 1286, as "beyond dispute the noblest in the world."

The next province bordering on the ocean is Fukien, with Kiangsi on the west and Kiangtung on the south. Formosa lies opposite Fukien, and formed part of that province until it passed into the hands of Japan. In many parts highly cultivated, the country is generally densely peopled, having a population of 13,000,000 in an area of 46,000 square miles. Among its numerous large cities are the treaty ports of Fuchau and Amoy.

The province of Honan, with its fertile sections of the Great Plain, supports a population of 25,000,000 on an area of 68,000 square miles. On its north lie Shansi and Chihli, on the east Anhwei, on the south Hupeh, and Shensi on the west. The northern part of Honan, next the Yellow River, is level, fertile, and well peopled. Kaifung, the capital, lying close to the southern bank of that river, was the metropolis from A.D. 780 to 1129.

The province of Anhwei is situated in the central and southern parts of the Great Plain, between Honan and Hupeh on the west, and Kiangsi and Chekiang on the east and north, with Kiangsi in the south. The area is 54,000 square miles, and its estimated population over 17,000,000. The country is generally similar to Kiangsu, but has fewer cities.

The central provinces of Hupeh and Hunan were formerly one province. Hupeh is the more populous and fertile, but the smaller of the two, its area being some 71,000 square miles against 83,000 for Hunan,

the estimated populations being 25,000,000 and 23,000,000. The Yangtze flows through Hupeh, carrying an immense amount of silt into the side valleys. The southeastern portion of the province is considered the most fertile portion of China. The provincial capital, Wuchang, lies on the southern side of the Yangtze, Hankau and Hangyang being on the opposite bank, and divided by its tributary, the Han, the admirable position of Hankau, situated as it is on the central portion of the Yangtze, has been dealt on by all travelers in China; the city seems destined by nature to become the port of eastern central Asia. The rich province of Hunan, the population of which was terribly reduced by the Taiping rebellion, is drained by four rivers, the Siang and Yuan being both navigable for some two hundred miles, except at low season, whose basins occupy almost the entire province. The people have a reputation for roughness and turbulence.

The province of Kiangsi, south of Anhwei and Hupeh, is bounded by Hunan on the west, Kwangtung on the south, and Fukien on the east. Its area is 69,000 square miles, the population reported 14,500,000. The country is hilly and well watered, much of it being marsh-land. Its soil is generally productive, and the inhabitants, like those of the coast provinces, engage to a considerable extent in manufactures.

Of the islands belonging to China two may be briefly mentioned. Hainan (situated on the Gulf of Tongking) is about one hundred and fifty miles long by one hundred broad. The interior of the island is mountainous and well wooded. The inhabitants,

said to be racially the same as the mountaineers of Kweichau, have only partially submitted to the Chinese. Kiungchau fu, the prefectural town, lies at the mouth of the Himu River; but the port is Hoihau, where the entrance is so shallow that trade actually centers at Pakhoi, the nearest treaty port on the mainland.

Chusan is of particular interest to England, having been occupied several times by a British force. It was captured first in 1840 and again in 1842, being held till 1846 as a guarantee for the fulfilment of the treaty with China until the full payment of the indemnity had been made by the Chinese government according to the provisions of the treaty of Nanking. It was again occupied in the war of 1860. The length of the island, which was incorporated with China in the seventh century, is twenty miles and its greatest breadth six miles. Tinghai, the capital, is situated half a mile from the shore; the harbor is well land-locked, the water varying from four to eight fathoms.

Of the two chief features of northern China—the mountainous region and the Great Plain—the latter is economically far the more important and is the richest part of China. Politically it is of great consequence, affording an easy means of advance from the north. The plain extends some seven hundred miles from the Great Wall and mountain ranges north of Peking to the junction of the Poyang Lake with the Yangtze River. Of varying breadth, it has an average of two hundred miles in its northern part (next Shantung and Shansi); farther south it is about three hundred miles broad; and next to the

Yangtze basin it is as much as four hundred miles in width, stretching from the seaboard inland. The northern section of the plain is partly a deposit of *loess*, being alluvial elsewhere, and the region of Kiangsu is low and liable to inundation, with frequent lakes, the whole covered with a network of water-courses. The population supported on this plain is very great, among the most densely populated sections of the whole world's surface.

Before leaving the subject of the physical aspect, the *loess* formation peculiar to the northern provinces must be mentioned. *Loess* is a solid but friable earth of brownish-yellow color, differing from loam in having a highly porous and tubular structure. It is found in most of the northern provinces, disappearing gradually toward the lower Yangtze, though remnants are found in the lakes south of that river. No trace of it is found in Szechuan. How far it extends into central Asia is as yet unknown. With the *loess* (called *hwang-tu* by the Chinese) are bound up the distinguishing features of interior China, not merely in regard to scenery, but agricultural products, dwelling, and means of transport. The *loess* spreads over high and low ground alike, smoothing the irregularities and having often a thickness of as much as one thousand feet. Its peculiar feature is its vertical cleavage and sudden crevices, which are narrow, of vast depth, and greatly ramified. No scenery presents smoother, gentler, and more monotonous outlines than a *loess* basin if overlooked from some high point of view. Should the traced roads be left, however, it is impassable even on foot, and the strayed traveler finds himself in a labyrinth of

vertical walls, irretrievably lost. It is probably one of the most difficult countries in the world for either military or engineering purposes. In the *loess* region the people dwell mainly in caves. Agriculture in modern China is, in fact, confined to the alluvial plains and the *loess*, in southern China to the alluvial plains and the terraced hillsides. Richthofen has given to the north and south the names of *Loess* and non-*Loess* China—no mere pedantic terms, for they accurately describe the two regions. It is a noteworthy fact that, excepting in the *loess* regions, the Chinese are able to cultivate only a certain portion of the soil, bearing a direct ratio to the quantity of human manure they are able to supply and therefore to the density of population.

As might be expected from the varied character of the country, comprising wild mountainous tracts, table-lands, the *loess* and non-*loess* regions, and alluvial plains, the products vary greatly, as do the people and their language. From north to south and from east to west the races, now for the most part welded into one people, are distinguishable. To this day, although there is one language common to the Empire (with three varieties), spoken by perhaps two-thirds of the people, still the number of *patois* is great, and in the south the aboriginal tribes retain their languages.

The ancient Chinese, who introduced civilization and subdued the aboriginal tribes, entered China from the northwest, following the course of the Hoang ho. The valley of the Yangtze and the whole region to the south continued up to the Christian era to be the abode of savage tribes, which were

gradually—and, indeed, only partially—absorbed and assimilated. The aborigines, who were driven south as the Chinese moved forward, are still found on the islands of Formosa and Hainan, and on the mainland in Kweichau, Szechuan, Yunnan, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi, some millions in number. They are divided by the Chinese into a multitude of tribes, but the chief races are the Lolo, the Miao, the Pai (Shan), the Ikias, the Hakkas, and the Hoklos. The Shans are not met northeast of Yunnan fu, but are found at the lower levels all along the south Yunnan border, and from Kwangnan fu to the border of Kweichau they form almost the whole population. They must have been masters of Kwangsi before the Chinese. It appears likely that the Shans mainly reached Kwangsi across the Yunnan plateau; those in southern Kweichau, however, are undoubtedly immigrants from Kwangsi, and did not cross Yunnan.

The climate presents many varieties of the temperate and even of the frigid and torrid zones. The northern provinces have winters like those of Siberia, while the heat of Canton is equal to that of Hindostan. Between these two extremes is found every variation of temperature and climate. During the months of December, January, and February, the rivers debouching in the Gulf of Pechili are frozen, and even the gulf itself is fringed with a broad border of ice. The plain-dwellers of China consider the highland provinces—especially the three southwestern ones—to be extremely unhealthy, a reputation partly due to prejudice, which probably arose from these provinces being remote regions, whither criminals and political offenders were transported.

The highlanders, on their part, look upon the plains as far from healthy. The central regions are, perhaps, the healthiest—not so subject to cold as the northern and western districts, nor so liable to changes as along the seaboard.

It will be apparent, then, that some knowledge of the physical features of China is of importance. The chief points to be noted are the extent of the Great Plain, its fertility, its extent of population; the richness of the Yangtze basin, with its far-reaching system of waterways, and its value as the great artery of China; and, finally, the mountainous region, Tibet, and its buttresses, forming western and southwestern China, which form the natural barrier, the line of defense, for the northeastern frontier of India, much as Afganistan does for its northwestern frontier. Variety and contrast are the salient features of the physical characteristics of China.

X

THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM

THE slumbering factors of an immense industrial production all exist in China, says Richthofen. The chief elements of an industrial country—coal and iron—exist to an extent unparalleled elsewhere in the world, while the vast supply of labor, whether regarded from the point of view of numbers, personal efficiency, or power of endurance, is unsurpassed. Among the various races of mankind the Chinese is the only one which in all climates, the hottest and the coldest, is capable of great and lasting activity. The Chinaman fulfils in the highest degree the ideal of an intelligent human machine. It is evident that in many important industries use will be increasingly made of this latent activity, and that the seat of many industries will be established by the Chinese themselves or transplanted from abroad to Chinese soil. It is very doubtful whether the people themselves lack initiative, as is so commonly maintained, but if that be the case foreign capital will utilize the opportunity for flooding the markets of the world with the products of cheap Chinese labor.[1]

[1] "It is not difficult to guess what they will do when foreign importations cause them serious anxiety," says M. Simon. "They will erect looms, mills, and steam machinery of all kinds . . . if need-

China may be divided into three zones, of which the temperature and products are very different. The northern zone comprises the country lying to the north of the Yellow River. The climate here is much too severe for tea or rice, and the land is mostly sown with millet and barley. The central zone (stretching from the Yellow River southward to the twenty-sixth degree of latitude) has much milder winters than the northern, and rice and wheat thrive well there. It possesses, too, the better kinds of tea, the mulberry, the cotton-tree, the jujube, the orange-tree, the sugar-cane, and the bamboo, which has been applied by the Chinese to a great variety of purposes. The eastern part of this favored zone is celebrated for its manufactures of silk and cotton; the middle is the granary of China, and might feed the whole country from its enormous harvests of rice; the west alone abounds in valuable timber, the rest of the country having been denuded of its forests. The southern zone, bordered by the sea, has much the same natural productions, though not generally of as good a quality, as the temperature is much higher.

Numerous mineral and metalliferous deposits are distributed throughout all zones: coal and iron in the north, south, and center; gold and silver in the provinces of the north, south, and west; and copper, tin, mercury, and lead in many parts. Coal, iron,

ful obtain European assistance and dispense with European products. It is to be hoped that they will stop there, because the day that they take a fancy to engage in Western industry will mark a disastrous day for Europe. Free from taxes, with cheap and abundant labor, it will be impossible to compete with them."

copper, and tin are the chief minerals. The vast mineral wealth of the country is still for the most part locked up, and cannot be developed until communications have been more fully developed.

The population of China, pre-eminently agricultural—the vast majority of its people being cultivators of the soil—is only dense along and close to the seaboard and the main waterways of the interior. Away from these it becomes sparser, and trade does not penetrate because communications have been, as noted already, almost entirely wanting, thus taking away all incentive from the people to produce beyond their immediate wants. It should be borne in mind, in dealing with China, that paucity of population is a very imperfect index to the potentialities of any district which is not in communication with the main trade arteries. Scantiness of population does not imply absence of mineral and other latent wealth, and affords a poor test of the character of the soil.

The use of coal in the household and the arts has been carried to some perfection.[1] Anthracite is powdered and mixed with wet clay, earth, sawdust, or dung, according to the exigencies of the case, in the proportion of about seven to one, the balls thus made being dried in the sun. The brick-beds (*kang*) are

[1] Marco Polo notices its use: "It is a fact," says the Venetian, "that all over the country of Cathay there is a kind of black stone existing in beds in the mountains, which they dig out and burn like firewood. It is true they have plenty of wood also, but they do not burn it, because those stones burn better and cost less." (Yule's *Marco Polo*, vol. i, p. 395.)

effective means of warming the house, and the hand furnaces, aided by a little charcoal, enable the poor to cook with these balls at a trifling expense. Owing to the extremely defective means of communication, however, only those who live in close vicinity to coal-mines can derive benefit from them; while to others who live at a day's walk from the mine coal is a luxury for which a poor people like the Chinese could not afford to pay. The manner in which defective means of transport operates may be illustrated by an example: Coal, which cost in Shansi thirteen cents per ton at the mine, not many years ago, rose to four taels at a distance of thirty miles, and to seven taels at sixty miles. Thus the price increased one tael per ton in every ten miles.

Coal is destined to play an important part in the future of China, and indeed in that of the whole Far East. The largest coal-measures are found in Shansi and Honan, while there are coal-fields of great value in Manchuria, Chihli, Shantung, Hupeh, and Szechuan. Other provinces throughout the country have deposits of varying value. The deplorable condition into which communications and transport facilities had fallen has, until the recent development of railways (with branches to the mines in certain sections of the country) by foreign capital and enterprise, greatly retarded the development of mining, which is even now in its infancy in China. Mines have long been worked by the natives in a primitive way in Hunan province, where there are two fields—one in the basin of the Lei River, yielding anthracite, and the other next the Siang with bituminous coal. Communication with Hankau by water is thus se-

cured. Lines to serve the local coal-mines have been constructed here as in other provinces.

Shansi is one of the most remarkable coal and iron regions in the world. At the present rate of consumption the world could be supplied with coal for thousands of years from Shansi alone, according to Richthofen. And speaking of Professor Dana's comparison of the proportions in various countries of coal-land to the total area (the State of Pennsylvania being given as leading the world, with its 43,960 square miles embracing 20,000 of coal-land), the distinguished geologist says the province of Shansi will take the palm from Pennsylvania. Nor is its extent the only advantage possessed by the Chinese coal-field, the ease and cheapness with which coal can be extracted being a remarkable feature. This region, however, has labored under the disadvantage of being situated at a distance from the coast and navigable rivers, while the coal formation lies a few thousand feet above the adjoining plain, difficulties which have been partly overcome by the construction of the Taiyuan fu railway.

Shansi has the greatest coal-field of China, the seams (from twenty feet to thirty-six feet in thickness) resting on a substructure of limestone and the stratification being horizontal. The limestone-bed being some two thousand feet above the plain, the coal crops out, and mining is carried on by means of adits without any difficulty. A curious circumstance in connection with the Shansi coal-field is that it is divided into two—anthracite and bituminous—by a mountain range of granite formation, of an earlier date than the limestone and coal formations.

The Peking Syndicate retroceded its mining rights in Shansi to the Chinese government four years ago, and is now working coal only in Honan, permission to work iron having been obtained. The first coal-field opened in China was in the east of the Chihli province, at Kaiping, which is connected by rail with the seaport of Taku, at the mouth of the Pei ho, and with Chinwang tao farther north. The coal obtained there is a soft bituminous variety with a considerable admixture of dust.

Iron ore of varying quality is found in many parts, the principal region as yet worked being at Ta-yeh (in Hupeh), and at Tsze-chau and Ping-ting (in Shansi), which supply nearly the whole of north China with the iron required for agricultural and domestic purposes. Iron ores, worked by the natives for local consumption, on a very small scale, are found in Szechuan, and also in Hunan, Fukien, Chekiang, and Shantung. Finally, iron (in conjunction with the great coal supplies found there) is worked in Manchuria, but this can hardly now be counted an asset of China.

Regarding the basin of Taiyuan fu, Richthofen says that coal is abundant everywhere, and in most places worth little more than the cost of transportation. All the coal in the vicinity is of extremely good quality. The beds are numerous, those worked being generally from three to five feet thick, but in some instances eight and even ten feet. Owing to their horizontal position, the outcroppings being exposed to view on the hillside, mining is extraordinarily easy. Most of the coal-seams, too, are overlain by hard sandstone, forming a solid roof in the mines, which

only needs to be supported by coal-pillars, thus reducing the expense of timbering to a minimum.

At another coal-field, Pingting chau, according to the same authority, the mines constitute a narrow and crooked belt, following the line along which the coal-measures crop out. Here the coal-bearing strata extend to the west, southwest, and north, practically through almost the whole of southern Shansi. Adits, miles in length, could be driven within the body of the coal, underneath great thicknesses of superincumbent strata. It is probable that all, or nearly all, the anthracite beds here would be worth development. Mining, therefore, seems capable of an almost unlimited extension. With railroads built from the plain to this district, and branches carried through the body of these beds of anthracite (among the thickest and most valuable in the world), the output of the coal-beds can be loaded direct on railroad cars and railed to distant places. In northern Shensi, also rich in coal, the difficulties of transportation place it beyond the reach of any but the adjacent places. The coal formation in the bottom of ravines cut through the cover of *loess* is so similar to that of Shansi as, in Richthofen's opinion, to make it probable that the table-lands of coal extend over the greater portion of northern Shensi.

The same methods witnessed by Richthofen for extracting the metals at Tszechau (in Shansi) were probably applied several thousand years ago. They bear the character of nearly all Chinese industry, being primitive and imperfect and yet producing good results. The trains of mules and men en-

countered on the road, laden with ironware of the most varied description, prepare the traveler to see the metal manufactured on a large scale. It is surprising, on arrival at the spot, to see hundreds of small establishments, between which the labor is divided, each manufacturing a certain set of articles for which a reputation has been gained. It is evident that the success which the local manufacturers attain, by application of the rudest methods, must be due in great measure to the superiority of the material they employ. They have, in fact, an abundance of every kind of material they require—iron ores of great purity (rich in metal and easily fusible), all sorts of clay and sand (such as are required for crucibles and molds), and anthracite of a superior quality.

In Shantung coal-fields have been developed on a considerable scale by Germany, which are well served by the railways she is building into the interior. There are several fields of considerable but unequal value, the chief being those at Wei-hsien and Poshan. The importance of these coal-fields to Germany, for the working of the network of railways she has in hand and for naval supplies, is self-evident.

Copper is found chiefly in Kweichau and Yunnan, across which there is a valuable hill of copper-bearing ore, extending into the south of Szechuan. The output of the mines is known to be considerable; but they are a government monopoly, and no information is available. Copper is also worked near Kiukiang, on the Yangtze. Tin is mined in Yunnan, in the Mengtze district, connected since 1909 with Hanoi (the capital of Tongking), and also in Hainan.

Antimony ore is found in Hunan, and quicksilver in Kweichau. Notwithstanding her vast mineral wealth, China has as yet a small surplus of minerals for export. A few years ago her export of coal was only one per cent. of the amount imported and of iron ore less than one-sixth.

Salt, which forms so important an item in the revenue, is obtained chiefly by coast evaporation and then from brine-wells in Szechuan. The salt industry evidences Chinese ingenuity in a striking way. The sale of salt is a government monopoly, the revenue raised by the central government until recently being about thirteen million taels.[1] The United States consul-general at Shanghai, in 1897, gave an interesting account, which embodied the information collected by Baber, Richthofen, and other travelers:

The ingenuity which, seventeen hundred years ago, bored through solid rock to the depth of from two to five thousand feet attests scientific skill that may still interest. The salt-wells of China are found in Szechuan, Yunnan, and Shansi; but the more important are in the province of Szechuan, about one hundred and seventy-five miles west of Chungking and an equal distance southeast of Chêngtu. The salt-belt is a triangular tract, having the Min River (from Ching-ting fu to its junction with the Yangtze at Sui-fu) for its base, and its apex near Tzeliutsing, an area of some fifteen hundred miles. The number of wells in this region, officially reported, is twelve hundred, but the number is by some estimated as high as five thousand.

[1] This item, like all other sources of revenue, is largely increased in the Imperial Budget for the year 1911 (see Appendix III).

Tea, which was once the chief item in the trade of China, is still an important element in the foreign trade, although relatively diminishing on account of the competition from India and Ceylon. Fifty years ago the United Kingdom received all its tea from China; now it gets little over one-twentieth. Its use in China is not so universal as imagined; in the north and west the people use preparations in which tea forms a small proportion, or else drink hot water. The "brick tea" for the Siberian, Mongolian, and Tibetan markets—where it is used, not as a beverage, but as a soup—is principally prepared at Hankau. For the better qualities the Russians invariably outbid the English, and the finest kinds are consumed either in China or in Russia, where alone, it would seem, the upper classes are prepared to pay heavily for a fine tea. Tea was used as a beverage, in the earlier centuries of our era, in China, whence a knowledge of the plant was carried to Japan, where the cultivation was established in the thirteenth century.

The wool industry in Mongolia and north Chihli is important, but the principal development of trade in recent years is the soya-bean from Manchuria, of which in 1909 no less than five hundred and eighteen thousand tons were shipped to Europe, of which four-fifths went to Britain, chiefly for soap manufacture, the residue being suitable for feeding cattle.

Insect-wax is exported to some extent from Szechuan, and the supply from that province, Yunnan, and Kweichau is believed to be capable of great expansion. Unlike those of their kind in Szechuan, the wax-insects of Shantung breed and

become productive in the same districts. They are placed upon the trees in the spring, and at the close of the summer they void a peculiar substance which, when melted, forms wax. In the autumn they are taken off the trees, and are preserved within doors until the following spring.

The history of tobacco in China is very curious, showing how rapidly a narcotic can spread. Some three hundred years ago it came from Japan (doubtless introduced there by the Portuguese or Dutch) to Korea. Thence it was introduced into Manchuria, and, when the Manchu dynasty ascended the throne (A.D. 1664), made its way into China. Its use is now universal, the Manchurian tobacco being famous throughout China.

Apart from the preparation of tea and other produce, the chief manufactures before the Western trader entered into competition were porcelain and silk, the silks and gauzes of Suchau, Nanking, and Hangchau being highly esteemed. Silk is still the most valuable export from China, although pressed hard by Japan. Silk-weaving is still carried on with native looms, the greater portion of the output being used in China; but twenty-seven per cent. of the world's supply of raw silk still comes from China. Reeling of silk cocoons by machinery and filatures for winding silk have come into use. The world-famous porcelain came from the province of Kiangsi, and at one time as many as one million people were, according to report, employed on the works there; but the industry has fallen upon evil days, and the color and finish of earlier days are no longer to be found.

Cotton-spinning and weaving mills, established by

foreigners at Shanghai, are doing an increasing business, and are gradually displacing the native handlooms, though a large proportion of the clothing of the lower classes is still produced by the older methods. It was the Chino-Japanese War of 1894–95 which secured to the Japanese, and thus to other foreigners, the right to establish these mills at Shanghai and elsewhere for the manufacture of yarn for the Chinese market. Flour and rice mills and sugar-refineries are superseding native methods. It appears, then, from this very rough survey, that China is becoming industrialized after the Western fashion, a fact which is bound to modify her relations with the other Powers.

The production of opium, which was a considerable industry fourteen years ago, when the first edition of this book was published, is an ancient industry. As a medicine it has been used for nine centuries, and the smoking of opium mixed with tobacco was introduced by the Dutch in the middle of the seventeenth century. It was in 1800 that the importation of foreign opium was forbidden, and it was not till 1858 that it was regularized by being placed on a regular tariff footing. The abuses of the period during which it was contraband made this necessary; but with the growth of Chinese feeling against the injurious use of the drug came a demand for the limitation of its import, particularly from India. The present arrangement is that India shall send no opium in future to provinces which have abandoned its cultivation, and there is evidence that the home production is decreasing and that a firm stand is being made against the opium habit.

In the development of her resources China has an invaluable asset in her great reserve of human labor. A Chinese coolie can be employed at from six to eight dollars (Mexican) a month, and, considering his greater strength and endurance, he is cheaper at these rates, either in or out of his own country, than the ordinary native of India. The people are sturdy and well built, those of north China being stronger than those of the south and more civil to foreigners. The poorer classes live almost entirely on rice and vegetables, to which they sometimes add small pieces of fish and meat. An artisan's wages vary, according to his skill, from 5*d.* to 10*d.* per diem. As a rule they are diligent workmen, being generally good carpenters, slow bricklayers, excellent stone-cutters, very fair navvies, indifferent blacksmiths, and bad at forge-work and iron-work. They are said not to appreciate the necessity of exactness, but to have considerable powers of imitation. They are considered indifferent miners, but experience in South Africa seems to prove that they learn rapidly. When working by contract, piecework being usual, meals are provided on the premises. They work generally nine hours a day, lunching about noon, and dining after the day's work is done, usually on rice, fish, and vegetables. The amount of work done by a Chinaman in a given time does not equal that of white men working under similar conditions—a fact which is even more true of Japanese and, indeed, of all non-meat-eating races. In skill and industry, however, the Chinaman is unrivaled.

Of the population not engaged in agriculture, a large number are tradesmen or engaged in commerce.

The extremely overpopulated condition of certain sections of the country has had a powerful influence in molding the national character. Under the conditions which have prevailed till lately—especially want of communications—large numbers of the inhabitants have been compelled to emigrate. The Chinese immigration into Mongol territory, which commenced some centuries ago, was at first a purely political measure, the Emperor Kanghi fostering it by deporting criminals and building fortified cities. But the most rapid progress in the way of spontaneous colonization appears to have been made in the last two decades. While in Manchuria the Chinese have succeeded in becoming the dominant race, they gain upon the Mongols chiefly by pushing them back, for no intermarriage takes place, and the Mongols, unlike the Manchus, do not assume the Chinese language and literature. Chinese are found abroad throughout the Far East as traders, laborers, farmers, and miners, and in places like Singapore, Bangkok, and Rangoon they are among the leading merchants; while in the United States, Australia, and Canada they would be much more numerous but for the anti-Asiatic immigration policy adopted by these countries. There are probably at least ten million Chinese residents beyond the Empire. In Japan and Korea there are comparatively few—a significant fact.

The general opinion among foreigners seems to be that the Chinese will be unable to manufacture any but low-grade articles, which may enable them to compete with Japan, but that the finer qualities of goods, for which as the country is opened there is an

increasing demand, will still be supplied from abroad. So far, as might be expected, the general use of foreign goods is confined chiefly to the towns and districts either on the coast or near the great rivers, and this condition cannot change until railways penetrate those regions hitherto closed to foreign trade, and indeed to any but local manufacturers. In their industrial enterprises the Chinese are averse to the employment of foreigners as managers or engineers; and, if utilized, their services are dispensed with as soon as possible, often before the native engineers have learned how to manage the intricate and delicate machinery which has to be dealt with. In the field of commerce, again, the Chinese are said to be incapable of conducting the greater enterprises, such as steamship services, iron-works, and so forth, while owing to defective management the majority of Chinese companies are, if not in actual financial difficulties, not doing well. Some of the more enlightened Chinese, however, begin to realize that capital, machinery, and labor alone are not sufficient to make industrial and commercial undertakings a success.[1] It must be borne in mind that Rome was not built in one day, and that we heard very much the same story in the early days of Japanese railways, steamships, and factories. The period of superficial training will pass, and China may yet astonish the industrial and commercial world. There is one serious drawback to progress—the absence of any code of company law, and no legal obligation on Chinese companies to furnish properly

[1] Report by British acting Commercial Attaché at Peking on Trade of China in 1910.

audited accounts, and the only security for a loan is a mortgage on the property, involving expert valuation, investigation of title, and government sanction.

The foreign trade of China is carried on through "treaty ports"—sea and river ports and some inland cities which by treaties have been thrown open to trade. The total foreign trade in 1910 amounted to £113,605,126 (imports £62,331,472 and exports £51,273,654), showing an increase of over £15,000,000 over the previous year. Of this, British trade (Great Britain, Hongkong, India, British dominions) accounted for 52 per cent. and foreign countries for 48 per cent. Of the foreign share, Japan had 17 per cent.; Europe (excluding Russia), 13 per cent.; United States, 7 per cent.; Russia, 7 per cent.; and other countries, 4 per cent.

Of our competitors for China's import trade Japan is the most serious. In 1910 for the first time imports from Japan were higher than those direct from the British Isles, though still far below the gross British total from all sources. Japan's share in Chinese imports has been rising very rapidly of late years, but it is satisfactory to note that, with the exception of textile goods and one or two other items, the increases are due to lines in which Great Britain does not compete with her, though they affect some of our Asiatic possessions.

The Western world got many things from China, and many others were in use in the Chinese Empire before they were known to us. The mariner's compass, gunpowder, the use of the umbrella belong to the first category, and possibly some of the follow-

ing also: The system of civil-service examinations, the early telegraph (signal towers), bull-fights, theaters, novels, the census, the rotation of crops, printing, incubators, bank-notes, newspapers, and inoculation for smallpox.

In reviewing the general economic condition of the Chinese Empire we cannot fail to be struck by the fact that, though progress has been at a standstill for centuries, some of the products of China not only hold their own in the markets of the world, but are in some cases unrivaled. Again, though the tools used by the Chinese in their manufactures and arts are, as a rule, most primitive, the results are remarkable, and sometimes beyond the reach of the European, with his improved methods and up-to-date machinery and mechanism. The mineral wealth of China, perhaps the greatest of any country on the world's surface, is as yet hardly touched, while there is a vast store of human energy in the people of China to develop that wealth. A great force at present runs to waste in the shape of the water-power, at present unutilized. If the Chinese have been able to accomplish so much with so little adventitious aid, it requires no great foresight to be able to foretell that when the spirit of progress is really abroad in the land, and when modern improvements and methods are studied and adopted by the people, the Chinaman will occupy a leading position among his contemporaries in the world of commerce and manufacture.

XI

COMMUNICATIONS

THE first organic need of all civilized States, and pre-eminently so in a country so vast and so various in its terrestrial conditions as China, is arterial communication. This need, now long neglected, has been fully recognized by its rulers in the past, who have from time to time made serious efforts to connect the most distant parts of the Empire by both land and water routes. But in these degenerate days little has been attempted to maintain, nothing has been done to improve, either by land or water, the great arterial communications, so urgent a necessity for China.

The "Grand Canal," or Yun ho, so often spoken of and so highly extolled by travelers in past times, is in its way as great a monument of human industry as the Great Wall, although perhaps at first sight it may seem less wonderful. Not a canal in the Western sense of the word, it is "a series of abandoned river-beds, lakes, and marshes, connected one with another by cuttings of no importance, fed by the Wan ho in Shantung and by other streams and rivers along its course. A part of the water of the Wan ho descends toward the Hoang ho and Gulf of Pechili; the larger

part runs south in the direction of the Yangtze."[1]

It has generally the aspect of a winding river of varying width. As related by Marco Polo, the Emperor Kublai Khan, toward the end of the thirteenth century, created the Yun-ho, the "River of Transports," chiefly by connecting river with river, lake with lake. Even before that epoch goods were conveyed partly by water and partly by land from the Yangtze to the Pei ho basin. The Grand Canal connects Hangchau (in Chekiang) with Tientsin (in Chihli), and may be said to extend to Tungchau, in the neighborhood of Peking. After leaving Hangchau, it skirts the eastern border of the Great Lake, surrounding in its course the beautiful city of Suchau, and then runs in a northwesterly direction through the fertile districts of Kiangsu as far as Chinkiang, on the Yangtze. Thence it passes through Kiangsu, Anhwei, Shantung, and Chihli, to Tientsin. In the halcyon days when the canal was in order there was, it is said, uninterrupted water communication from Peking to Canton, the waterways between the Yangtze and the West (Canton) rivers being connected. Many other canals of a minor importance also existed in the past.

For many years past, but especially since the carriage of tribute-rice by steamers along the coast began, repairs to the Grand Canal have been practically abandoned. Numberless instances of the manner in which the waterways and the river embankments are neglected could be given. The re-

[1] Richthofen.

pairs furnish a source of income for the local officials. Nothing is attempted till too late, when several hundred coolies, sometimes thousands, are requisitioned and hurried off to undertake what could be done by a few men and a little application of mechanical skill, if taken in time.

The higher waters of the streams and rivers are difficult to navigate. But the absence of cataracts, the cheapness of wages, and the small value of time, and even of life, make it possible for the Chinese to employ boat navigation advantageously where the difficulty, expense, and risk would make it an impossibility in Europe. The Chinaman drags his boat over rapids that in most countries would form an absolute barrier to navigation. He takes it across shallows only a couple of inches deep and flowing with great velocity over a pebbly or shingly bottom. The amount of freight carried in this manner in the face of almost superhuman difficulties is astounding.

The roads in China, confined generally to the northern and western sections of the country, are proverbially the very worst in the world. Roads are *worn*, not made. The typical western China road is a thing to be experienced; it cannot be described.

The paving is of the usual Chinese pattern [says Baber], rough boulders and blocks of stone laid somewhat loosely together on the surface of the ground; "good for ten years and bad for ten thousand," as the Chinese proverb admits. On the level plains of China, in places where the population is sufficiently affluent to subscribe for occasional repairs, this system has much

practical value. But in the Yunnan Mountains the roads are never repaired; so far from it, the indigent natives extract the most convenient blocks to stop the holes in their hovel walls, or to build a fence on the windward side of their poppy patches. The rain soon undermines the pavement, especially where it is laid on a steep incline; whole sections of it topple down the slope, leaving chasms a yard or more in depth; and isolated fragments balance themselves here and there, with the notorious purpose of breaking a leg or spraining an ankle.

But they were not always so. China has had her roads and bridges at a time when many parts of Europe had none, for instance in Szechuan, Yunnan, and western China generally.

Where traveling by water is impossible, carts, mule-litters, and sedan-chairs are used to carry passengers, and coolies with poles and slings, or animals, transport the luggage and goods. The distances covered by the sedan-chair porters across these highland roads are remarkable, sometimes as much as thirty-five miles daily, even on a journey extending over a month, and with only a few days' halt together.

No traveler in western China who possesses any sense of self-respect [says Baber] should journey without a sedan-chair, not necessarily as a conveyance, but for the honor and glory of the thing. Unfurnished with this indispensable token of respectability, he is liable to be thrust aside on the highway, to be kept waiting at ferries, to be relegated to the *worst* inn's *worst* room, and generally to be treated with indignity or, what is sometimes worse, with familiarity, as a peddling footpad who, unable to

gain a living in his own country, has come to subsist on China. A chair is far more effective than a passport.

The transport animals—ponies, mules, oxen, and donkeys—are very strong and hardy, and manage to drag the carts along the most execrable roads, six or eight animals being harnessed (often as a mixed team) to a cart drawing about a ton. Many descriptions of travel in a springless Chinese cart have been attempted, but no pen can possibly reproduce the sensation. The ponies of northern and western China are admirable, a rougher edition of the Shan or Burma pony, hardier and more enduring. The mules are unequaled in any other country. The distances that ponies and mules will cover are surprising, and this on the very poorest of fodder; their endurance and patience being equaled only by that of the coolies.

From Peking four highroads branch in various directions. One leads to Urga, and traverses the Great Wall at Kalgan; another enters Mongolia through the Ku-pei-kou in the northeast, and after reaching Fungning proceeds with a northwesterly bearing to Dolonor; a third goes due east by way of Tungchau and Yungping fu to Shanhaikwan (the point on the gulf where the Great Wall terminates), and fourthly, one leads in a southwesterly direction to Paoting fu and on to Taiyuen fu in Shansi.

The central Asian trade route from Sian fu, which turns northwest, leaving the fertile *loess* Wei Valley and traversing the once rich but now devastated and depopulated hills and valleys of Shensi and Kansu as far as the confines of the Gobi Desert, passes throug-

a country of great agricultural wealth, possessed of a magnificent coal and probably also iron supply. It is a point of great importance to note that the most practicable line of approach for a railway from central Asia to central China is the present cart road *via* Sian, south of the Yellow River. From its favorable position Kaifeng-fu, the capital of Honan province, seems destined to be a great railway center.

In turning one's steps southward, one is struck by the backward and decaying condition of the northern as compared with the central and southern provinces. The chief causes are: (1) The deterioration of the climate, due to the persistent destruction of the forests, and failure to take any steps to renew them. In the north, for example, on the route from Hankau to Peking, mountains and hills are destitute of trees and shrubs, and present a most forbidding appearance. (2) The neglected state of the means of intercommunication. When the Empire was flourishing, some of the roads were in a fairly good condition; now they are almost impassable, and hence the congested state of certain districts in the north, especially Honan.

The three great enemies of the supreme government in China have been famine, provincial autonomy, and rebellion. Famines are caused in China by various calamities. Locusts and rats may devour the growing crop of a whole province; deficient rainfall may prevent the crops (particularly on the *loess*) from coming to maturity; unseasonable snow on the highlands or heavy and continuous rainfall may breach the dykes and cause inundation, thus bringing starvation and its accompanying

horrors home to millions. China, however, is a land of such variety and contrast that, though there may be famine in one or more provinces, at the same time there may be abundance in neighboring ones. But here, as elsewhere, without communications, a failure of the local crops means famine, while a bumper harvest actually depreciates the value of the produce, so as scarcely to repay the labor of reaping, for it cannot be removed. It is mainly the difficulty encountered by the government in transporting the food supply that, in famine times, leads to the terrible loss of life. To carry for long distances the enormous amount of grain required, over terribly defective roads—especially in the north, where for practical purposes no waterway exists—is an impossible task.

The story of the 1878 famine illustrates what such a calamity means in China. In that year Shansi and large portions of Chihli, Shensi, Shantung, and Honan—that is, a population of some millions—were suffering at the same time from famine. In Shansi it was at its worst. The people were hemmed in by a belt of famine-stricken country which it took weeks to cross. The peasantry clung to their homes until their last *cash* was spent, praying each day for rain that never came, and vainly awaiting the government relief. At last, penniless and weakened by starvation, they started—some with wives and children, but generally abandoning these—on their march to reach the food districts. Few succeeded. A consular officer, despatched on a merciful mission, says that of the thousands who thus attempted to escape, only those on the outer

confines of the famine district succeeded in doing so. The Chinese government has been the subject of considerable opprobrium in connnection with famines, but its character for apathy and incapacity is not altogether deserved. The history of Indian famines should make us reflect before we too severely blame the Chinese government for its want of success in famine relief. Means of communication did not exist, and the system and organization were faulty. The government, finding itself powerless to deal with the transport, was compelled to attempt relief by distributing money. The cost of cart transport from the Chihli plain to Shansi was officially stated to be £12 per ton! In addition to want of communications, official corruption, as usual, found its opportunity. Thus came about the strange anomaly that, while people were suffering from starvation, relief was sparingly given in money rather than in grain. When money began to fail, and general starvation set in, the government seriously bestirred itself and imported silver as fast as it could, impressing into the service all available carts and animals. But the official rate of hire is considerably below the ordinary one, and there are other obvious reasons why government work is unpopular in China. The transport owners, therefore, avoided all parts where "requisition" was liable to be enforced, and the government scheme of transport was brought to a standstill. The rates were then raised to the market standard, but much time had been lost, and in the mean time thousands upon thousands died from want. The wolves attacked not only children, but adults, in broad daylight and in the

village streets. There is no need to dwell further upon the horrible scene; it is sufficient to state that the consumption of human flesh became a practice.

So long as China was absolutely cut off from the rest of the world, so long, even, as she was not impinged upon, hemmed in, or carved into, by Western Powers, it was quite possible for the Empire to at least hold together, loose as the system was throughout. Two disintegrating processes, however, have been at work. While, on the one hand, foreign nations have closed in upon China both by sea and by land, internal communications have been gradually falling into greater and greater neglect. The growing weakness of the Manchu government has, for a long time past, been becoming more and more evident to the people and the officials, whose confidence had been gravely shaken, even before the shock of events since 1895 had completely done so. The enfeebled control exercised over most of the eighteen provinces, especially those remote from the capital, has been largely due to Peking being at the extremity of the country and to the defective condition of the communications. "Chinese" Gordon laid great stress on the importance of having the capital central; and he was right. The influence of the Peking government is exhausted long before it can reach the central region, and still more the southern and western provinces. The same cause that kills trade on its way inland paralyzes the authority of Peking a few hundred miles from the capital. Absence of communication means failure of control and lack of power; causes which chiefly contribute to the frequent occurrence of rebellions.

COMMUNICATIONS

If communications are a necessity to the government in checking famine, crushing the secret societies which sow the seeds of rebellion, and generally in effecting good government, their value for purposes of defense and in time of war can hardly be overestimated. The importance of railways in war-time has been fully illustrated, notably in the Russo-Japanese campaign. The lesson should have been taken to heart by China. To have had the power at the beginning of the Chino-Japanese War of concentrating on the border, suddenly and without fear of interruption, a drilled army, however small, might have prevented things drifting into war; Russia might have thought twice before executing the *coup de main* on the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur; Manchuria and Korea might still be hers.

Much remains to be accomplished by steam navigation, though the rapid adoption of steamers along the coast and on the Yangtze has paved the way. Shallow steamers now traverse the Poyang and Tungting lakes, which lie next the Yangtze, and the Pei ho and Canton rivers, as well as many minor streams. But railways are the supreme necessity. Except along the Yangtze, for the thousand-odd miles now covered by steamers and other navigable rivers, there is no single trade route of importance in China where a railway would not pay. Such a line as those from Peking and Tientsin, carried through the heart of China to the extreme south, along existing trade highways, cannot fail to be advantageous and remunerative. The plain-lands, with defective waterways where small craft only are now

available, and even the table-lands (less peopled than the river valleys, yet often rich), could profitably be covered with railways. The enormous traffic carried on throughout the Empire, in the face of appalling difficulties—on men's backs, by caravans of mules or ponies, by the rudest of carts and wheelbarrows—must some day be undertaken by the railway.

It is matter for regret that the Chinese apostles of progress should have laid such importance on the introduction of the railway for strategic purposes. In the interests of foreigners, and of China herself, such steps were less to be desired than inter-provincial trunk-lines, designed primarily for administration and commerce. In such free transit throughout the Empire, China would have found the wisest and safest means of defense. It was only by opening the Empire and peacefully developing its resources, thereby giving to all foreign nations a commercial interest in the country, enabling her to carry out the necessary reforms, that safety was to be found.

The basis of railway construction should be the development of the internal or inter-provincial trade of China on some settled plan, the interchange of the varied products of a country boasting so many climates and soils. This would bring prosperity to the people, render administrative reform possible, and open "China for the Chinese," more than for the European merchant or manufacturer. Thus would be avoided the enormous waste of capital which has occurred in England, for instance, where double the requisite amount has been expended owing to want of system. Consider the advantages to be gained.

Here is a country of marvelous resources, with a population intelligent, peaceful, industrious, and well disposed to migration, and yet the existing means of transport, whether by road or canal, are failing or disused.

Of all the factors which are working a profound change in China one of the most powerful is the construction of railways within the past quarter of a century. With the exception of the small Kaiping railway built by Mr. Claude Kinder, the tiny Shanghai-Woosung line, torn up after a brief existence and dumped down in Formosa some years later, and the line in that island which was allowed to fall into disuse, there was not until twenty-five years ago a single mile of railway in China. If China was dilatory in embarking on railway construction she has, judging from the conditions to-day, been trying to make up for lost time since then. In the year 1912 there is a mileage of railways open or under construction of over eight thousand miles (of which over fifty-nine hundred miles are in operation or nearly so), while there are also some three thousand miles of projected railways.[1] Want of funds, dissensions among the promoters, differences of opinion between the central and provincial governments, apart from the intrinsic merits of the schemes, render the failure of some of these projected lines certain. When comparison is made with Japan the extent of the revolution effected in China in the matter of communications will be made evident. In the country which holds the record for magic evolu-

[1] So far as can be ascertained, the position at present is given in Appendix I.

tion from feudalism to modern methods thirty years were occupied in building the first three thousand miles. The Chinese, as was anticipated by all who knew the character of the people and the success of railways in India and other Oriental countries, have taken to railways with alacrity and travel freely not merely for business, but often actually for the fun of the thing. The question now is not "Shall railways be built?" but, "Who shall build them?" The anti-foreign capital movement and the revolution have for the time being suspended railway construction, but, order once restored, the work will be renewed with increased vigor.

XII

CHINA AND THE POWERS

SINCE the first edition of this book was published two fresh factors in the Far East have been added to our calculations—Japan and Germany. It is true that, in 1898, the former had already shown, by her victory over China, that she was rapidly becoming the first of Oriental Powers, but it was not until the treaty of Portsmouth, in 1905, that she took her place among world Powers, and executed a treaty with Great Britain, which is the first of its kind between an Oriental and an Occidental nation. The German navy dates from 1898, but the modest naval bill passed through the Reichstag in that year was a finger-post hardly noticed by Germans themselves, among whom the propaganda of the Navy League (founded in the same year) had not yet spread the doctrine that their future "lies on the sea." The modification wrought in world politics by the emergence of two new and great naval Powers, in the East and in the West, was, moreover, stimulated in a manner little foreseen by the adoption of a new type of battle-ship, and the consequent necessity for "scrapping" a large number of vessels which, under earlier conditions, would have survived to augment the naval superiority of Great Britain.

The writer on foreign politics of fourteen years ago was still reckoning with a world situation, in which Great Britain's naval supremacy was unassailable. Although he may perhaps still derive comfort from a calculation of tons and guns, and a meticulous comparison of dates when certain vessels will be completed, yet, broadly speaking, no one can deny that British naval supremacy is no longer a fixed and immutable quantity, but must be regarded in the light of hypotheses and contingencies which could not enter into the calculations of fourteen years ago.

But, while making every allowance for the changes wrought by the developments referred to, there are certain broad lines, laid down by the writer in 1898, to which he is prepared to adhere. He saw then, and sees now, the greatest menace to China from the steady advance of the great Russian Empire toward her historic goal. After 1905 the Russian Empire passed through a period of internal convulsions so severe that it became usual to speak of her as almost a negligible quantity in world politics. To-day we find her pursuing, by identical methods, the foreign policy which led her across Asia. The weakness of Persia or of China are her opportunities. "The policy of the Russian government," said Lord Palmerston, in 1851, "has always been to proceed with its conquests as rapidly as the apathy or want of firmness of other governments permitted, but to retire if it encountered determined opposition, and then to await the next favorable opportunity to renew the onslaught on its intended victim." The collision with Japan does not disprove this. Russia did not realize that she had at last come up against

a hard instead of a soft organism. She disbelieved the reports of Japan's readiness for war, and the latter took care not to give her time to be better informed. The events of 1904 checked her advance in one direction, but not in another. The recent announcement of the "declaration of independence" by the Mongolian tribes, under the protection of Russia, was not unexpected, for in the last twenty years she has been steadily spreading a network of "diplomatic influence" throughout Mongolia, and the allegiance of the tribes to Peking was always more a matter of compulsion than of love. Of late years the Chinese government has been stiffening up its administration of these outlying provinces, and, whether through government encouragement or not, the Chinese colonist has been making his way not only to the belt of fertile land just beyond the Great Wall (which, indeed, is practically indistinguishable from the Inner provinces), but to the country north and east of the Gobi Desert, and therefore contiguous to Russian territory. Indeed, the Chinese colonist has become a serious feature in Siberia itself, where the Russian agriculturist or trader is at a disadvantage with a rival so skilful, thrifty, and industrious. The Manchurian War revealed the fact, only half suspected by most observers, that Russian colonization, even in that favored country, had not bitten deep, and that the territorial advances of Russia were being met by the economic advances of China. These considerations, however, only serve to whet the blade of Russia's determination, and they are mentioned here chiefly because of the light they throw on the

Russian official explanation of the Mongol attitude—China's aggressive policy, her people pushing the Mongols off the fertile land, and so forth.

Russia will now be in a position to construct the Trans-Mongolian extension from the Siberian line (*via* Kiachta and Urga) to Kalgan, which lies close to the Chinese boundary, being only one hundred and twenty-four miles from Peking, with which it is already linked by rail. That this short cut from the West will largely supersede the Manchurian railway cannot be doubted. It will also bring Russia within striking distance of the Chinese capital and the gulf of Pechili.

The fate of Tibet is obscure. In 1898 the writer was inclined to take it for granted that it must fall into the hands which hold Mongolia and Turkestan. He was aware of the immense pains taken by Russia to become acquainted with the internal affairs and conditions of a country at that time jealously preserved from foreign contact. The Tibet expedition, with its extremely negative results, and the conventions of 1904 with Tibet and with China, followed by an arrangement between Great Britain and Russia concerning Tibet, have to a certain extent modified this view. The position of Tibet, not as an independent power, but as subject to China, was recognized and affirmed by those instruments. That the Tibetans do not like their position is well known. Whether or no they are strong enough to throw off the yoke is another thing. Certainly the Chinese administration of Tibet is in an unenviable position, some six weeks' journey from the capital of the Empire. Lord Curzon, to judge from a speech

made in January, 1912, regrets that the British government lost in 1904 the chance of creating in Tibet an independent buffer state. The outbreak of any serious revolt against China would probably render some such action imperative now, but the difficulty and danger of such an experiment at this stage is certainly aggravated by the fact that we have now a convention with China recognizing her suzerainty in Tibet. It would be deplorable if, in the interests of our Indian frontier, we were obliged to appear as embarrassing, and even betraying, the new Chinese government. But if we have tied our own hands as regards Tibet we have also, surely, tied those of Russia. India and China, be it noted, have at present three thousand miles of common frontier.

An outline of French relations with China will be found elsewhere, in the chapter on foreign intercourse. Probably the most cynical thing in all history is France's use, in foreign relations, of the church and religion which she has handled so severely at home. The position of a French bishop in China, where he ranks with the highest grade of local officials and possesses extra-territorial rights, may be contrasted with that of a similar dignitary of the dispossessed church at home. The part played by France in southern China cannot be considered altogether apart from the Franco-Russian alliance, although the moderating power of Germany has altered the perspective of the British view of that alliance. The writer saw a good deal of the "Franco-Chinese Empire" at the period when it was being energetically pushed into public notice in France,

and he wrote with considerable disapprobation of the French colonial method of administration, which consists chiefly in providing armies of *fonctionnaires*. But in one respect he is bound, as an honorable antagonist, to acknowledge a French victory. From the period of his earliest acquaintance with China he has been the advocate of the connection of that country, in its rich and populous province of Yunnan and the Upper Yangtze, with Burma by a railway. The project has been again and again revived, more than one route has been surveyed, but nothing has been done. Meanwhile, France (whose intentions first spurred the writer on to his own efforts in this cause) has been allowed a walk-over in what he originally described as a "race for the Yangtze." Her line from Hanoi (the capital of Tongking), *via* Lao-kai (on the frontier), to Yunnanfu, the capital of the province, is now complete, and surveys are made for the extension to the Yangtze.

The importance of promoting intercourse between the two most populous countries in the world, India and China, so widely different in their circumstances, yet having so many and such vital interests in common, should require no argument. The idea has its foundations in the actual circumstances of the two empires. Essentially commercial and peaceful, both are endowed, though in varied degree, with the complementary resources which, united, would make them not merely a serious antagonist, but dominant in southern Asia. Such an *entente* should and could have been cemented by interacquaintance and intercommunication. In such an understanding would have been, and might still be, found the best guar-

antee for the preservation of the interests of the two empires, a sure means of preserving the peace of Asia. China knows that the policy of Britain, whatever it may have been at one time, is one of commercial expansion and development only, untainted by ulterior designs, and that while Britain wants Chinese trade, other nations want Chinese provinces; and, as China is compelled by circumstances to take a new departure in the direction of industrial and defensive enterprise, she is still disposed to look to Britain as an efficient guide and a safe ally. Better than "disinterestedness" in international relations is an interest which is mutual, clearly avowed and understood, and such is the bond which should cement British India with China. The unique opportunity so long enjoyed for developing our relations with our Imperial neighbor, bound to us by geographical and other ties, has been neglected.

It was our duty to take China into tutelage, to strengthen her by insisting upon reforms. Instead of that, Britain blindly counted on China as an ally against Russia: China, in fact, was to play the part of buffer—*vide*, for instance, the Tibet Convention. Our diplomacy has been devoted to seeking her goodwill, even at the cost of undue deference in the questions of Sikkim, Tibet, and Burma; slights and affronts were met with humility, claims remained unsatisfied or were shelved; "treaty rights" became the synonym for "treaty wrongs." At the same time, China was encouraged against Russia, vague promises of help were held out, and hopes were raised which were doomed to bring nothing but disappointment in their train, until British promises

came to be regarded—so a Chinese statesman in my presence termed them—as merely "from the teeth outward."

In the long run Japan took up the cudgels—not to protect China but herself from the growing menace of Russian expansion, and the result of a war, which might have been averted by a firm Far Eastern policy on our part at an earlier stage, has been the downfall of Western prestige in the eyes of all Asia, and, not least, in those of the natives of India.

Another feature of France's development is singularly paralleled in our own experience, and has had much to do with her comparative quiescence in southern China to-day, as compared with twenty years ago. She, like ourselves, was distracted from the Far East by the possibilities of empire-making on a nearer continent. Just as preoccupation with equatorial Africa prevented our statesmen from devoting any real attention to China in the eighties and nineties, so France found her true colonizing *métier* in the north of Africa, where her special qualities of method and administrative symmetry, and her scientific zeal for communications, are enabling her to build up a great empire. There is one feature of this preoccupation of both France and Great Britain which needs to be brought out. In northern and equatorial Africa—indeed, in almost the whole of that continent—we have a vast reserve for the product of raw material. How valuable that reserve is need not be emphasized here. But in China we have, as every authority has always insisted, the greatest market, as yet only partially exploited, for manufactured goods. If, as an industrial nation,

we need a supply, free from the manipulations of foreign markets, of the raw materials of our industries, do we not equally need to insure, both for the teeming millions of our own industrial population and for those of India, a fair chance of disposing of those industries on equal terms in the markets of the Far East? Elementary as this proposition may seem, it has over and over again been lost sight of by our statesmen, and to-day we have to face not only the handicapping of our goods in the Japanese home market, but their gradual exclusion from Manchuria and Korea, under a system of tariffs and railway rates judiciously framed to favor Japanese goods, without openly infringing the doctrine of the open door.

"How vital is its maintenance," as Lord Curzon has said, "not merely for the sake of our Empire, but for the sustenance of our people, no arguments are needed to prove. It is only in the East, and especially in the Far East, that we may still hope to keep and to create open markets for British manufactures. Every port, every town, and every village that passes into French or Russian hands is an outlet lost to Manchester, Bradford, or Bombay." [1]

If we add Japan to Russia and France we shall bring this statement up to date,[2] but we may also

[1] *Problems of the Far East*, p. 415, by Hon. G. N. Curzon.

[2] The following table, relating to cotton piece-goods, is taken from R. P. Porter's *The Full Recognition of Japan, 1911*. It tells its own tale:

Nationality	1906 Pieces	1910 Pieces
British	10,785,227	6,511,126
United States	8,544,165	1,385,819
Japanese	733,436	2,389,693
Indian	85,003	147,952

console ourselves with the reflection that it cannot now be long before we are able to resume, for the waging of our economic battles, the weapons which, as Lord Salisbury declared, we threw down in a vain attempt to convert the world to free trade.

Before leaving the question of the relations of Britain, France, and Russia in the Far East it may be useful to repeat what was said in 1898 on this subject, because the vast improvement in the relations of the three Powers in Europe have not, so far, been adequately reflected in that Pacific arena which, as a rule, reproduces the European situation. "In China," it was said in the first edition of this book, "England has been completely isolated. Her efforts to achieve something have for years past been rendered futile by a systematic process of thwarting, practised as a fine art, by Russia and France. These two countries, and, later on, Germany, were securing for themselves solid advantages."

The United States is another fresh factor in the Far Eastern situation, and one which cannot be dealt with here in any detail. The writer has elsewhere made a special study of the steps which have led the American republic overseas and established her firmly as a great Pacific Power.[1] Having grown up, as it were, with her face to the Atlantic and her back to the Pacific, it has taken the United States some while to realize her manifest destiny; but, with hostages to fortune in so many parts of the ocean, she is no longer able to maintain an attitude

[1] "The Mastery of the Pacific," 1902.

of aloofness. The American occupation of the Philippines brought many of her statesmen and administrators into contact with the Chinese, and the growing industrialization of their own country also drove them to the search for markets. A brief account of the diplomatic and commercial relations of the two countries has already been given, and it is enough here to say that the United States now has not only a considerable stake in the opening of China, but a great moral influence on the young educated class, which cannot fail to be reflected in future policy.

The whole question of British and American relations with China and Japan must ultimately hinge upon some solution of the problem of Asiatic immigration. This question is so important that it must be dealt with at some length. The writer has frequently insisted that any attempt to differentiate between Chinese and Japanese in international intercourse can only be temporarily successful. Legislation to exclude the one yellow race must ultimately extend to the other. The arguments advanced against one are equally applicable to both, and the whole question tends to resolve itself into the problem of white and yellow. In order to appreciate this it is necessary to review briefly the arguments usually advanced in favor of excluding the Chinese (and consequently also the Japanese) from various countries.

As the first move of this kind took place on the Pacific coast of America (as late as 1880) it is well to turn to the American case first. The Western States welcomed Chinese labor in their early days, and it

was a valuable assistance to them in their pioneer work. Without it the rapid rise to fortune of the Pacific slope could not have been accomplished The beginning of the anti-Chinese agitation on the "sand lots" of San Francisco, under the auspices of a notorious and disreputable tub-thumper, is now historical. Nominally a "trade-union" movement, it soon became political, and having become involved in the tangled web of party politics in America there was little chance that Chinese labor would ever again be considered dispassionately. The conscience of the American people demanded that the Chinese should be vilified to justify their exclusion, and accordingly a vivid picture was drawn of the moral obliquity of the yellow man and the degrading influence of his presence in a white community. Although this libel has been largely discounted by the independent testimony of the white men who know most of Chinese psychology, yet it still survives in some quarters, and therefore a few words on the subject may be useful.

The average Chinese—even the average emigrant —is a very fair specimen of humanity. He is usually educated, despite the very great difficulties of his language, accustomed to a civilized mode of life, has certain fine and even lofty ideals, and is industrious and thrifty. Removed from the influences of the communistic society in which he was brought up, he is liable to lose many of his native virtues, but his vices (with one exception) are emphatically those of the community in which he finds himself, while his virtues are his own. The existence of such a moral canker as Chinatown in San Francisco is due

not so much to the wickedness of the Chinese as to the corruption of the white men's government. No people are more easily governed than the Chinese, but none are more capable of taking advantage of lax or corrupt officials. The statistics of crime show that the Chinese compare favorably with the Americans among whom they dwell, but as a matter of fact they prefer to deal with many offenses themselves. Crimes of violence are not usual among Chinese in their own country, and in western America, where such crimes are deplorably frequent, there are a few cases of a Chinese attacking a white man or woman. The Chinese minister at Washington, in a speech which was (to the writer's knowledge) not confuted, said, in reference to the murder of American missionaries in China, that more Chinese had been killed in the United States within twenty-five years than all the Americans ever killed in China, and that in no single case had punishment been meted out to the white man.

There is, of course, a strong moral argument against forming yellow communities within white ones. The number of Chinese who are likely to bring their wives is small, and miscegenation is as undesirable between white and yellow as between white and black. This objection does not apply to contract labor for fixed periods, but labor unions, especially in America, have set their faces against contract labor. They resent the fact that the Chinese refuse to enter their unions or to fetter themselves by restrictions on their hours of work. The crux of the exclusion of the yellow races is, therefore, found in the intensely protectionist spirit

of the new democracies—for a similar argument is employed in Australasia, Canada, and even South Africa. This argument is assumed to be an economic one—"We are ruined by Chinese cheap labor!"—but, in reality, it must be taken out of the confused region of economics into the higher one of sociology. We must return to this point again; but, in passing, it must be urged that it would be wiser to abandon the "moral" argument altogether. Oriental travelers who have seen something of our own moral atmosphere comment bitterly on the stigma placed on their countrymen. We should be wiser, as well as more just, if we looked at the question fairly and gave the true reason for our attitude.

The history of the American attitude to Chinese immigration follows a sharp, upward curve after 1880. Restriction was followed by exclusion of "coolies," then by the extension of the word "coolie," then by regulations as to the American-born Chinese and the re-entry of those who revisit China. The increasingly strict and vexatious interpretation of the Immigration Acts culminated in the action taken at the time of the Louisiana Exhibition already referred to, and President Roosevelt declared that his country had "fallen far short of its duty" toward the people of China. The awakening national consciousness of China, stimulated by Japanese success, led to a retaliation upon American goods, which constituted, perhaps, the first really national demonstration in China. The boycott had no official sanction, and was even actively opposed by Viceroy Yuan Shih-kai, but it was consistently carried through, not only in China but in Hongkong and

Singapore, and as American trade was growing rapidly it caused genuine dislocation. Cotton-mills in the United States had to be shut down, and, although the boycott was abandoned, American trade, which expected such a large expansion after the Russo-Japanese War opened the door of the East, received a serious check.

The question of the education of Japanese in California schools is merely another sign of the increasing tension between white and yellow. Japanese immigration increased from 2,230 in 1898 to nearly 20,000 in 1903, and there was a strong suspicion that the men, of whom 90 per cent. come in as "farmers," fulfilled the immigration regulations through collusion with certain labor immigration agencies. It was also stated that the Chinese evaded the law by obtaining illegal naturalization. A Federal judge has calculated that, if all the Chinese claiming naturalization were legally entitled to it, every Chinese woman in the country twenty years ago must have had about five hundred children. The situation reflects not only on the ingenuity of the Chinese, but on the corruptibility of the naturalization officials. Despite these evasions it cannot be seriously urged that the actual number of Asiatics constitute a moral or economic danger in States which contain a strong white population. It is different, of course, in a country like British Columbia, where the white settlers are still only a handful. The method of exclusion adopted by Canada is a penalty of five hundred dollars for landing prohibited immigrants and a tax of fifty dollars on each immigrant. The prohibition by the British Colum-

bia legislature of immigrants who could not read or write a European language was disallowed by the Dominion government in 1909, but the strong feeling against Asiatic immigration still exists.

The attitude of Japan toward this question is significant. By 1906 trade between Canada and Japan had shown such signs of increase that the Dominion asked to be allowed to become a party to the original Japanese-British commercial treaty of 1894, without any restriction on immigration. No sooner was this done than a large Japanese immigration into British Columbia began, and anti-Asiatic riots were the result. A Canadian minister was sent to Tokio, with the result that Japan intimated that she would not "insist upon the complete enjoyment of the rights and privileges" to which her position, by the treaty of 1894, still entitled her. In short, while she had been willing in 1895 to accept treaties with the dominions (as with the United States) which involved the exclusion of Japanese immigrants, she refused in 1907 to do more than voluntarily—and as a favor—restrict immigration from her shores to Canada.

In 1894, when the British government agreed to the abolition of its extra-territorial rights in Japan, that country entered into the comity of civilized nations. A commercial treaty between Great Britain and Japan gave privileges to the traders of each, and allowed unrestricted rights and liberties to travelers "in any part of the dominions or possessions of the other." An amending clause, however, added that these rights should not be granted in India or

the self-governing dominions unless they consented. Only Natal and Newfoundland acceded; the other dominions offering to adopt a proviso similar to that put forward in the commercial treaty between the United States and Japan of 1895, but going beyond it in excluding not only laborers but artisans. These terms were practically accepted by Japan, but when the question was discussed at the Colonial Conference of 1897 it was finally decided to refuse the treaty altogether. In the last commercial treaty with the United States the same significant change is noticeable. In 1895 the United States asserted the right to exclude Japanese laborers. That paragraph has been altogether dropped in the new treaty, and the question is therefore suspended, as it were, by a single hair, the real Damocles's sword of the international situation.

It is interesting to note that out of some four and three-quarter millions of Chinese who have left their country for other continents in the last thirty years only four million have returned. Making full allowance for a considerable death rate, this shows a leakage to foreign countries of some four hundred thousand. The possibility of such leakage is therefore some excuse for the American attitude, but it is hard to reconcile Anglo-Saxon ideas of liberty and justice with the attempt made in 1892 to render unlawful residence by a Chinese in the United States a crime punishable by a year's imprisonment without trial by jury. Although this was disallowed, it meets the views of a large section of the American public, and, taken in conjunction with the attitude of the Western nations in forcing their way into China, is a

striking illustration of the adage about orthodoxy and heterodoxy.

The main objection raised to yellow labor on economic grounds is that it lowers the standard and undercuts white labor. All over the world the same phenomenon is to be observed, that the Asiatic can do work as well as, and even better than, the white man, and because of his frugal habits can accept a lower wage. It is frequently asserted that it is the low standard of an inferior civilization which enables him to do this, but no one who has any real acquaintance with the Oriental could accept this dictum without question. What is the essential of a high grade of civilization? Certainly not a high rate of expenditure on material comforts. Who that knows the Chinese and still more the Japanese in their homes—homes where the annual family budget is perhaps only a few pounds —who has seen the grace and dignity with which they invest their small possessions, the etiquette and self-control, the philosophy and artistry with which they are imbued, their attitude toward the family, the Unseen World, and the state—who that has seen all this can be prepared to say that the working classes of the West, with their frank materialism, are a superior type of civilization? We may well ask ourselves if we are not setting up a false standard in this as in other matters; but, even if this standard of expenditure is adopted, a great deal of the agitation against yellow labor will be found to be unjustifiable. The old story that the Chinaman sends all the gold he earns out of the country is by no means accurate. A proportion he will always send, but as he earns easily he will spend generously, and with all his

business cunning he is neither a miser nor curmudgeon and will surround himself with the comforts and luxuries of the country he lives in.

If, therefore, we intend to take our stand on the economic argument, let us not do so with hypocritical pretense that it is the inferiority of the yellow man that makes him dangerous, but let us frankly acknowledge, as the Australian premier has done, that it is the many superior qualities of the yellow man which make it necessary for us to protect ourselves against his competition. In this, as in other ways, the younger democracies are frankly protectionist, and the recognition of the principle of protection is the only logical excuse or explanation for the policy of Chinese exclusion.

The Australian measures for Asiatic exclusion are very stringent, since they include a dictation test—fifty words in "any prescribed language." New Zealand makes the test in "any European language." It must be said that the test is used to exclude undesirable aliens of all races. In the Union of South Africa, although the Immigrants Restriction Act of 1911 failed to pass, the measures for exclusion are of the same drastic character, and arrest without warrant of persons suspected of being prohibited immigrants is allowed.

The Australian's point of view is one that arouses sympathy. His is the only continent which is genuinely homogeneous in race, and his effort has been to keep it as the heritage of a white British race. Unlike the western American, he has not called in foreign or Asiatic help to do his pioneering or to swell his population, and he is prepared to sacrifice

much to preserve the ideal of race solidarity. But, with every appreciation of the Australian attitude, one cannot but regard the facts of the case with apprehension. This handful of white men, some four and a half millions in number, are undertaking a serious task in proposing to hold three million square miles of country in the teeth of four hundred millions of Asiatics who are embarked on that course of national development which invariably leads to land hunger. At present there are only thirty thousand Chinese and thirty-five hundred Japanese in Australia, and the immigration acts make it difficult for any Asiatic to land. The strong point in the Australian case is that they have always discriminated against alien immigration of all kinds, and that the Chinese has not to complain that people of inferior caliber, mentally or morally, are admitted while he is refused. As Mr. Deakin said, it is not a moral objection which influences Australia, but simply the desire to protect her sons from competition. This is an argument which the Chinese perfectly understand, and, although they may regret it, they are too anxious to recover their own "sovereign rights" to protest against the exercise of those prerogatives by another country. The danger for Australia is, therefore, not immediate, but it is none the less an inevitable *sequitur* unless the populations of the Pacific can be better balanced by an enormous increase in the white population of Australia.

The basis of all the acts which exclude the Chinese, disqualify them or the Japanese, or interfere with their freedom of action in foreign countries is not a pharisaical regard for public morality, is not even

only the selfishness of trade-unions, nor the protectionist policy of young democracies. It is rooted far deeper than this in the mysterious barrier which lies between white and yellow as it does between white and black. Relations between races which cannot successfully blend, and which seem to have an instinct against miscegenation, can never be arranged on terms of freedom and equality. In the past our intercourse with the two main yellow races has been complicated by the foolish contempt with which we and they mutually regarded each other. Now it is becoming possible to have a better mutual understanding, and since the peace of Portsmouth and our own alliance with Japan we have made public acknowledgment of the status of a yellow people in the comity of civilized nations. It is possible that Japan expected (and that China also expects) this acknowledgment to be followed by the placing of the yellow man on the same footing internationally as the rest of the civilized races. Such a hope is bound to be disappointed, and it is in the highest degree important that we should make this clear and place our relations with the East on a broad and definite footing before one of those unforeseen "incidents" occurs which outrage national sentiment and make war inevitable. This matter of the relations between white and yellow is not as complicated as that between white and black. We are not dealing with unreason or with undeveloped possibilities, but with a situation and a people with whom we can come to terms on a basis of mutual concession and advantage. They will not question—have never questioned—our right to protection in any form;

they do resent the non-fulfilment of treaties, the vexatious application of laws, and the violation of obligations of courtesy between civilized peoples. If a satisfactory basis of relations can be established there seems no reason why, without any idea of settlement, large numbers of Chinese should not be recruited for certain terms to help on the great works for which the world is waiting. Such temporary immigration relieves the congestion of the country, and by enlarging the ideas of the coolies helps forward the progress of China. The conditions of Chinese society and the peculiarities of Chinese character mitigate all the more obvious evils of such coolie emigration. "Chinese cheap labor" is a world asset which ought not to be allowed to run to waste, for, be it remembered, the value of the Chinese worker is not measured by his "cheapness," but by the excellence of his work.

To turn again to the relations of the Powers in the Far East. Japan, of course, in 1898, was still the hated conqueror, who had inflicted humiliation on China. A portion of the odium which would have descended on her head, however, was diverted to the Powers who intervened, and compensated themselves so liberally for their generosity. Also the vast majority of Chinese never appreciated the fact that the Japanese had defeated the Imperial troops and sunk the Imperial navy. No such news was officially circulated, and at that time unofficial channels for diffusion of news were still few and far between. To the official mind, and especially to Li Hung Chang and the late Dowager-Empress, their defeat, and the superior efficiency of Japan, presented itself in the

light of a revelation, but like many revelations it was only partial. Being still convinced of the ineffable superiority of Chinese civilization, they concluded Japan's success to be due to the use of modern machinery. If killing is really an essential feature of relations between modern states, they said, we must certainly buy some up-to-date killing apparatus. Accordingly, they began to place large orders for guns and armaments, but took few measures to provide the man behind the gun. That Japan handled the situation with tact cannot be denied, for she was always ready with instructors, teachers, and drill-masters, but it was only after her defeat of Russia that China really took to heart the lesson of the awakening of Japan, and since that time the diplomatic situation between the two Oriental neighbors has more than once been strained to breaking-point by their relations in Manchuria.

It is generally assumed that Japan's particular interest in the present crisis has been to preserve the Manchu dynasty, because a republican form of government will introduce a dangerous free-thinking element in the Far East, where religion and government are closely interwoven. It is undoubtedly true that the theocratic basis of Japanese rule may suffer from contact with Chinese republicanism; but, as Japan was the breeding-ground for anti-Manchu propaganda, she cannot complain too much. It used to appear as though she did not mind encouraging what might prove an embarrassment to the Chinese government, but probably this is to do her injustice. A stable and prosperous but not too large and not too united China would probably suit best those

projects of economic and territorial expansion which are dearest to Japan. An alliance of the Oriental against the Occidental races might occur if sufficient pressure were brought to bear from outside, or if the Asiatic exclusion worked up to a climax. At present, however, it is some way off, for China is too weak to afford alliances.

This survey of the international situation began with the premise that Great Britain no longer holds unquestioned supremacy in the sea. It must end with a brief account of what was the logical outcome of that state of affairs—the Anglo-Japanese Alliance concluded in London on August 12, 1905. The preamble of the treaty states its objects as threefold: first, the consolidation and maintenance of general peace in eastern Asia and India; second, the preservation of the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for all nations in China; and, third, the maintenance of the territorial rights of the high contracting parties, and defense of their special interests, which are further defined as existing in Korea and on the frontiers of India. As this treaty was substantially renewed in 1911, it may be convenient to say here that the main difference in this part of the instruments of 1905 and 1911 lies in the omission from the latter of any mention of Korea, which had passed from the stage of "special interest" into that of incorporation with the Japanese Empire. The obligations incurred by the contracting parties vary somewhat in the two treaties. In both of them unprovoked attack or aggressive action, involving either party in war, for defense of its territorial rights

or special interests, makes it obligatory that the second party shall come to the assistance of the one attacked. In the 1905 treaty Great Britain undertook to come to the assistance of Japan in the war she was still waging with Russia if any other Power or Powers joined Russia.

A clause in the 1911 treaty, not found in the earlier one, provides that, in the event of either contracting party concluding a treaty of arbitration with another Power, "nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting Power an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such arbitration treaty is in force." This is an echo of the now somewhat discredited policy of arbitration treaties, advanced by President Taft and seconded by Sir Edward Grey. It was suggested that the Anglo-Japanese treaty, in the event of a war between the United States and Japan, would oblige Great Britain to fight for the latter against the former, even though she might have agreed to submit all questions between herself and the American republic to arbitration. The enthusiasts for a peace policy had begun to dream of arbitration agreements covering the globe like a network, and as a concession to them Article IV gave either party the chance of contradicting out of the agreement. As the American Senate appears to oppose an impenetrable barrier to arbitration proposals, because they decline to waive their right of deciding what questions are and what are not "arbitrable," it does not look as if Article IV made any real breach in the alliance, which certainly, as it stands, binds Great Britain to fight with and for Japan against any unprovoked attack or aggressive

action involving her in war for the preservation of her territorial rights or special interests.

The enormous advantage this treaty gave to Japan at the moment of its conclusion can only be realized when we remember that her heroic efforts had brought her to the end of her financial resources. But it cannot be denied that it also relieved British statesmen of a serious anxiety. The situation in Europe, and the rapid growth of German naval policy, made it necessary to rearrange the distribution of the British navy and to concentrate the bulk of it in home waters. There is at present no prospect of any change in that distribution. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which secures the friendship of the one naval Power whose home waters are in the Pacific, was a covering movement, and has served its object. At the same time, it cannot be forgotten that the British Empire lies partly in the Pacific, and that in Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific coast of Canada we have hostages to fortune whose immunity from attack we cannot permanently assure by our present policy. Australia is founding a small but efficient navy, so constituted as to be easily combined with the British force; New Zealand contributes the flag-ship of the China squadron and adheres to the policy of contribution. Both Australia and New Zealand have adopted universal military training. Canada, so far, places her reliance entirely in the Monroe Doctrine. All these countries enforce strict Asiatic exclusion laws, and could not substantially modify them without sacrificing national ideals. The writer looks upon this question as one which at any time may come to the

front, and doubts very much whether it can be postponed until the dominions are strong enough to maintain their attitude unaided. The awakening and reform of China and the establishment of a more modern form of government are bound to stimulate the national pride and self-respect of Orientals. That there is no way out of the difficulty is not suggested, but that it can be secured through reliance on an Oriental ally must be strongly questioned.

The result of that policy, even in securing interests mentioned in the preamble, is by no means satisfactory, though it may be argued (and has been argued by the present Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir E. Grey) that when we are not prepared to pay the piper we cannot expect to call the tune. The British government which came into office in 1906 was pledged to retrenchment in armaments, and has had a constant struggle ever since to justify that pledge in the light of the competition that has had to be met. In many respects that government has done far better in the field of foreign policy than could have been expected, but it had certainly no mandate for any bold or adventurous policy. If, therefore, Great Britain has had to stand aside, and see her trade conventions slighted, her railway investments in China tied up, and her interests generally suffering, nothing else could have been expected. Manchuria, at the time of signing the 1905 treaty, was (and still is in law) part of China, but Japan cannot be competed with in the markets of Manchuria. Korea, of course, is quite lost. Incidentally, the existing treaty, while nominally securing the integrity of China, cannot apparently be invoked in

the teeth of a secession (under Russian protection) by Mongolia, which has just declared its independence.

The mistake lies in the comfortable supposition that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance secured the *status quo* in the Far East. The *status quo* has been altering all the time, and will continue to alter, and both British and American interests can only be secured by vigilance and determination. As it is fairly clear to every one in the Far East that neither Great Britain nor the United States is in a position to back diplomacy with force, it cannot be a matter of surprise if that diplomacy sometimes lacks effectiveness.

XIII

WHITHER, CHINA?

AS this chapter goes to press China is in the throes of a revolution, and the immediate course of it cannot, with any certainty, be predicted. The ultimate outcome will be a remodeled China, as efficient in her way as the new Japan, and more wealthy—perhaps more powerful. But how much water must flow under the bridge before this goal is reached no one can say. There are too many unknown quantities to be reckoned with.

In the chapter on the New Learning can be traced the very characteristic course of the Chinese renascence. It came through literary sources. Japan's revolution was aristocratic, military, from above. China's has come from below. The gradual spread of printed matter has coincided with an increased intercourse with the West. Chinese students have gone to Japan, Europe, and America, and Chinese of the literary and official classes have traveled and seen the world. One of the features of the revolution has been the support accorded to it by Chinese living abroad, and the rallying-point for reformers of all classes has been found, eventually, in the anti-Manchu propaganda. It is not the intention of the writer to elaborate in this chapter arguments against

the dynasty, which can be found throughout this book. Most of the charges brought against them were written over fourteen years ago, and have not been altered, for the faults of the Manchus in 1912 are the faults of 1898, with the additional grievance that, whereas in the Empress-Dowager Tze Hsi's time there was at least some semblance of a policy, since her death the government have been mere straws on the current. If the current had been purely Chinese the straws might have floated down-stream, but as it is they have swirled and eddied, and finally coalesced into what the Chinese believe to be an insuperable obstacle to progress.

The late Empress-Dowager, before her death, chose to adopt a pro-reform attitude. Edict after edict was promulgated, dealing with the principal abuses found in the kingdom. Some of these were chiefly intended to impress foreign nations, others were concessions to pressure from below. The promise of constitutional government in 1906 and the despatch of an Imperial mission to study foreign forms of government were probably regarded by the Court as an excellent way of staving off a difficulty; but the edict of 1907, which declared that China must, "after careful investigation, proceed to imitate the constitutional type of government," was followed by surprisingly rapid results. Yuan Shih-kai, in the autumn of that year, introduced a new scheme of municipal popular government in Tientsin.

The council was elected by delegates, themselves chosen by popular ballot. The council is not paid, and its decrees are carried out by an executive board of salaried officials chosen by ballot from the coun-

cilors. This microcosm of a parliament met first, after much preliminary educative work, on August 18, 1908, and had the honor of being the first representative assembly in China. By the edict of 1906 the provincial officials had been directed to prepare the ground for local representative assemblies, and in the summer of 1908 edicts were issued convoking these parliaments within a year, and fixing their functions, which were to be purely advisory. At the same time (August, 1908) constitutional government for the whole country was promised in nine years; this was reaffirmed in the following December, after the death of the Empress-Dowager and the Emperor Kwang-su, and the accession of the new infant sovereign. It was not till the autumn of the following year (October, 1909) that the Provincial Assemblies first met, and they conducted themselves with a decorum and, on the whole, a harmony which surprised some observers. It was noticed from the first, however, that they were inclined to assume powers beyond the very limited advisory ones permitted by the edict of the previous year. The demand for a national parliament grew apace, and the next year (October, 1910) saw the second meeting of the Provincial Assemblies and the first of the embryo National Parliament at Peking. The latter was composed of two hundred and sixty-two members: ninety-eight nominated by the Emperor (comprising members of the Imperial family, Mongol princes, Chinese and Manchu nobles, Imperial clansmen, representatives of various boards, scholars, and landowners), ninety-eight representatives of Provincial Assemblies, and the remainder deputies appointed

by the Grand Council and boards. In the year 1910 three largely signed petitions were presented to the government in favor of the immediate grant of a constitution, and the last was sent up by the Provincial Assemblies, and was actually supported by the Senate of the National Parliament. Moreover, when in Kwangsi the Provincial Assembly had a difference with the governor, the Senate supported the Assembly. One of the more important measures of the National Parliament was the appointment of a commissioner of foreign affairs for each province—a decentralization of power, since hitherto all foreign relations had to be referred to Peking.

But, although on the surface the advance toward representative government appears to have been both orderly and rapid, the Chinese reformers were not satisfied. The changes which were made in deference to the pressure of public opinion did not go to the root of abuses which lie, very largely, in the Manchu system of nepotism. The Dowager-Empress Tze Hsi, not long before her death, issued an edict abolishing the special privileges of the Manchus, and recommending mixed marriages, thus endeavoring to mitigate the offensiveness, to Chinese eyes, of the presence of a ruling caste. But under the régime of her successors the reactionary Manchu nobles regained power, and the position of the Imperial clansmen and bannermen, as "eaters-up" of the people, holding a large number of administrative posts and enjoying a living which neither they nor their fathers had earned, was not to be altered by a stroke of the pen. Changes made in the forms of government at Peking were illusory—a square table

instead of a round one and the same reactionary gang dominating the councils. Moreover, in the Palace itself (although the writer believes some of the stories as to this to be exaggerated) the old evil Manchu custom of eunuch domination, and consequent intrigue and corruption, ran riot. Administrative reform is impossible when the stream is poisoned at its source, and true parliamentary government was believed by the Chinese to be impossible with a Manchu *camarilla* always at hand.

We come, therefore, to the revolution of 1911, and the sudden emergence from obscurity of Dr. Sun Yat Sen as the leader of a republican party. Born in Honolulu in 1862, Sun was educated as a Christian at a mission school, and later on was a medical student at Dr. Kerr's Hospital at Tientsin, whence he went to join the staff of the Alice Memorial Hospital in Hongkong. His first attempt at private practice was in Macao, but owing to the customary prohibition of any practitioner not possessing the Portuguese diploma, he had to move to Canton, where he became involved in the reform plots of 1895. The Canton plot was betrayed, many reformers were captured and executed, and Dr. Sun escaped with a price on his head. He was a political fugitive from that time till January, 1912, when, in answer to a cable from the reform leaders in Shanghai, he landed there and was shortly after proclaimed the Provisional President of the new Chinese republic. In the six years of his wanderings he has never ceased the work of propaganda, and at the same time has visited and studied many countries. His adventure in 1896, when he was kidnapped and kept prisoner in the

Chinese legation in London, is too well known for repetition. Had he not succeeded in communicating with a friend outside, he would doubtless have been deported to China, and would have paid forfeit with his life. On Europeans with whom he comes in contact Dr. Sun makes a most favorable impression, being obviously a man of genuine enthusiasm and single mind. While other Chinese reformers, even Kang Yu-Wei, have fallen into disrepute with their countrymen, Dr. Sun, who has handled very large sums of money for his compatriots, has remained poor, and is of the utmost simplicity in his habits.

Just before he sailed for China the writer had two long and intimate conversations with Dr. Sun, and was empowered by him to state authoritatively the plan of action which the reform party intended to put into action should it gain ascendancy. The first and unshakable resolve is that the Manchu dynasty must go. Next, they designed to set up a provisional government, with Dr. Sun as its President. There will be three periods. First, a period of martial law, during which administrative abuses will be abolished. The second period will be "conventional"—that is, carried on by means of conventions between the military and local elected bodies. Three years later it is hoped that the country will be ready for a federal constitution, when the President will abdicate, and a new National Assembly, with two chambers, will be elected and will promulgate an organic law. Dr. Sun does not wish the Chinese republic to follow closely any existing model, and proposes to retain two features already familiar to China—the Board of Censors, who form an inspec-

torate and have the power of impeaching for dereliction of duty any offending official, and the method of selection for administrative posts through a literary competitive examination.

So far the progress made by the Republican party in China does not promise a smooth path to success, and yet the first and most vital feature in their programme seems to be nearly assured. At the time of writing the Imperial family still hovers on the edge of abdication, but there seems to be little doubt that they must accept the terms offered. In their consternation they sent for Yuan Shih-kai, who had been sent into retirement some years before, after the death of the Empress-Dowager Tze Hsi. Yuan did not respond immediately to their appeal, and when at last he arrived at Peking he did not betray any very striking signs of constructive statesmanship. The reform party captured Wuchang, Hanyang (with its arsenal), Hankau, and eventually Nanking. Fourteen provinces seceded, Canton and many other cities went over bodily to the Republicans, and disorders began to spread in the northern provinces. Massacres of Manchus, retaliation by Imperial troops, self-immolation by women fearful of falling into the enemy's hands—all the familiar features of revolution in China are there, though not comparable with rebellions such as that of the Taipings; but so far foreigners have been protected, and there is no doubt that they will be safe so long as the reform leaders can control their following.

Any attempt to bring the history of the revolution up to date would be useless. It is only possible to describe the issues in broad outline. At present the

Manchus demand the submission of their position to the will of a National Assembly. The reform party, whose headquarters are at Nanking, do not trust such an assembly, as is not unnatural. Few of them would adventure themselves in Peking, where a price is still on the heads of some. Yuan stands between the dynasty and the Republicans, and it is still possible that he will form the bridge between the old and the new order by becoming President of the republic. But Dr. Sun and his followers appear to distrust the viceroy; and, again, they cannot fail to remember that he betrayed the reform movement in 1898, and that till quite recently he has thrown his weight into the balance for a limited Manchu monarchy. The contest for the leadership between Yuan Shih-kai and Sun Yat Sen is unequal in some respects. The first is a high official, with great administrative experience, who raised and organized an army—the first real modern army in China—and who commands, moreover, the attention and respect of the foreign legations and press. Dr. Sun is a scholar, a scientist, and therefore likely to be esteemed by his countrymen. He has obviously imagination, devotion, and courage. He is trusted by young China, but he has neither military nor administrative experience, nor the prestige of official rank. In compelling Yuan to acquiesce in the abdication of the Manchus (even although the viceroy may again change his mind) he has won the first rubber. In justice to Dr. Sun it must be said that he appears to be devoid of personal ambition, and has expressed his willingness to yield to Yuan his place as leader. But he has to reckon with his followers.

Whether or no the republican form of government is suited to China is a question which only time can answer. China already possesses the essentials of a democratic government, but (as is explained in other chapters) she has also, superimposed, a highly centralized system, which unites her parts to a single head. No people on earth are, in all probability, less likely to trouble about the label worn by their central government, but if the new republic is an autocracy in everything but name it will come into collision with the newly formed and ambitious provincial assemblies. The question of state rights and federal rights will be the more difficult to settle because under the old régime the provincial treasuries were perfectly independent so long as they transmitted a fixed sum to Peking. Moreover, in the very incomplete and chaotic state of the national army the "martial law" period would be impossible for a central government to enforce.

The possibility of a split in China has to be faced. So far as it was developed to me by Dr. Sun there was nothing in the Republican scheme to adequately replace the Throne and dynasty as the focus of Chinese social and political life. The Emperor does not occupy the semi-divine position of his neighbor in Japan, but he does occupy a position as the apex of the social and political structure—as the Son of Heaven, and therefore the intermediary between his people and the Great Unseen, to which no popularly elected President can be elevated. The Emperor of Japan has magnified and elevated his office; the Manchu dynasty have brought theirs into contempt. Probably it must go, and as the idea of reviving a

native Chinese dynasty — there are peasant representatives of the Mings to be found, or the descendants of Confucius—does not seem to appeal to the Chinese imagination, there seems no alternative save a republic. The danger is that there may be more than one—China has split several times before, and if the strong sectional spirit which has been discerned in the recent movement continues it is likely that she will split again.

One change which is almost inevitable, sooner or later, is a change in the capital. Peking, lying in the extreme north, is further exposed by the Russo-Japanese control of Manchuria, the complete possession of Korea by Japan, and the threatened Russian "protection" of seceding Mongolia. An administrative center nearer the heart of China, and particularly its great artery, the Yangtze, will become imperative, and in the writer's opinion should help to secure any new Chinese government from the pressure which the geographical position of Peking has hitherto enabled certain foreign Powers to bring to bear in emergencies.

Long ago General Gordon gave the Chinese advice which they have never forgotten—"Move your queen bee to Nanking"—and as a historical fact Peking is a Mongol, and not a Chinese, capital.

Whither, China? is indeed the vital question of the day, for upon the answer depends the fate of nearly one-fourth of the world's population. What the caliber of these people is may be partially judged by readers of this book. What their future may be under wise and prudent guidance no one can estimate. For Great Britain and the United States, who have

no territorial ambitions in the Far East, the awakening of China is of supreme interest on account of its reflex action on themselves. Their commercial policy must be profoundly affected by the opening of so great and populous a country to modern influences, and their foreign policy cannot leave out of account the future strength and possible tendencies of the awakened giant. But for one who visited China, studied her and her people, and succumbed to her fascination at a time when she was still little known in Europe and America, the predominant feeling at this moment is one of satisfaction that her people are strong enough at last to throw off the Manchu blight, and of hope that their sterling and virile qualities and admirable powers of organization will carry them through the necessary initial disorders toward the haven of a stable and respectable government.



SKETCH-MAP OF CHINA AND MANCHURIA SHOWING TREATY PORTS AND RAILWAYS

APPENDIX I

MEMORANDUM *RE* RAILWAYS

RAILWAYS built or being built with *foreign capital* are:

The Chinese Eastern Railway, about 1,100 miles; Russian control.

The South Manchurian Railway, about 803 miles; Japanese control (main line, 437; Mukden-Antung, 189; branches, 177).

These are the Manchurian lines, and are working.

Imperial Railways of North China (Peking-Mukden), 601 miles (main line, 522; branches, 79); British and Chinese money; running.

Peking-Hankau Railway, about 755 miles; Franco-Belgian money; running, and redeemed by China, 1908; branches, 60.

Tientsin-Pukau Railway, about 635 miles; Anglo-German money; in construction; nearly completed except the Yellow River bridge.

Shantung Railway, 256 miles; opened 1904; branch, 28; German.

Szechuan-Hankau Railway, about 800 miles.

Hankau-Canton Railway, about 750 miles.

These lines are provided for under the so-called "Four Nation Contract" (England, France, Germany, and United States) negotiated in 1911, which has been the subject of general protest, and *ostensibly* the pretext for the

present revolution. (Work not begun; under contract.)

Taokau-Tsinghuai Railway, about 96 miles; British capital, redeemed by issue of bonds, 1905.
Shansi Railway, 151 miles; Belgian.
Kaifeng-Honan Railway, 140 miles; opened 1908; Belgian.

Shanghai-Nanking Railway, 193 miles; British money.
Canton-Kaulun Railway, about 110 miles; British money.

Both now open to traffic.

Yunnan Railway, about 300 miles; open; capital and control French.
—Total 6,818 miles.

Railways built and building with *Chinese capital* and *by Chinese engineers* (though not entirely so) are roughly as follows:

Peking-Kalgan Frontier Railway, about 360 miles; 124 miles open to Kalgan; balance under construction.
Sunning Railway, 55 miles.
Swatau-Chaochau, about 24 miles.
Tungkwan-Honan fu Railway, about 166 miles; under construction.
Kiang-si Railway, about 80 miles; under construction; Japanese engineers.
Anhui Railway, about 150 miles; under construction.
Chekiang-Kiangsu Railway, about 220 miles; Anglo-Chinese capital; work suspended.
Fukien Railway, about 33 miles.

And a few minor lines, about 100 miles; under construction.
—Total, 1,188 miles.

APPENDIX I

In addition, there are about *3,000 miles* of railway, projected to be "China built," but, as noted already, many of the schemes are in abeyance.

The statement shows a total of 8,006 miles built or building, but the data obtainable are in some cases conflicting, and the figures are only given as approximate.

According to M. E. de Laboulaye (*Les Chemins de fer de Chine*, 1911) the sum which China will have to disburse in order to repurchase existing lines is no less than 1 milliard 407 millions of francs (say, £56,280,000), or more than one-third of her total exterior debt. In tabular form details are given from which the following is taken, showing the share of the different countries interested.

	Francs		
France	205,000,000		
France and Belgium	41,000,000		
France, Britain, Germany, U.S.A.	150,000,000		
Britain	165,000,000		
Germany	66,138,000		
Germany and Britain	200,000,000		
Japan	231,882,000	(approximate)	Manchurian Railways.
Russia	348,000,000	"	
Total	1,407,020,000	(say, £56,280,000)	

Two-thirds of the railway network, in the opinion of M. de Laboulaye, belong to foreigners—one-third to Russia and Japan, and the other third to France, Germany, Britain, Belgium, and the United States.

APPENDIX II

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Boy, a male personal attendant or general servant.
Cangue, or "wooden collar," the Chinese form of pillory, in which the neck and hands are confined.
Cash, the Chinese copper coin, with a square hole in the center, used for stringing.
Cathay, the medieval name for China.
Cattie, 1⅓ lbs.
Chifu, a prefect.
Chihtai, governor-general, usually superintending the affairs of two provinces.
Chin Chin, commonly supposed to be a corruption of the Chinese sounds *Ching Ching*, now generally used by Europeans as a form of greeting.
Chop, ❧ mark; term generally applied to a trade-mark and to a stamped official document.
Comprador, the chief Chinese employee in a foreign firm; the middle-man between the firm and the Chinese.
Coolie, a laborer or porter.
Fan Kwei, "foreign devil," foreigner.
Fan tai, provincial treasurer.
Feng shui, "wind and water," a system of geomancy.
Fu, a prefecture.
Futai, a governor of a province.
Ginseng, a root, greatly prized by the Chinese for medicinal purposes; found in Manchuria and imported from America.
Godown, a place for storing goods.
Haikwan, Chinese maritime customs.
Hanlin, the National Academy of Peking, admission to

which is gained by competitive examination, conferring great distinction on those who are successful.

Ho, a river.

Hong, a mercantile firm, a building used as an office.

Hoppo, an official, usually a Palace favorite, appointed to certain provinces as head of the native maritime customs.

Hsiang, a village.

Hsien, a district.

Hu, a lake.

Hui, a club or association.

Hui Hui, a Mohammedan.

Kiang, a river.

Kiao, a sect.

Kitai, the Russian name for China.

Kotow, literally "hitting the head on the ground," an act of prostration formerly demanded by the Chinese from foreign envoys.

Lamas, the Buddhist priests of Tibet, who live together in lamaseries.

Li, a Chinese mile, ⅓ of an English mile.

Likin, an inland tax, well known from its being imposed on foreign goods in transit.

Ling, a hill, peak, a pass.

Lingchi, the punishment of "slicing to death," inflicted on parricides and others.

Loess, called by the Chinese *hwang-tu*, a brownish-yellow earth, the chief physical characteristic of northern China.

Loti Shui, a terminal tax, imposed on goods arriving at their destination.

Mafu, horse-boy or groom.

Mandarin, a Chinese official.

Miaotsu, the aborigines of certain provinces.

Pailau, commemorative gateway or arch.

Peking Gazette, the official gazette published at the capital.

Picul, 133 lbs.

Pu, a board of government.

Red Book, a quarterly publication containing the names, titles, salaries, etc., of all officials.
Samshu, Chinese spirits, distilled from rice or millet.
Shan, a mountain.
Sheng, a province.
Shihye, a secretary—a great power in all *yamêns*.
Squeeze, generic term for extortion, official and otherwise.
Sycee, ingots of silver.
Ta Tsing Kwo, "great pure kingdom"—the Empire of China, the Manchu dynasty having been known as the *Ta Tsing*, or "great pure" dynasty.
Tael, 1⅓ ounces of silver in weight; now about 3*s*. 4*d*. in value.
Tao, a circuit or group of departments.
Taotai, an intendant of circuit.
Tientzu, "Son of Heaven," the Emperor.
Tsung Tu, governor-general, usually superintending the affairs of two provinces.
Tsungli Yamên, the bureau at the capital which was supposed to deal with foreign affairs, replaced by the Wai wu-pu.
Yamên, an official residence.

APPENDIX III

THE IMPERIAL BUDGET FOR THE YEAR 1911 (CHINA YEAR-BOOK, 1912)

REVENUE

	Taels
Land Taxes	49,669,858
Salt and Tea Taxes	47,621,920
Customs Revenue	42,139,287
Sundry Taxes	26,163,842
Likin	44,176,541
Government Property Receipts	47,228,036
Sale of Official Ranks	5,652,333
Miscellaneous Income	35,698,477
Sale of Government Bonds	3,560,000
Total	301,910,296

EXPENDITURE

Central Government:	Taels
Foreign Department and Foreign Affairs	2,783,287
Diplomatic Expenses	343,726
Constabulary	4,352,040
Financial Affairs (under the Tuchihpu)	111,249,315
Education	2,747,477
Army	77,915,890
Navy	9,907,946
Law	6,643,828
Yuchuanpu	37,569,097
Industry	5,453,833
Colonial Affairs	1,688,559
Total	260,745,003
Provincial Government:	
Details not given	37,703,362
Total Expenditure	298,448,365

APPENDIX IV

FOREIGN LOANS OF CHINA, SHOWING THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING ON JANUARY 1, 1910 (CHINA ASSOCIATION REPORT, 1910–1911)

		Original Amount		Amount Outstanding January 1, 1910	Repayable in
7 per cent.	Silver Loan of 1894	Sh. Taels	10,000,000	4,360,000	1914
6 "	Gold Loan of 1895	£	3,000,000	1,000,000	1914
6 "	Gold Loan of 1895 (Chartered Bank)	"	1,000,000	400,000	1915
6 "	Gold Loan of 1895 (issued in Berlin)	"	1,000,000	333,333	1915
4 "	Russian Loan of 1895	Frs.	400,000,000	305,709,749	1931
5 "	Anglo-German Loan of 1896	£	16,000,000	12,806,685	1932
4½ "	Anglo-German Loan of 1898	"	16,000,000	14,249,216	1943
5 "	North China Railway Loan of 1898	"	2,300,000	1,988,541	1944
5 "	Canton-Hankow Railway American Loan, 1900	G. $	2,222,000	2,222,000	—
5 "	Cheng-Tai (Shansi) Railway Loan of 1902	Frs.	40,000,000	40,000,000	1932
5 "	Shanghai-Nanking Railway Loan, 1904	£	2,900,000	2,900,000	1953
5 "	State Loan, 1905	"	1,000,000	262,500	1915
5 "	Honan-Kaifeng Railway Loan, 1905	Frs.	41,000,000	41,000,000	1934
4½ "	Hankow-Canton Railway Redemption Loan, 1905	£	1,100,000	660,000	1915
5 "	Taokow-Chinghua Railway Loan, 1905	"	795,800	795,800	1934
5 "	Canton-Kowloon Railway Loan, 1907	"	1,500,000	1,500,000	1936
5 "	Peking-Hankow Railway Redemption Loan, 1908	"	5,000,000	5,000,000	1937
5 "	Shanghai-Hangchow Railway Loan, 1908	"	1,500,000	1,500,000	1937
5 "	Tientsin-Pukow Railway Loan, 1908	"	5,000,000	5,000,000	1938
5 "	Hsinmintun-Mukden Railway Loan, 1909	Yen	320,000	320,000	1926
5 "	Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan, 1909		2,150,000	2,150,000	1933
5 "	Tientsin-Pukow (Supplementary), 1910	£	3,000,000	3,000,000	1938
Boxer	Indemnity under Protocol of 1901, carrying Interest at 4 per cent.	Haikuan Tls.	450,000,000	422,767,714	1941

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